Arquivo de etiquetas: Paris 2015

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius V

Achieving Large Global Goals 

We are in a challenge unique in history, unprecedented, to bring a global scale, environmental threat under control. And unfortunately for the reasons that I ticked off earlier, the eight extraordinary features of this challenge, this is one of the toughest challenges that humanity has faced as a peacetime challenge. So we have our work cut out for us.

Some people are pessimistic, are cynical, believe that the vested interests will win, that the short-sightedness is inevitable, that politics can’t agree on anything much less something as complicated as this. Or that it’s humanity’s fate to have to suffer massive climate derangement cause we don’t pay attention and we don’t take care of ourselves. I think we need not believe any of that kind of pessimism or cynicism. And we do need to take heart, again, as students of history in the fact that good things happen. Big changes do take place. Social movements can be successful in creating very large-scale, indeed global, very positive change. And this is really the topic that I’d like to explore with you in this final chapter.

1052How we can help to bring about large-scale social change, that is the change to help make the world safe, to respect the planetary boundaries, to achieve sustainable development, generally and specifically to honor the 2-degree Celsius limit as a limit of safety, a guardrail for the world environment? To do that the basic lesson of social change is that not only are governments needed at the table, businesses needed at the table, academics, scientists, experts needed at the table, we as global citizens are also needed at the table.

Large-scale social change occurs ultimately through large-scale social movements. It’s the public, it’s civil society that raises its voice and says, we need to be heard because it’s our safety, it’s our children’s safety, it’s the safety of future generations that we care about that need respect and need attention now. These social movements often start with small groups of very dedicated, committed and very brave people, but they do tap into a moral spirit widely shared. They tap into a knowledge base that can be demonstrated and proved and by being based on fact as well as based on ethical values, widely shared, they can turn into very large-scale social change.

I think about some of the most important of these movements in the last couple of centuries. Think about the fight about ending slavery. Slavery was pervasive. It was the norm at the end of the 18th Century.  A small group of committed activists in Britain at what was becoming the height of the British Empire, said, this is morally wrong, abominable. We need to end the…first the trafficking and then the presence of slavery in the British Empire. It may seem obvious to us, how could anybody defend slavery, but slavery was strongly defended within England itself, of course with the huge slave industry and in other parts of the world. But Wilberforce and Clarkson and others persisted over the course of decades. And quite astoundingly and wonderfully the moral case became the dominant social reality and then the political reality. And slavery was ended in the British empire in 1833. It took a war in the United States to end slavery. Step by step slavery was seen as the abomination that it was.

And by the end of the 19th Century in most places, but still not in every place today, slavery was eliminated. But this is an example of how a moral principle can finally turn into a political inevitability. Ending colonial rule was seen as something impossible to achieve when Gandhi began his campaign in India in the early 20th Century. And by the end of the century it was again, a near inevitability. Not complete, not total by any means, but the mindset, the ideas about what is right and wrong about one people politically dominating another had changed fundamentally in the course of the 20th Century.

The civil rights movement and the anti-apartheid movement similarly required the bravery and genius of a Martin Luther King, Jr. and a Nelson Mandela, but those ideas became widespread ideas. And when one looks at social attitudes today in places that were virulently racist a generation or two generations ago, social attitudes also do change over time.1053

And now we’re in a battle for women’s rights, for the freedom of sexual orientation, new social mores that come through brave people saying, this is right, this is our moral stake in this, this is something which society more generally needs to embrace. And I think the evidence is that these magnificent and large-scale social changes, starting with very brave, small groups of people but through persistence finally spreading through society can fundamentally change the direction of the world as a whole.

In the last 14 years I’ve been very privileged to be a part of what many of you are also part of and that is the fight to end extreme poverty. The idea that extreme poverty is an anachronism, absolutely needs through directed efforts brought to a close of human history is an idea that was adopted by world leaders at the beginning of the new millennium in the Millennium Development Goals. They have not ended extreme poverty by any means but they have played their role and extreme poverty is coming down as a proportion of the world’s population and in the new phase that will follow the Millennium Development Goals, it’s within reach for governments to say, we can end extreme poverty. The idea is there, the progress is there, the momentum is there and the moral commitment is increasingly taking hold around the world.

Climate change and sustainable development more generally is another case where we need a worldwide reorientation of what we do, how we live, and the morals with which we live. And it was interesting and not just interesting, I would say notable and very important that when the world leaders came together on the 20th anniversary of the Earth Summit, as I described earlier, at the Rio+20 summit in June, 2012 in Rio de Janeiro. At that point, they looked at the Millennium Development Goals and said, that is social action that’s working, we have treaties, we have law, we have negotiations but they’re not working as they need to, we need to look at the lessons of the Millennium Development Goals. In other words, we need to bring society to the table of sustainable development.1051

And in the outcome document of Rio+20, the conferees made a very valuable contribution and I want to read it. You see it here on the screen. We recognize that the development of goals could also be useful for pursuing focused and coherent action on sustainable development.

These goals should address and incorporate in a balanced way all three dimensions of sustainable development and their inter-linkages. By that they mean, economic, social and environmental. We’ll also underscore that STGs should be action oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all countries while taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities.

We are in that sense part of a new social movement. The public is coming to the table, the sustainable development goals of which one headline goal will be a safe global climate, gives us the opportunity to help create a worldwide public understanding and public demand for climate safety and for the other features of sustainable development. It’s in that context that the DDPP, the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project arose, because Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in the aftermath of Rio+20, we need a global network of problem-solving. And he created the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the SDSN.

And I’m very privileged to be the director of that. He created that network in order to bring together scientists, engineers, business leaders and civil society leaders, precisely for the kind of problem-solving in which we’re engaged. And the DDPP is a great flagship of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network. It’s an example of civil society, in this case experts from around the world, largely from academia and from other knowledge-based institutions, coming to the fore and saying, here is how this particular problem of deep decarbonization can be solved.

And we’ve learned a lot that we’ve been emphasizing through these lectures, through the DDPP process. We’ve learned a lot about problem-solving itself because we’ve had to solve the problem of how to make our process work, which is not an easy…easy process by any means to actually find these pathways in a constructive manner that can help the world move towards a meaningful climate agreement.

We’ve identified in the SDSN and in the DDPP some of the strategies for success in achieving big social goals. The first part of success is set goals. This I think is absolutely fundamental, because without the goal we have no direction. With a goal, stay below the 2-degrees Celsius in order to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system, we have goal. We have something we can hold onto. And as President John F. Kennedy said about setting goals, “By defining our goal more clearly, by helping it seem more manageable and less remote we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.” So not only do we need goals but we have to define the goals more clearly, make them seem more manageable as we hope the DDPP process is doing. And specifically to make the goals seem more manageable we have to identify pathways o achieving those goals.

What we have called backcasting. Look at 2050, where we need to be and ask, how are we going to get there from where we are today in 2014? We need R&D roadmaps, a point that we’ve emphasized to overcome existing hurdles. We’re going to need to demonstrate successes of some of these technologies. We’re going to need to build momentum of civil society.

And then rapid scale up, mass public education and of course, deepening the political and the institutional framework by reaching meaningful agreements in COP21 and similar kinds of frameworks in other areas. It’s obviously a huge undertaking, but sustainable development defines the most important agenda of our generation. Earlier generations faced their specific challenges, ours is the challenge of a very crowded planet, pressing against planetary boundaries, threatening survival itself of millions of species, the well-being, the survival of humanity itself. And so we must take on this challenge.

And we must take heart from the success of earlier vast social change actions as I’ve noted. It may see awfully hard to accomplish this. Some of the technological challenges seem absolutely daunting. Can you really take the core of the world energy system and within 25 or 30 years change it to a low carbon energy system? The answer, the evidence says, is yes, if we really work at it. If we direct our attention and direct our technological change in the needed area.1054

As I’ve said, I was inspired in my youth by the moon shot. By President John F. Kennedy standing in Congress and saying early in 1961 that he recommends that the United States accept the challenge of putting a man safely to the moon and bringing him back safely to earth by the end of the decade. And what’s absolutely interesting about that among so many other things is that when President Kennedy made that call to action, there was no plan to do it. He wasn’t referring to the accepted engineering reports that said exactly what the blueprint is. It took NASA more than a year to come up with the, the basic ideas and then it took brainstorming and problem-solving and heroics and brilliant engineering, a lot of resources and a major sustained commitment through the entire process. In 1962, in talking about this attempt to go to the moon, President Kennedy said something that I believe resonates today in the spirit of the challenge that we face in climate change and in all of this deep systems transformation and technological change that we’re going to need to undertake, he was talking to a public that was asking, is this too hard, can we do it? And President Kennedy said, “We choose to go to the moon.” We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.

