Arquivo de etiquetas: descarbonização

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius V

Achieving Large Global Goals 

We are in a challenge unique in history, unprecedented, to bring a global scale, environmental threat under control. And unfortunately for the reasons that I ticked off earlier, the eight extraordinary features of this challenge, this is one of the toughest challenges that humanity has faced as a peacetime challenge. So we have our work cut out for us.

Some people are pessimistic, are cynical, believe that the vested interests will win, that the short-sightedness is inevitable, that politics can’t agree on anything much less something as complicated as this. Or that it’s humanity’s fate to have to suffer massive climate derangement cause we don’t pay attention and we don’t take care of ourselves. I think we need not believe any of that kind of pessimism or cynicism. And we do need to take heart, again, as students of history in the fact that good things happen. Big changes do take place. Social movements can be successful in creating very large-scale, indeed global, very positive change. And this is really the topic that I’d like to explore with you in this final chapter.

1052How we can help to bring about large-scale social change, that is the change to help make the world safe, to respect the planetary boundaries, to achieve sustainable development, generally and specifically to honor the 2-degree Celsius limit as a limit of safety, a guardrail for the world environment? To do that the basic lesson of social change is that not only are governments needed at the table, businesses needed at the table, academics, scientists, experts needed at the table, we as global citizens are also needed at the table.

Large-scale social change occurs ultimately through large-scale social movements. It’s the public, it’s civil society that raises its voice and says, we need to be heard because it’s our safety, it’s our children’s safety, it’s the safety of future generations that we care about that need respect and need attention now. These social movements often start with small groups of very dedicated, committed and very brave people, but they do tap into a moral spirit widely shared. They tap into a knowledge base that can be demonstrated and proved and by being based on fact as well as based on ethical values, widely shared, they can turn into very large-scale social change.

I think about some of the most important of these movements in the last couple of centuries. Think about the fight about ending slavery. Slavery was pervasive. It was the norm at the end of the 18th Century.  A small group of committed activists in Britain at what was becoming the height of the British Empire, said, this is morally wrong, abominable. We need to end the…first the trafficking and then the presence of slavery in the British Empire. It may seem obvious to us, how could anybody defend slavery, but slavery was strongly defended within England itself, of course with the huge slave industry and in other parts of the world. But Wilberforce and Clarkson and others persisted over the course of decades. And quite astoundingly and wonderfully the moral case became the dominant social reality and then the political reality. And slavery was ended in the British empire in 1833. It took a war in the United States to end slavery. Step by step slavery was seen as the abomination that it was.

And by the end of the 19th Century in most places, but still not in every place today, slavery was eliminated. But this is an example of how a moral principle can finally turn into a political inevitability. Ending colonial rule was seen as something impossible to achieve when Gandhi began his campaign in India in the early 20th Century. And by the end of the century it was again, a near inevitability. Not complete, not total by any means, but the mindset, the ideas about what is right and wrong about one people politically dominating another had changed fundamentally in the course of the 20th Century.

The civil rights movement and the anti-apartheid movement similarly required the bravery and genius of a Martin Luther King, Jr. and a Nelson Mandela, but those ideas became widespread ideas. And when one looks at social attitudes today in places that were virulently racist a generation or two generations ago, social attitudes also do change over time.1053

And now we’re in a battle for women’s rights, for the freedom of sexual orientation, new social mores that come through brave people saying, this is right, this is our moral stake in this, this is something which society more generally needs to embrace. And I think the evidence is that these magnificent and large-scale social changes, starting with very brave, small groups of people but through persistence finally spreading through society can fundamentally change the direction of the world as a whole.

In the last 14 years I’ve been very privileged to be a part of what many of you are also part of and that is the fight to end extreme poverty. The idea that extreme poverty is an anachronism, absolutely needs through directed efforts brought to a close of human history is an idea that was adopted by world leaders at the beginning of the new millennium in the Millennium Development Goals. They have not ended extreme poverty by any means but they have played their role and extreme poverty is coming down as a proportion of the world’s population and in the new phase that will follow the Millennium Development Goals, it’s within reach for governments to say, we can end extreme poverty. The idea is there, the progress is there, the momentum is there and the moral commitment is increasingly taking hold around the world.

Climate change and sustainable development more generally is another case where we need a worldwide reorientation of what we do, how we live, and the morals with which we live. And it was interesting and not just interesting, I would say notable and very important that when the world leaders came together on the 20th anniversary of the Earth Summit, as I described earlier, at the Rio+20 summit in June, 2012 in Rio de Janeiro. At that point, they looked at the Millennium Development Goals and said, that is social action that’s working, we have treaties, we have law, we have negotiations but they’re not working as they need to, we need to look at the lessons of the Millennium Development Goals. In other words, we need to bring society to the table of sustainable development.1051

And in the outcome document of Rio+20, the conferees made a very valuable contribution and I want to read it. You see it here on the screen. We recognize that the development of goals could also be useful for pursuing focused and coherent action on sustainable development.

These goals should address and incorporate in a balanced way all three dimensions of sustainable development and their inter-linkages. By that they mean, economic, social and environmental. We’ll also underscore that STGs should be action oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all countries while taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities.

We are in that sense part of a new social movement. The public is coming to the table, the sustainable development goals of which one headline goal will be a safe global climate, gives us the opportunity to help create a worldwide public understanding and public demand for climate safety and for the other features of sustainable development. It’s in that context that the DDPP, the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project arose, because Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in the aftermath of Rio+20, we need a global network of problem-solving. And he created the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the SDSN.

And I’m very privileged to be the director of that. He created that network in order to bring together scientists, engineers, business leaders and civil society leaders, precisely for the kind of problem-solving in which we’re engaged. And the DDPP is a great flagship of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network. It’s an example of civil society, in this case experts from around the world, largely from academia and from other knowledge-based institutions, coming to the fore and saying, here is how this particular problem of deep decarbonization can be solved.

And we’ve learned a lot that we’ve been emphasizing through these lectures, through the DDPP process. We’ve learned a lot about problem-solving itself because we’ve had to solve the problem of how to make our process work, which is not an easy…easy process by any means to actually find these pathways in a constructive manner that can help the world move towards a meaningful climate agreement.

We’ve identified in the SDSN and in the DDPP some of the strategies for success in achieving big social goals. The first part of success is set goals. This I think is absolutely fundamental, because without the goal we have no direction. With a goal, stay below the 2-degrees Celsius in order to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system, we have goal. We have something we can hold onto. And as President John F. Kennedy said about setting goals, “By defining our goal more clearly, by helping it seem more manageable and less remote we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.” So not only do we need goals but we have to define the goals more clearly, make them seem more manageable as we hope the DDPP process is doing. And specifically to make the goals seem more manageable we have to identify pathways o achieving those goals.

What we have called backcasting. Look at 2050, where we need to be and ask, how are we going to get there from where we are today in 2014? We need R&D roadmaps, a point that we’ve emphasized to overcome existing hurdles. We’re going to need to demonstrate successes of some of these technologies. We’re going to need to build momentum of civil society.

And then rapid scale up, mass public education and of course, deepening the political and the institutional framework by reaching meaningful