Because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills. Because that challenge is one that we’re willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone and one we intend to win, and the others too. And I can tell you as he spoke at Rice University in a vast open stadium that day, the applause were phenomenal, because the public rallied to this.

They said, this is, this is something we can do. This is a challenge we are willing to accept. Fundamentally we need the world around the table. We need the experts. We need the engineers. We need the governments. And we need us as civil society. And we need to do this at a time that is extraordinarily difficult, because we’re talking about climate change at a time where we’re also facing a lot of war, a lot of conflict, a lot of battles that are not only devastating in and of themselves but taking up the energy, taking up our attention, turning us away from what really counts for our long-term survival.

And so fundamentally we are going to have to find a way to cooperate on what is important, find a way to turn away from the violence and the war and find a way to cooperate peacefully for decades to come. And as I close the course I want to close one more time with President Kennedy who pursued peace in 1963 and very much with a vision that by doing so we could turn to science and to the arts and to cooperation and to public health and to other goals. And he faced a big challenge then. The world was deeply divided then as it is now. And he had to urge Americans and the world about the capacity to cooperate.

So I want to close with my favorite lines of President Kennedy about cooperation itself, but you’ll see that they really resonate when it comes to our specific challenges, fifty years later. President Kennedy said, “So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet, we all breathe the same air, we all cherish our children’s futures and we are all mortal.” Thank you for being in the class. I look forward to being together with you in the next semester.

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius IV

Can Everybody Win? Should Everybody Win?

We’re discussing in this lecture the structure, the shape of COP21; of the agreement and the premise of a negotiation in general as I’ve emphasized is a Pareto improvement, that the participants in the negotiation come out of the negotiation feeling that they’re better off than they were in the business as usual trajectory and the question that

I’d like to ask is can everybody really win in a climate agreement and an important second question is should everybody win? It all depends I suppose on one’s perspective. I’ve emphasized repeatedly now that there are many different divisions at the negotiating table.1041

There are the divisions of the rich and the poor countries. There are the divisions of the fossil rich and the fossil poor countries. There are divisions between producers of the fossil fuels and the consumers of the fossil fuels, not as countries but as players in the market, and here I’m thinking about the private companies, the big oil companies Exxon Mobil or Chevron or BP and others versus the consumers on the other side. Not only the consumers of their products but people who will then experience the results of climate change.

And another division which I’ve emphasized although only briefly is the different perspectives of the present and the future generations. Now here we have a little bit of an advantage. Only the present generation is present right now. The future generations don’t get their direct say, but they do have a strong interest. They’re not really at the table except through us, except through our logic, our moral commitments, our cultural imperatives, but we need to understand that future generations really are at the table.

They have interests and the question is, are they winners in this process? Under business as usual, they’re surely losers but how can both the present and the future generations be winners in the process? Well, let me come back one more time to this basic diagram that I introduced earlier where on the horizontal axis we had the income of one group of countries and on the vertical axis the income or the well-being of a second group and I’m imagining that these two groups are negotiating with each other for an agreement starting from inside the potential well-being line at business as usual and trying to reach the cooperative point.

Now in this final use of this curve I’m using the country one grouping to be the oil exporters. Countries like the Gulf states, Venezuela, Canada, Australia, which are significant exporters of fossil fuels. And I’m using in this case on the vertical axis the oil importing or the fossil fuel importing countries that are buying these carbon rich energy supplies from the first group of countries. And as usual, both groups are at the bargaining table and in principle one could have a Pareto improving outcome in which both the oil exporters and the oil importing countries are better off. But think about the ways that the policy choices are typically discussed.

Well, we’ve not focused in this course on the details of policy choices of how to move to the low carbon economy. At this point emphasizing mostly how does one achieve a low-carbon economy.

We know that to move from coal fire power plants to wind and solar power or to move from internal combustion automobiles to more expensive electric vehicles something has to be done through regulation or through emissions permits or through carbon taxation to tilt the balance in the marketplace towards the lower carbon option. And remember of course that the whole theory of this is that we should be willing to spend a bit more of our resources than we’re now spending on the carbon rich infrastructure to spend it on a low carbon infrastructure because we’re going to come out way ahead in the long term by avoiding climate disaster and so the idea is that while the alternatives right now may look more expensive when you add in the social cost of carbon to the market cost of carbon then these alternatives either are or through research and development could be made to be the best cost alternative.

But how do you tilt the consumers or the market behavior in that direction. You may regulate, no more coal fired power plants without carbon capture and sequestration. No more internal combustion engines after 2030. You can only buy light duty vehicles that are…have zero tailpipe emissions. That’s one way to do it. And the other way we know is to tilt the market prices through corrective pricing. For example through a carbon tax that’s levied on the use of coal, oil and gas. And suddenly wind and solar power and electric vehicles look like the better deal.

Suppose we go that second option which has been the preferred option in the European Union for example to use a tradable permit system. We know that the implication of that kind of policy or not an equivalent but closely related policy of putting on a carbon tax is to raise the price of carbon fuels to the consumer but by driving down demand for those carbon fuels to lower the price received by the producers.

So the typical strategy right now not necessarily wrong in any way but the typical strategy is let’s push demand away from coal, oil and gas by creating a price wedge between what the consumers pay, a high price, and what the producers receive, a lower price and that will move the economy to a safer, lower emitting, 2-degree C limit kind of economy of our pathways.

All fine and good; absolutely right from a climate point of view but what I’m illustrating here is one absolutely plausible outcome that the world thereby moves to a higher aggregate level of well-being by avoiding climate disaster but it does so with a big improvement of the oil importing countries because they not only have a safer climate but they now pay a lower market price, not as consumers but the price that is actually net of tax paid to the oil exporters. They get a double benefit.

Whereas the oil exporting countries, say Saudi Arabia or Australia or Canada would face a lower world market price because demand for their products from other countries has gone down. Yes, they’re compensated by a safer climate, but maybe they’ve taken a big hit in their revenues and the way that I’ve drawn it here is that instead of reaching a Pareto improving outcome, that is along an arrow that goes from the southwest to the northeast, maybe the arrow goes to the northwest, that the oil importers are way better off but the oil exporters while living now in a safer climate also have seen their market really, really cut sharply and therefore they would say that’s not a mutually beneficial outcome, that’s just a punishment of the oil countries.

Now what could be done? What could be done for example would be a transfer of income. Let’s say that the oil importers impose a carbon tax and that has the effect of shifting us to a safe energy system but the losers are the oil exporters and the oil importing countries that have collected this tax on oil use could transfer some of the revenues to the oil exporters.

That probably would seem a little bit shocking to a lot of people. Indeed, when I once proposed it they said you’re heretical. How dare you give money to the oil exporters, they’re damaging the world. We’re not going to pay for them, we’re not going to compensate them. I mention this to raise the point. Can everybody benefit from an agreement? Should everybody benefit from an agreement?

Should is on the basis of principle, ethics, morals, legal judgment, responsibility, can is more of an economist’s question. I can tell you it’s possible to compensate oil exporters, even oil companies for a loss of their market income that may come from putting on a carbon tax. The should is another question. Is it really true that every party to the negotiation should walk away feeling better off? Maybe some of the oil exporters should walk away a bit unhappy that well, there goes our market, only compensated by the fact the climate will be safer and they were the polluters in the first place. My point is that there are different standards of outcome.

You might say a Pareto improving outcome is what we’re after. You might say no, no, polluter pays, I’m not interested in the polluter being compensated in any way. They’re both absolutely pragmatic and sensible standards. They contradict each other. And from a practical negotiating point of view it’s complicated. Because it could be that the oil exporting countries become a blocking coalition to say well, these negotiations are all fine and good in saving the climate and saving the world along with it, but why should we be the big losers in all of this? We’ll stop that until we’re compensated.

This is for us to discuss and debate in the global online negotiations next semester. This is for the world to discuss and debate. But as a practical matter, let me make a point. The oil exporting interests have been a blocking coalition in practice. Maybe not in the literal way that I’ve just described it, but there’s no doubt that the resistance to strong climate action has been greater among the net fossil fuel exporting countries than it has been among the net fossil fuel importing countries.

By and large, with exceptions within the European Union, most of the European Union is a net fossil fuel importing region and it’s also a region experiencing a lot of climate devastation. On both counts, the European Union is the world leader in saying we must take climate action. But in other parts of the world where countries are fuel exporters, for instance Canada and Australia, the politics is much, much less interested, let’s put it that way, in a climate agreement because the real weight of the politics is powerful interests of the fossil fuel industry who are saying why should we bear that cost?

I’d say the same is certainly true in the case of Russia. A massive fossil fuel exporter and so far not so interested in a strong, low-carbon climate deal, perhaps because of the specific interests involved.

And so it’s worth us to ask the question who are these big fossil fuel entities, wh1042at kind of role do they play in the negotiations, are they a blocking coalition, what kind of sharing of the costs and benefits would be a reasonable approach to reaching a full deal and I just want to share with you a few tables showing how concentrated in fact the fossil fuel resources are.

Coal, for example, is so concentrated that five countries alone have about three-quarters of the total world’s coal supply, the U.S., Russia, China, Australia and India. And you can imagine within each of those five countries there are very, very powerful lobbies, politically influential that say don’t go there to a low-carbon agreement.

On the next graph, I show the oil reserves. Same story, actually.1043 If I take groupings of countries, the five big groupings constitute in fact the three-quarters of the total proved oil reserves. These are the Gulf countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), that’s Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and neighbors, it’s Venezuela with its vast oil and unconventional, both conventional and unconventional oil reserves, it’s Canada with its massive unconventional heavy oil, the oil sands of Alberta, it’s Iran and Iraq. And these countries obviously also have very, very strong interests in the market price and the future use of petroleum.

And if I turn to the next of the three resources, natural gas reserves, once again there is tremendous concentration of the proved reserves f natural gas. A1044gain, the Arabian peninsula is so central to this story of course, next comes Iran, Russia with its vast natural gas deposits, Turkmenistan and Venezuela. Combined these five countries, the top five holders of natural gas reserves, account for two-thirds of the total reserves. So we see that this is going to be complicated, these negotiations, and there is a question about what these countries will demand, that’s perhaps more evident.

What they might receive, what they should expect on a practical and on an ethical basis in a worldwide transition to a low carbon economy. One thing we can say for sure, and I would like to point it out to all of the oil countries and oil exporting countries and companies, if carbon capture and sequestration works, then the space that is opened up in the carbon budget is expanded and this is why all of the fossil fuel producers have an enormous stake in proving and from their point of view demonstrating if it’s right, the feasibility of large scale carbon capture and sequestration.

And it’s why that group of countries and the companies that I’m going to introduce at this moment also should be major financiers of the testing, the research, the development, the demonstration and if successful the diffusion of carbon capture and sequestration. Now I’ve talked about the oil reserves and production in terms of countries but of course there’s some very, very major players in the world. Those are big oil companies. Some are privately owned, others are state owned and they are extraordinarily powerful actors in the world scene. They’re among the major largest countries it’s almost right because of their scale, but companies in the world and they are absolutely in my opinion the most powerful political lobby in the world.

They’re an enormously successful industry. Massive in scale, massive in wealth, massive in technological capacity, massive in determination for more than 100 years the oil companies have basically gone anywhere to the most remote places to the…to Siberia, to the middle of rain forests, to absolutely difficult terrain to the deep oceans to extract oil and sell it and they’ve made vast fortunes doing it but one has to marvel at the technological might and fortitude of this industry.

But when you look at the bottom line, the bottom line is absolutely amazing.1045 Fortune 500 has its list of the top companies in the world measured by revenue and take a look at the top ten. Wow. Of the top ten, number one, number three, number four, number five, number six, number ten are oil companies. Extraordinary. And number seven is the power distribution company of China, so you have Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation, British Petroleum, the State Grid Corporation of China, and Total. Giants in the world, the biggest companies in the world. Seven of the ten Fortune 500 companies are in the oil sector.

They have a voice, believe me. Two of the remainder…remaining countries…there I go again…two of the remaining three companies in this top ten list are automobile companies. Major users of petroleum. We have number eight, Toyota, and number nine, Volkswagen. It’s fair to say that nine of the ten companies in the top ten of the Fortune 500 are therefore basically in the petroleum sector and it’s not surprising how powerful this sector has been and continues to be. It has to be at the table in my view in these negotiations, it absolutely has to put its vast financial might into the research and development of carbon capture and sequestration because that is ultimately its long term license to operate.

The tenth remaining company on this list is Walmart a retail giant of phenomenal reach. It’s interesting that Walmart has been pursuing a strategy of trying to press tremendous energy efficiency through its supply chains and it’s been involved very much in…in trying to bring its supply chains in agriculture as well and there as a consumer facing company where consumers are saying what are you doing for the environment? Walmart perhaps feels that more directly than the big oil giants. Here is a…an undeniable story and reality that we absolutely need to face and to understand in the coming months of negotiation. We’re talking about the core of the world economy when we talk about the energy system. We’re talking about the very biggest companies in the whole world.

We’re talking about major countries that have strong national interests, reasons of state and a massive part of their economies involved in energy production and in the export or import of primary energy resources. In other words, the stakes are very high if the logic is of finding a way to create an agreement in which there is widespread benefit shared in a way that is…that enables us to get to that agreement, we’re going to have to face the realities of this concentration of fossil fuel resources and fossil fuel economic and political power in the coming months.

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius III

Climate Financing

I want to say some words about a very complicated and unsolved and unsettled area: climate finance. This is a complicated topic because it covers a tremendous range of issues, but involves broadly speaking the question of how the world both individually as governments and collectively through international organizations and institutions and through market forces internally within a country and internationally will finance the transition to a low-carbon world economy and also will finance other parts of the climate challenge including adaptation to ongoing climate change.

There are many categories of need and many issues about how this financing can be allocated, who’s to pay, who would be the recipients, what are the terms of the financing?

There are many kinds of financial instruments that might be considered and there are aspects of financial regulation as well. All of this points to the underlying fact that the category of climate finance is a big one and it means a lot of things and a lot of different things to a lot of different groups.

I want to sort out some key aspects of the climate finance issue, but don’t pretend in any way to find a clear bottom line because as of now there are still too many issues in play and not yet the clarity of either concept or magnitude of financing that will be needed for the whole transition process. Well what are the kinds of areas that need financing when we consider the transformation to a low-carbon economy and when we consider life in the midst of anthropogenic climate change?

The first category is the core financing of our energy-related infrastructure. This is the biggest single item of finance. It is a multi-trillion dollar amount of financing each year. Remember that we are in a world economy of nearly a $100 trillion per annum at this point. And the economy globally continues to grow at around three to four percentage points per year, meaning that it doubles roughly every twenty years. Maybe by 2035 or 2040 it will be at a scale of $200 trillion.

Typically, infrastructure would be a few percentage points of that. That means the investments in power generation, in transmission, in roads, in rail, in airports, in port facilities and in other physical infrastructure, dams, levees, coastal protection, inland waterway infrastructure and so forth might total somewhere between three and five percent of the world economy.

So we’re talking about total investments on the order of roughly three to five trillion dollars a year. And that’s why when we think about climate finance, which does not include the totality of infrastructure, but certainly includes power generation, the transmission grid, the road and rail network which constitutes the core of the domestic transport, ports and airports, those are expensive and large amounts of investment. And in this sense, climate finance is a trillion, trillions of dollar a year activity.

Many questions are raised as to how this financing will get done, especially given the fact that we’re going to have to direct a lot of that financing towards investments that may be at a higher market cost than traditional investments, in other words, costs of power generation that may be more expensive apparently than investing in a coal fired power plant, but less expensive when we take into account the social cost of carbon.

And so to direct massive amounts of investment to sustainable low carbon infrastructure will require all of the normal means of financing, budgets of the government, state financial institutions, the private capital markets, the retained earnings of private companies that may be generating power or managing rail and so forth, plus new instruments of regulation and carbon pricing such as of course tradable emissions permits or a carbon tax.

But the basic idea is that this universe of trillions of dollars of infrastructure finance must continue, but change course under the pressures of regulation, carbon pricing, and other systematic parts of the deep Decarbonization pathway and be directed towards a low-carbon core infrastructure. This is one part of the overall climate finance puzzle. Some of the others of course are ways to pay for other categories of activities that we’ve been talking about at length.

Another part of the climate financing is the financing of the research, development, demonstration and diffusion of low carbon or zero carbon technologies. So this is another category, the RDD&D financing. Then there is a category of financing which is financing for infrastructure in part, but is directed towards the needs of the poorest countries.

And here the Green Climate Fund that has been established under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change is under the agreements that have been reached by the parties to be a major instrument for financing infrastructure and climate adaptation of low-income countries. It is to be one of the main ways that a specific pledge of a $100 billion per year from high income countries for low income countries should be implemented. But the details of the role of the Green Climate Fund and how it will be financed, which countries will contribute, whether it will go to the market and how are still being debated and, and are as yet unresolved.

Then it’s been recognized under the Framework Convention that in addition to the financing of the new power sector or a new low-carbon transport there will have to be considerable financing for adaptation itself. Some of that is for the soft infrastructure of behavior and redesign of settlements ensuring that people are living outside of what will become new flood plains under changing climate conditions.

But also the hard infrastructure that protects low-lying areas such as The Netherlands, or New York City which are each implementing very large scale, tens of billions of dollars hard infrastructure. And I’ve just added a picture for you of many of the so-called Delta Works for this most famous of low-lying countries, The Netherlands, the low-lying lands of Europe, which has been battling the sea level for all of its existence, but as ocean’s levels rise and as storms become more intense, 1031The Netherlands, which is perhaps the world’s leader in the technology of adaptation to sea level pressures has, is now implementing a project of more than a hundred billion dollars over the coming decades to protect itself against the changing ocean conditions. This famous Delta Works program is cutting-edge technology. It includes dikes, dams, levees, storm surge barriers of tremendous innovation and creativity because the designers and engineers are always balancing the physical protection with the protection of the ecosystems as well.

Now in New York City, we don’t have Delta Works quite in the same way, but Manhattan and other parts of New York City are also low-lying coastal zones that experienced a tremendous flooding during Super Storm Sandy. And in response to that, the New York City government under former Mayor Bloomberg put forward a twenty billion dollar plan like Delta Works, just illustrated in part here with new flood walls and surge protection barriers and so forth, showing that the adaptation agenda is partly behavioral and it’s partly hard physical infrastructure and financing of adaptation is going to be also a very pricey item given of course the fact that the climate related hydro meteorological disasters are now claiming also massive, massive losses of infrastructure and not to mention lives per year.1032

This brings us to another category of funding, agreed, but still not designed for losses and damages, experienced especially by poor countries. We don’t have an adequate global insurance system against hydro-meteorological disasters.

The low-income countries demanded it, they got assent in COP19 in Warsaw. And such a financing of losses and damages is now on, on the table for design. We also need financing for more general ecosystem protection and resilience. And here the global environment facility, which was created in part under the Framework Convention and partly under the Convention on Biological Diversity plays the unique role in the official world of financing resilience and protection of natural ecosystems and also human managed ecosystems. Well I hope that the list makes clear how complex this topic is from hard physical infrastructure of power generation and transmission and roads and rail to ecosystem functioning, protection against storm surges, research and development, help for the poor and compensation for losses and damages. The climate finance agenda is obviously extraordinarily complex.

What does financing even mean in this context? Of course it means financial resources devoted to these challenges, but the nature of those instruments is also extraordinarily varied and heavily debated I might add. The rich countries have promised the poor countries a hundred billion dollars in finance by the year 2020. But what do they mean by that? Do they mean private sector financing? Do they mean foreign investment? Do they mean loans? Do they mean grants? There are many categories of finance and some require repayment, others are essentially transfers. And when it comes to something as significant as the hundred billion dollars promised by the rich to the poor countries, the answer is we don’t know because it hasn’t been negotiated yet.

And there are very, very different opinions about it. I mention here some of the categories of finance, hardly exhaustive. Of course grants mean direct transfers of money that don’t need to be paid back. Loans are moneys that require repayment. The interest rate on those loans can be below market at which, in which case these loans are called concessional loans, or they could be at market terms.

There are also ways to extend guarantees to an agent, could be a city government that wants to borrow on the market in order to build infrastructure. And an outside entity, say the World Bank or the African Development Bank or another government could say, we will guarantee the repayment of the loan so you can borrow that funding on preferred terms.

And there is neither a grant, nor a loan but a credit guarantee which may come to almost the same thing as a loan. There can be insurance protection against various kinds of risks. There can be liability protection where a government says you build the carbon capture and sequestration facility, we will bear any of the liability that results if there’s an accident, if there is leakage, if there is loss of life. If there’s some other industrial problem, we’ll bear the responsibility. This is a, a big issue for nuclear power also where often governments take the liability of nuclear power even though the power company itself is in the private sector.

There are specific instruments on a flow basis where governments may say, we’ll buy directly from you a renewable energy producer at a preferred price, a so-called feed-in tariff. This is another powerful instrument of financing, it’s using the public purse itself, not in handing out a loan or extending a grant, but in paying for a service. And government procurement of machinery or government procurement of infrastructure or government payment for energy services is also part of climate financing.1033

Project financing means to finance a complex project such as the grand Inga Falls that I discussed earlier where perhaps $50 or $60 billion dollars could produce a 40-megawatt, sorry, gigawatt facility in.of hydropower in Central Africa. And that kind of project financing is itself a very complex challenge with multiple kinds of financial instruments included within the single project and the money coming from all different kinds of partners.

And as I discussed briefly about public-private partnerships for research and development, in general RDD&D programs are also multi-stakeholder. They have their own distinctive financial arrangements. Sometimes an inventor is given a prize, sometimes an inventor is given a patent, sometimes an inventor is told, if you make this invention, we extend your patent on another invention. Sometimes an inventor is just given a grant, use this money, hire staff and run your laboratory. So there are many, many ways to finance research and development programs.

All of this is to say that when we think about climate finance, not only are there multiple categories of financing, but there are many instruments of climate financing as well.

And finally I want to emphasize how many potential actors there are in financing, in providing in essence the saving that will go into the new low-carbon infrastructure and other low-carbon systems that are part of the deep Decarbonization pathways. So some of the actors of course include the private sector, the financial sector which raises bonds or equity for private investors. A lot of the financing is public. For instance the role of the public in building roads and rail in most countries and power in some countries. In the United States the power sector is heavily private, but in other countries the power sector is largely public investment.

Then there are many international financial institutions whose job it is, backed by governments, to provide funding to member governments. And the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the IBRD, colloquially known as the World Bank is a major funder of infrastructure projects in its developing country member states. Other multi-lateral development banks include the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank. And now there are some new development banks that are started also. The BRICS Infrastructure Bank that is being created.

So there are many multilateral players as well. Many countries have national development institutions which are specialized institutions, either for tapping the market or collecting deposits where the loans are for usually public sector infrastructure. And this form of institution will play a major role as well. There are the new sovereign wealth funds, especially of natural resource exporting countries that collect their revenues in, at a very large scale and invest these public revenues in the private international marketplace. And sovereign wealth funds command vast, vast sums now, some of which will be directed towards the low-carbon infrastructure. There is the new Green Climate Fund which I mentioned briefly just a moment ago which has been established under the Framework Convention to Finance Low-income Countries. The Global Environment Facility which I mentioned earlier. And distinctively within the private sector financing are a set of institutions that are almost by nature oriented or at least should be oriented towards long-term investments.

These are institutions that take not the site deposits of a commercial bank, but long-term inflows that don’t pay out for decades to come. Pension funds would be the quintessential example of this. And pension funds have vast asset bases at this point of trillions and trillions of dollars. And they are natural investors in long-term infrastructure such as low-carbon power generation or electric public transportation and so forth. Similarly insurance companies that are providing for example life insurance would take in vast sums and make investments for the long-term. And they’re another candidate for transforming long-term international saving into the long-term investments that will be required for financing a low-carbon infrastructure.

The final point that I want to mention about climate financing is it’s not only about the money, but about the rules for deploying the money. And one of the most interesting and perhaps powerful ways that funding can be directed towards low-carbon projects and away from high-carbon and high climate risk projects is through new reporting and disclosure requirements on the private sector itself.

Many companies bear a tremendous amount of climate risk that isn’t necessarily exposed to the marketplace. An oil company bears the risk that it may end up having to strand its res…its, its oil reserves because as we’ve discussed, we can burn all of the oil, gas and coal reserves that we have, but those reserves are typically reflected in the market capitalization of companies.

And there is now an effort to say to companies, you must disclose your vulnerability to assets being stranded. There is an important carbon tracker initiative which is battling out in, in public right now with the different companies saying, your assets are at risk of stranding and your investors need to know it. And the companies often come back and say, we’re going to burn all that we want or we’re going to ship all that we want. But in fact there is a carbon budget and investors are going to need to know about it and the oil companies are going to be priced with an appropriate understanding of the true carbon budget.

More generally, even outside of the fossil fuel sector companies have a lot of exposure. They may be big carbon using countries–companies and big CO2 emitting companies. And in the event that the price of CO2 charged to these companies goes up through a carbon tax or through a tradable permit system, or implicitly through regulation, companies that are big energy users are going to find that also they are going to bear the cost of their heavy CO2 emissions. And a number of disclosure initiatives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project are saying to companies, you must describe your CO2 emissions in detail so that investors know what the risks are.

And very recently the large-scale global insurance and reinsurance industry has said the same thing, companies must disclose their risk to climate-related disasters, both so that insurance can help to cover those risks so that investors know what the potential losses are and so that investments that shouldn’t be made in flood plains or in areas of great risk of drought or great risk of other kinds of extreme events shouldn’t be undertaken in the first place and disclosure can warn away investors who otherwise might naively invest in such projects.

I wish I could draw a bottom line. The only bottom line I can tell you is that we have tens of trillions of dollars of investment at stake over the coming decades in climate financing. This is a highly varied, very complex, a multiple actor framework that we’re going to need. A lot still needs to be built. A lot of new institutions will form and a lot of thought is going to have to go into ensuring that the financial resources are available to carry out what the world needs to accomplish and that is the transition to a low carbon world energy and infrastructure system

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius II

Technology RDD&D

Where we’re outlining how the negotiating process and agreement could bring us to a meaningful 2-degree Celsius framework for the COP21 agreement. And in this chapter I want to talk about the technology development that needs to underpin an agreement.

Of course we have many powerful technologies that we have already talked about, renewable energy, other low carbon energy sources, even advanced technologies like carbon capture and sequestration which are already deployed at a very small scale that can bring us forward and help to reduce carbon emissions. But as this whole course has shown and as the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project has made very clear in detail for 15 major emitting countries, we will need improvements in low carbon energy and in energy utilization, in energy efficiency, in urban planning and design in order to be able to combine the economic development and growth that we aspire to, the population increases that are underway and the significant reductions of global carbon dioxide emissions.

How are we going to get those technological improvements? Sometimes it’s said and argued that technology comes from the business sector, it comes from inventors and entrepreneurs who see an idea, develop it. Maybe a team of scientists with a new discovery looking for profitability under patent protection. And that is a model for certain kinds of incremental technological changes. In our patent system, which is now a worldwide patent system, an inventor of a new useful technology or, or process can file their invention and have a exclusive right to use that new product for example or that new technology for a period of twenty years from the date of filing.

That’s like a temporary monopoly. It means if this is a really good idea, that the demand will be high, the inventor or the holder of the patent will be able to charge a monopoly price. The argument is that granting that monopoly price while distorting the market by reducing the use of that technology relati veto what a competitive market would allow is an important incentive for the invention in the first place. The monopoly profit that comes during the twenty years of the life of the patent is what gives the incentive in this vision to the invention in the first place.

No doubt some part of technology advances that way. But for the kind of massive changes of technology that we are going to need to achieve the 2-degree C limit, we’re going to need to have a faster pace of technological change and a more directed path of that change as well in order to overcome identifiable obstacles that are preventing for example the large deployment of electric vehicles more in, on a more speedy basis or the large deployment of carbon capture and sequestration, or are leaving the public with such high anxieties about nuclear energy that even though it’s a zero carbon energy source, in many countries there’s strong public resistance to the deployment of more nuclear power.

In order to get the technologies where they are going to need to be for their rapid scale up and worldwide dissemination, we’re going to need to target the technological change, not leave it to the market alone. The market will still play a role, private companies will still be looking for the profits that they can earn under patent protection for discoveries that they make. But we’re going to need to go farther in directed technological change. Do we know how to do that?

The answer is and I think it’s a surprise to many people, that is an absolutely normal way for technology to change, especially for important classes of technology. Throughout the centuries governments have been driving technological change.

1021There’s a famous book that many people know called Longitude which is a story of how the British government offered a prize for inventions that could help sailors and especially the British navy know the longitude of the ship, which was otherwise very difficult to do. And in order to direct technological innovation towards being able to determine the longitude a prize was given and that was an added incentive for invention. The outcome was a remarkably accurate clock that could be used to keep exquisitely precise time on ships despite all the rolling of the vessels and by knowing the time at the ship and knowing the time in London and knowing the declination of the sun, it was possible to measure longitude more precisely than had ever been done before.

It’s an early example of governments using their financial power to direct technological 1022change. Well the 20th Century is absolutely filled with stunning examples, both led and very often they have been led by the military as well as for many, many kinds of civilian use or in some cases, originally for military purposes and, and then it turned out that the civilian use became an enormous part of the contribution or the, the predominant part.

Perhaps the, the most striking and famous of such cases in the Manhattan Project, which was the, the crash effort of the United States government to bring together the world’s leading nuclear physicists to develop an atomic bomb at a, in what was thought to be a race with Nazi Germany. And from a technological scientific point of view it, it’s an astounding historical experience, because in a few years atomic science, the ability 1023to harness the new quantum mechanics, the remarkable innovations of technological advance in managing uranium based fuels and fuel processing all took hold and of course the atomic bomb was developed. It’s perhaps not the most heartening example from the point of view of, of military application when we’re talking about saving the world from our own destruction through human induced climate change, we obviously are looking at a peaceful imperative. But still the Manhattan Project tells us something very important about directed technological change, about the capacity to push a major technological advance in an extraordinarily short period of time, in that case, by recruiting some of the world’s greatest geniuses and under the pressures of war.

Well I grew up as a young boy in another such example of a massive government led effort. My childhood was spent listening to the radio or watching the television of one space shot after the next, from the earliest days of the Mercury mission that put an American astronaut into suborbital flight, chasing the Russians who had gotten into space first and then following President John F. Kennedy’s call to go to the moon to bring, to have a man travel safely to the moon and return safely to earth before the end of the 1960s.

And in really what is an absolutely astounding demonstration of what was the U.S. extraordinary engineering technological and scientific capability of that decade, from 1961 to 1969, a government led mission, led by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, succeeded in putting a man on the moon, Neil Armstrong and several others that followed and bringing the astronauts back safely to earth, all within a very short period of time, a little over eight years. It was a massive outlay. It required tremendous technological advances, but it was done within the course of a decade. The list is long.

One can include the internet itself which began as a project of the U.S. defense sector to find ways to protect computer information in the event of nuclear war. It aimed to allow computers to share information with each other. It became the global internet over time, but it was directed technological change, again, harnessing engineering brilliance and within a few decades it created a technology and an industry of such transformative power that it is felt in every sector of the world economy as our most fundamental technological driver of our time.

And with the advances of the internet, the computer industry pushed again by the U.S. and other governments through massive public-private partnerships. We’ve had advances in almost every other major area of science in human health and in biology. Of course the genetics revolution has been a partner and close part of the overall information revolution.

And it’s notable that once again the United States government set a goal in what became known as the Human Genome Project. Said, within 15 years we should sequence the entire1024 three billion base pairs of a human genome. And they did it well before the end of the 15-year period. It was a public-private partnership. Private companies were involved. Public laboratories at U.S. universities, international universities. In the end there was a bit of a race to the finish line between the National Institutes of Health and a private company that said, we know how to do it better and faster and that competition was also exhilarating and made important breakthroughs in genomics sequencing.

And interestingly after the first human genome was sequenced at the cost of many billions of dollars and after a bit of experience, in 2001, the National Institutes of Health of the United States came together with leading scientists and said, what should our next goal be on the human genome? Now they were in 2001 and the cost of sequencing the genome at that point was estimated to be about $100 million dollars. Around the table the scientists said, let’s aim for a $1000 dollar sequencing protocol and system. One thousand dollars when you’re at a hundred million? They said, yes we can reduce the cost dramatically and if we succeed in doing so we’ll have enormous benefits for medicine, for personalized healthcare, for many biological discoveries, for many advances in other biomedical technologies.

And you know within 14 years that effort succeeded as well and the $1000-dollar per genome sequencing is now a reality. It didn’t just come through market forces, through patent protected rights. It came through a race towards that goal that was instigated by the National Institutes of Health, that was heavily funded by the U.S. government that said, benchmarks, timelines and scientific expertise in order to accomplish the goal. Well my list that you’re looking at on the screen is a long one. Fundamental particle physics, identifying the Higgs particle, one of the most important scientific discoveries of modern times about the nature of, of matter itself was a huge intergovernmental effort that cost billions of dollars and made a transcendent scientific finding as a result.

We live off of Moore’s law, that is the improvement of semiconductor capacity that’s allowed for a doubling of the number of transistors on an integrated circuit, roughly every two years since the late 1950s. That’s why our phones have computers more powerful than NASA had in the 1960s, why we’d had about a billion-fold reduction of the cost of process of storing and transmitting data. That didn’t just happen by itself. Of course private companies like Fairchild or Intel played an essential role. But there was a strategy to it, there was industry-wide road mapping.1025

There was a cooperative effort to set milestones and find technological solutions and create industry-wide standards to keep Moore’s law going decade after decade after decade, giving us the information revolution

All of this is to say we need the same kind of directed technological change for low carbon energy, as we have had in these other areas. It’s a proven process. It’s breathtaking in the creativity and the excitement and the advance that can be unleashed. It includes the public sector, the private sector, the foundation sector, all as partners in such an effort. It means setting goals and technological specifications. Setting milestones and timelines for technological advances. Of financing that comes from multiple directions, from the government, from the private sector, from philanthropists. And one final point that I would note is it is expensive.

These technological breakthroughs don’t come for free. We have to invest in them. But when we’re talking about a $90 trillion dollar world economy that could lose significant output value, not to mention loss of life on a large scale, we should be ready to undertake expensive investments in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars if necessary in order to make the breakthroughs in the coming years that will be necessary.

What are those areas going to be? Well Emmanuel Guerin has gone over them in detail. Let me just mention them very briefly again. We need to test the feasibility of large-scale carbon capture and sequestration. We need safer nuclear power and nuclear power that is perceived to be safer by the public and therefore publicly acceptable. And we need good solutions for the storage of intermittent wind and solar power and for regional grids that are heavily dependent on large penetrations of wind and solar and other intermittent renewable energy sources. We need high quality electric vehicles.

We have many already but we need them at lower cost and with an infrastructure that leads to very large-scale consumer acceptance, so that by the 2030s the entire light duty fleet of the world is electric vehicles. We need important breakthroughs in decarbonizing key industrial sectors which as we’ve noted in this course are some of the most recalcitrant in terms of getting the CO2 emissions down. Iron and steel, cement, petrochemicals, pulp and paper.

1026And we’re doing to need technological efforts on agriculture, land use and forestry to help support more biological storage of carbon dioxide and thereby shift the balance from the current direction of carbon emissions from the land use sector to carbon storage in the land use sector in the decades ahead. And technology can play an important role in that process.

These ideas should be incorporated in a quite fundamental way in the COP21 agreement because in that way we will overcome hurdles and also give confidence to the countries of the world that if they chart deep decarbonization pathways the means to accomplish those pathways will be at hand.

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius I

The Three-Tiered Structure of Mitigation Commitments

Welcome to theglobal online negotiation will put you at the negotiating table as a delegate to work out with fellow citizens around the world a meaningful climate agreement for 2015, one that I count of us being able to deliver and to say to the world leaders, here it is, here a kind of agreement you should have and if you don’t come up with it, well the world’s citizens have.

So I’m looking forward to participating together with you as delegates to the global online negotiation next semester. And therefore in this tenth and final lecture of this semester, I’d like to talk about the structure of the negotiations at COP21, how they can produce a meaningful agreement, an agreement to achieve the 2-degree Celsius limit on mean global temperature increase. And to do that in this chapter one, I want to talk about a kind of structure, a three-tiered structure for an actual agreement.

Now these three tiers are not the only parts of a climate agreement, indeed, in further chapters of this lecture I’ll talk about some of the other parts of an agreement in terms of financing for instance.

But here I want to talk about the logic of an agreement on mitigation. What would it mean to agree to a 2-degree Celsius limit for the world as a whole? And for that purpose let’s go back to the three kinds of interactions that I discussed in lecture nine.  The poker game, the brainstorming around the table and the conductor-less orchestra, because I think that all three have some role in the negotiations. What’s being discussed now mostly is the poker game. That’s been the tradition of the negotiations up until now. What are we going to agree to? How do I make sure as representing country one that I’m not giving up something relative to country two? And we’re going to have that kind of bargaining no doubt and we’ll have absolutely that spirit to some unavoidable extent, also to some logical extent to make sure that the commitments are shared.

The first tier of any agreement is likely to be some legally binding contributions or commitments of countries in the relatively short-term. Say up to the year 2030, the agreement to be reached next year will only take force most likely by around 2018 and maybe begin its period of implementation around 2020. And perhaps the next phase envisioned within an agreement would be 2030. Governments are saying to others, what are you ready to put on the table that is a firm commitment on emissions levels across the greenhouse gases and that can be monitored, reported, verified and that will be binding for you? Now that’s the poker game. It is not going to deliver a 2-degree Celsius ambition. Why? First, it’s too short-term for that. In order to deep, deeply decarbonizes, we’re going to need decades, not decade, so any real deep decarbonization program needs to have a horizon well beyond 2030 to mid-century and even beyond because we know that if our goal is to reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide by 2050 to say between 10 and 15 billion tons, we’re going to need as a world to reduce net emissions to nearly zero or to zero net emissions perhaps by 2070 to 2080.

So the second tier is going to have to give us a longer-term framework to begin with, 2030 can never do it. The other problem with focusing only on the short-term in that baseline poker game is that it can, it can trick you. It can lead countries to short-term improvements hat are kinds of dead-ends, that are limited progress but have a lock-in effect that don’t allow the countries to go further. This is evident in the United States with some of the sentiment right now to shift from coal fired power plants not to wind or solar or nuclear or zero emitting electricity, but to natural gas. And the argument is, well that’s an improvement. Going from coal to gas, that’s a good thing. And that would be built say into a 2030 scenario. The problem with that however is that while gas burns more cleanly than coal, an economy based natural gas is not an economy consistent with the 2-degree C limit. It would be emitting far, far more than would be permissible under a carbon budget of 2-degree centigrade. So the second tier has to be longer-term. And of course given our experience in the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, we feel quite strongly from our own experience and from the logic of the project itself that every country should put forward a deep decarbonization pathway, at least to the mid-century.

Those DDPPs are a little bit like the score that is on the musician’s stand in the conductor-less orchestra, that is the music that will be played. It’s not music under a contract that says, you play that, that’s legally binding and verified. More, it is the, the theme music that together around the world countries will play in order to make the sounds of, of 2-degrees C. In other words, to make the music that can really change the direction of the, the temperature and the energy system. It is to put it in other terms, part of that thinking through and implementation process, how can we really get to where we need to go?

Now there’s a third part of this puzzle around the table and that’s the fact that we don’t have solutions at hand that are quite good enough for what we’re going to need. Again, in the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project, many country teams had a very, very difficult time to have their models combine the assumed quite rapid economic growth for the developing countries for example and the deep decarbonization together with that growth.  And when the models were pushed on that, the models said, our technological assumptions are rather cautious, rather static. If we’re going to be able to decarbonizes more deeply, of course we’re going to need breakthroughs on technology.

This should be the third tier of an agreement.  If the first tier is for the short horizon, legally binding, the second tier is the pathways for the middle of the century. The third tier or component of an agreement is a serious worldwide effort to make breakthroughs on technology.

What is called the RDD&D framework. The research development demonstration and diffusion framework. This is not the kind of agreement unfortunately that has been negotiated in the past. When one looks at the Kyoto Protocol or the drafts that were circulated for Copenhagen, or even the discussions that are underway now, the components that I’ve just outlined of short-term, legally binding contributions, intermediate run pathways and a major constructive effort on technology has not really been a framework in place.

And one can see in the tensions that result, the failure to have that integrated frame has made it very difficult to reach agreements on any  particular component. Countries resist being pushed farther in terms of legally binding commitments beyond what they feel is already sure and available technologically. Without the technology building component, we also will not develop those improvements that will open up the space for much deeper action.

And yet without the pathways that guide us and tell us that it’s not enough to go from coal to natural gas, but we have to go from coal to zero carbon electricity, or nearly so, without those pathways, then we don’t even have guidelines on what the technological needs and obstacles that we must overcome really are.

So it’s that integrated framework that is the kind of framework that can carry us forward. In the next chapters, let’s look more deeply at the issues of technology, the issues of finance, and the issues of public mobilization and support of a bold agreement.

Main Challenges of Climate Change Negotiations V

Problem-Solving Versus Negotiating

I want to talk about the, the nature of the negotiating process and more generally, the nature of the problem-solving process of the 193 governments that are party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Let’s go back to an earlier picture, really the core of the logic of negotiation itself. Remember we talked about, in the first chapter of this lecture, the idea that negotiations are to improve the situation of all the negotiating parties relative to the business-as-usual.

951It’s to move to what we called a Pareto improving outcome. In this diagram from the business-as-usual point that is lower in possibilities for all countries to the cooperative equilibrium “C” in which both groups of countries shown in this figure are better off, and because climate change is, after all, potentially such a calamity, moving to a situation better than the one that we are facing in business-as-usual terms is evident, evidently possible. And yet, the negotiations have continuously proved to be extraordinarily difficult; that’s why we’re aiming for a real solution at COP21 that we might have thought would come in COP1 in Berlin in 1995 or COP3 as was attempted in Kyoto or COP15 in Copenhagen when it seemed that the world was coming close to making a meaningful breakthrough.

What are the reasons why it has proved so hard to go from that BAU point to the point “C”, the cooperative Pareto improving negotiating outcome?

I think that there are at least eight reasons that make climate negotiations just incredibly hard compared to almost any other kind of negotiation that one might consider, and it is worth it for us to think about those difficulties, those uncharacteristic difficulties making this issue so distinct in order to overcome these obstacles.

The first problem is that going from BAU to “C” is not an immediate process. Sometimes when you negotiate you’re better off when you get up from the table and you say, “ok we’ve made an advance”, but when it comes to climate change we’re talking about a transformation of the economy, of the energy system, of our technologies, of our behaviors stretching over decades, and we’re talking about seeing gains from that that also will show up mostly over decades and so negotiating over a very long-term process is inherently more difficult than negotiating over an outcome that gives the immediate gratification of an improvement relative to the status quo.

There’s a related but distinct second challenge and that is that when it comes to the actual improvements, that is why C is “better” than BAU, we’re not going to see those improvements for a long time, not just that it is a long time to realize the change, but the costs of action will be borne predominantly within the next two or three decades, whereas the benefits will be felt predominantly in decades to come. And so we have the costs up front, the benefits later-delayed gratification; not the simplest thing for humanity in general for any of us and certainly not the simplest thing for politicians to manage. They are immediate gratifiers to the ultimate extent; they want to win an election; they want to stay in power, so they’re looking at the short term. But, we have compressed in that negotiating diagram short- and long-term and saying that going from BAU to C is an improvement is simplifying a much more complicated situation where costs come early and gains are likely to be felt only much later.

A third problem that is obviously fundamental is that in many negotiations when you shake hands and have reached an outcome, you know clearly you’re better off, but when it comes to climate change there are enormous uncertainties, not the uncertainties that justify climate denial–this is pure anti-science—the basic science is overwhelming. But, there are uncertainties about technologies, there are uncertainties about future costs, there are uncertainties about the specific timing of climate events, there are uncertainties about the capacity to adapt to climate change rather than to mitigate climate change.

This is technically, scientifically, socially one of the most complex issues that humanity has ever faced because it’s global scale, because it goes to the heart of the economic system, because it involves a complex planetary dynamic, and these uncertainties, of course, enable doubt to be magnified, to be manufactured as has been said, into paralysis.

Of course, there is uncertainty. This doesn’t mean a failure, that we should fail to act, but it is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to act.952

The fourth element is that with the timeline and the timing and the uncertainties, the transition required in going from BAU to C is not simply stated. It is not self-evident and transparent, nor is it the product of a small number of actions.

We’re talking about transformation of the core of the energy system. We’re talking about changes of land use on a global scale. We’re talking about changes in agriculture that engages hundreds of millions of people around the world. There is nothing simple about this. We’re talking about an enormously complex process of change even if we could agree fully on what needs to be done and how to do it, we would then, and we will, I hope, face the challenge of implementation that itself will prove to be one of the most daunting aspects of this whole issue.

The fifth aspect that makes this so hard is the, the little fib that is shown in the simple diagram of going from BAU to C. I’ve drawn that picture of two symmetric negotiators, and the improvement is also symmetric. The arrow points up on a 45 degree line from, from the origin of the, of this graph. In other words, the countries are sharing equally, and it’s pretty easy to define in this simple diagram what equal means, but there is nothing equal about the status of the countries that are at the table.

There are huge, powerful asymmetries around the table. Some countries are fantastically rich and others are desperately poor. They have very different points of view. The rich countries often think, “we can impose a solution on the poor”, and the poor countries think “why are we even here being asked to do something when the rich have caused the problem and have the means to solve the problem.” There are big differences in how countries are feeling the advent of anthropogenic climate change.

The small island states know, they know in their gut their country could absolutely disappear under the waves. With rising sea levels, countries are threatened with their very survival, the case of some of the small island states.

Some of the big, northern, more temperate zone economies, Canada or Russia, may feel a little bit warmer, well, maybe not all bad; we’re a pretty cold climate much of the year. The sense of peril may not be felt, may not even be as dramatic as is experienced in an island or in a dryland country or in a tropical setting.

Countries really differ by the nature of the damages and harms, though it is absolutely the case no country will be able to stand-alone in a world profoundly perturbed and disrupted by large-scale climate change. Countries also differ, of course, tremendously in the ownership of energy resources, especially fossil fuels. Some countries are fossil fuel-rich, and they are typically saying, “we plan to use those fossil fuels, thank you”. Other countries don’t have fossil fuels; maybe they even have vast renewable alternatives and they’re saying, “stop the fossil fuels. Let’s move to alternative form of energy”. It’s easier for them to say that, more convenient. Not only do they not feel the lobbying pressure from the owners of the fossil fuels, but for countries that don’t have their own fossil fuel resources, the alternatives look more promising and more secure.

This are just some of the very strong asymmetries that make negotiating more difficult, that make defining a fair or focal bargain that says “yes that’s the point on which we should all agree”–a more daunting task.

953This comes to another point, what is fair? If we were all the same and symmetrically placed around the table, fair would be quite obvious. If a group of individuals is dividing the cake, and there’s no other reason, in terms of division, to do otherwise, you try to divide the cake in as close to equal pieces as possible. But, because of the asymmetries, every country has its own standard vision of what’s fair.

Poor countries talk about fairness in terms of wealth and poverty. The highly vulnerable countries, like the small island states, understandably, talk about fairness in terms of impact of climate change. The fossil fuel-owning countries talk about fair in terms of the right to use their own resources. Other countries talk about fair in terms of an equal allocation of the atmospheric space for greenhouse gas emissions, and so on.

These are all aspects of fairness, and the fact that there are so many different perspectives, of course, means that reaching an outcome–not that it’s impossible because countries could all say, “even though we differ in our moral judgments, ethical judgments, sense of fairness, we’re all better off at the following point”, but it does make it harder to find that point.

Then, as we discussed in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there’s a huge problem of trust. “Okay, we could agree, but how do I know you’re really going to carry that out. I have to go back to my parliament or my congress or my party and explain what I’ve committed to and they’re going to say, ‘you committed that when the others are not really going to follow through.'”

This is a standard problem of any kind of agreement. In an arms agreement, the peace negotiators may come home to find huge objection by saying, “you have entrusted our country on the basis of a promise that will not be fulfilled by the others.”

So, the whole question of finding a binding solution, one that can be monitored, one that can be verified is a part of negotiations.

Here just as it has long been a major part of arms limitation agreements and other kinds of geopolitical negotiations. And then the eighth point is, of course, very particular, powerful interests. Some of these interests are enormously concentrated. Some of the big oil companies, of course, face almost an existential question, “if we’re going to have a 2-degree C limit, what happens to us?

What happens to our multi-gazillion dollar capitalization in the marketplace? How will investors value us?” What will happen, asks the CEO, to my wealth, to my income, to my pension, to my position? And, put it the other way, some of these interests are extraordinarily powerful. They’re major political powers in their country, and they are able to shape the political discussion and the national negotiations.

And, of course, individual countries around the table also can play that role. It’s probably the case that if there’s a vast consensus about what to do, to unanimity, will not be the rule. But if any of the major countries–China or the United states or India or the European Union–say, “No way!” that makes a deal extraordinarily difficult, and so individual countries can play a pretty decisive role in blocking an agreement even one that has been agreed by dozens and dozens of other countries.

you might say, “that’s pretty exhausting”, and it has been exhausting because we have gone through 19 Conferences of the Parties. We’ll have the twentieth in Lima in December and the twenty-first in Paris in December 2015 and still no breakthrough. But, it may be in part because we have been looking at this whole issue in the not quite correct way.

If the negotiations are viewed as a largely zero-sum game that “I can’t make a concession because you’re going to get the big prize” or “you do more, I do less” or “you pay for it, I don’t pay for it” or “you have your historical responsibility, I don’t have to participate”; when it’s viewed as one versus the other, then all of these problems that I have discussed are brought to the fore.

If, however, the sense of the discussion around the table were somewhat different starting from the point “we are collectively in a mess; it is a horrendous problem facing everybody in the world, and we’re all in this together”, then the spirit of these discussions could be quite different. And I would compare this in the following way. One might view this as a poker game. Each negotiator is holding their cards, looking across the table. The US negotiator is looking at China; “what are they doing? What are they promising?” The Chinese negotiator is looking back at the US and casting a glance over to the European Union. Each side is wondering who is going to take the pot; how are we going to divide this?

But a quite different view would be the same group around the table; the men and women’s sleeves rolled up saying, “My God, what are we going to do? This is a horrendous problem. We’ve got to figure this out.” So it would be less of a poker game and more of an intense brainstorming and problem-solving; the kind of thing you’d see in a movie as world leaders get together pondering what to do about the asteroid coming towards the earth or the alien space invasion that suddenly unites all of humanity into a common force because the problem is external, shared by everyone, and requiring creativity, fortitude, bravery, brainstorming, far-sightedness.

And yet another analogy that I find very important and compelling is the idea of an orchestra; brainstorming, sleeves rolled up and trying to figure this one out. An orchestra is trying to make beautiful music together.

In other words, trying to implement a solution. The solution could be a wonderful symphony or the solution could be deep decarbonization. Now, one might immediately ask, “if it’s an orchestra, if the world’s to make beautiful music together, where’s the conductor? How is this going to be brought about?” And that in recent years is drawn my attention to a phenomenon known as the conductor-less orchestra. Here, you’re looking at Olin conductorless orchestra. They are a chamber orchestra playing beautiful music together; well worth listening to on Youtube. There’s no conductor. There is no single individual. There is, however, a score.

They all have the score in front of them. They’re playing to the same sheet music. That I believe is the closest analogy, at least that I can come up with, to what we ought to be doing. We do have the same sheet music; we have the 2-degree centigrade limit. We know what we need to do in terms of the global performance. We could have in front of everybody’s stand the respective deep decarbonization pathways that each country is playing its music, is pursuing its own designed deep decarbonization pathway. There is no single conductor, but in the aggregate, the music makes sense; it does keep the world safe.

So I believe that we are too much thinking of poker players, too little thinking of the brainstormers or the conductorless orchestra, and when it comes to the poker playing what really worries me is that the players around the table are not only looking at their hands, actually all of their cards are blank. They don’t know what’s on their cards or what’s their national interest.

What can they be doing? They don’t necessarily know because they haven’t made the analysis of a deep decarbonization pathway. They may think they’re defending their national interest, but how can you know the national interest unless you have investigated the real benefits and costs of alternative pathways, and alas, that has not happened. And one of the reasons that has not happened is that the players around the table are not quite the right players. That chamber orchestra would not be quite so interesting if every musician was playing a violin. It’s the mix that’s crucial to get the right music, but who’s at the table? The table is the government.

Of course, it’s the diplomats; they are not technologists; they are not engineers; they are negotiating very much from the point of view “don’t make concessions, have the other country make concessions.” Not, “how are we going to get carbon capture and sequestration working more rapidly?” Who should be around the table for this kind of problem solving and implementation? Well, the politicians should be there; they represent the governments that put the public policy into place but also the technologists, the engineers, the scientists who can say carbon capture and sequestration–this can be done if we can overcome the following technical obstacles. Or look at the possibility for energy storage with this technology if we can just push it over the boundary to commercialization then we’d all have much more running room.

The companies should be there as well. Both the established companies and the startups. Now, you might think if the companies are there that’s all lobbying, but I actually want the companies pulled to the table. What are the oil companies doing outside saying, “This isn’t our responsibility.” Just making huge amounts of money, lobbying behind the scenes perhaps to slow things down but not being at the table. When recently some of the big oil companies, Exxon Mobile and others, said, “We don’t believe in the 2-degree Celsius as a feasible goal.” I think that is pure moral hazard or immoral behavior. It’s not for a company, which is a major emitter and a beneficiary of inaction, to decide by itself what’s feasible or not; it has to be there exercising responsibility and indeed following public policy.

And citizens more generally need to be at the table, and that’s why I am going to emphasize shortly in the final lecture the role of global goals that are clear, that are succinct, that are understandable by everybody; this is not a technocrat adventure; it’s not a political insiders game; it’s not a business deal or a lobbyist’s dream; this is a citizen’s issue of the first-order of importance for the world. In the DDPP itself, in our Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project, as Emmanuel Guerin described to you, we had our own brainstorming and negotiating and thinking and working together across 15 countries, we realized, even as a group of strongly motivated, environmentally conscious, determined to help fight climate change group, it’s not easy to get to 2 degrees C; it’s going to require a huge effort even in the modeling itself, much less in the actual implementation.

Even within a project, therefore, you see that the brainstorming, the idea that we need to find our way, step-by-step together to meaningful solutions applies. And that needs to be the spirit around the table as world leaders from business, civil society, government, academia, technologists help to find a path forward. In the next lecture, I’ll talk about how we could help to make the negotiating process fit that purpose and do so in time for success in COP21.

Main Challenges of Climate Change Negotiations IV

Making an Agreement Stick

In this lecture we’re discussing the concepts of negotiation: how to have a Pareto improving outcome, where all of the parties to the agreement are better off than they would be in the business-as-usual trajectory, how to have an agreement that is efficient, mitigating carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions at low cost, how to have an agreement that is fair, that allocates the costs and benefits in a fair way, recognizing how many standards of fairness we want to apply, and how to have an agreement that is a true learning agreement, adapting not only to climate change but adapting to new science, new technology, and indeed actively promoting learning of new ways to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.

In this chapter I want to talk about another specific aspect of negotiations and that’s how to make an agreement stick. What are the problems and challenges when an agreement is reached in enforcing that agreement and again I am going to be discussing this issue at a conceptual level, at an abstract level, because I think that the abstractions are quite helpful. And I will take the most important abstraction of game theory or negotiating theory of the last half century to illustrate the issue, and that crucial abstraction is known as the prisoner’s dilemma: a framework of interaction that will be known to many students but that is important for everybody to have some exposure to.

941So in this framework we talk about strategies of the parties to a negotiation or to an interaction and we model or map those on a 2 by 2 matrix or a 2 by 2 table.

For the rows we have the strategies of the first country, say the developed countries, and they in this simple example can adopt one of two strategies: either to have business as usual energy policy or to have mitigation policy and for country two, those are the columns of this 2 by 2 matrix, and country two, say the developing country group, also has two possible strategies: business as usual or mitigation.

The assumption is that when both parties to this interaction choose to mitigate, they’re both left better off than in the business-as-usual. That of course is the underlying assumption of climate change and the assumption that we have strongly represented throughout this course.

Now in basic game theory or in a representation such as the one you’re looking at, we can use the outcomes for example as a single number to suggest again what happens when various mixes of strategies are followed. And in this two by two box, the first number in each box is the outcome. Call it the gross domestic product for example of country one, or group one, the developed countries. The second number refers to the gross domestic product of the second country, the one whose strategies are represented by the columns of this two by two matrix.

942So look at the box of mitigation, the one that is circled here in which both country one chooses mitigation strategy and country two chooses mitigation strategy. In that case, each has a gross domestic product of 130. Again, an arbitrary number, but for purposes of illustration.

Now go directly northwest to the business-as-usual, business-as-usual box. Where country one has not undertaken mitigation policy and country two has also followed suit and not undertaken mitigation policy. In that case, the gross domestic product of these two countries is a 100 and a 100. They’re worse off by virtue of the fact that they have failed to mitigate CO2 emissions. Well so far so good.

Clearly moving from the northwest box to the southeast box according, down that diagonal is a Pareto improvement.  Both parties are made better off. It’s like the graph that we looked at earlier, depicted in a different way where one moved from the BAU point to point C, the cooperative point.943

And both parties to the negotiation are left better off.

You might say, that’s the end of the story. Unfortunately it’s not quite the end of the story. Consider the situation where both countries have agreed to mitigate and they then go home and plan their national policies. And country one follows through and says, we have a good agreement, we’ll mitigate. Country two says, you know mitigation is pretty expensive actually. And we get some of the benefits of our mitigation, but so does the other part of the world.

It spills over. What would happen if we actually reneged on our promise and we decided that we would carry on with business-as-usual. Maybe we’ll give some nice speeches about the importance of our agreement, but we’ll carry on with the old energy policy?

The outcome is then shown in the lower left-hand side of the box, in the southwest corner. In this case, country undertakes the extra cost of mitigation. Country two does not. And according to the illustration that I’ve made here, country one ends up with a GDP of 80 because it’s made a big outlay of mitigation and the other country has still contributed to wrecking the climate by not undertaking and following through on what it promised to do. The other country is left at a 150.944

Yes it bears the climate damage, but it has not undertaken the added expenses of the deep decarbonization. The outcome from a world point of view is worse. Total output is 230, adding 80 and 150. The world suffers as a whole compared to the 260 gross world product of the all mitigation box in the lower right-hand corner.

But the fact that country two reneges on its commitment has left it actually better off and left country one materially worse off. And so one would say, this is not such a stable equilibrium after all, because once the agreement is struck, if it’s possible for country two to wriggle out of the agreement then we would have as you see, a kind of arrow from the lower right-hand box to the lower left-hand box, from the southeast to the southwest. And country two is made better off.

Ah, but of course it won’t stop there. Country one asks itself a question, I have followed through, we have honored our agreement, country two has not, should we continue to follow through or should we revert to a lower cost strategy? Yes, leading to worse climate outcome, but enabling us to avoid this very heavy and very unfair burden that we’re now bearing. And so country one asks itself, what will happen if we now ve to albusiness-as-usual climoughdwp-contenlest thing fo. Coave ing foyw y gros have d agariquilielf, n each bis a on o-con;ve ment/beep n agy heavr burdet oe deep decarbonizatiff and sa o, ton ars going tw ve , frof our mitigatiit pulfnue td a business-as-usuat pulfnld.

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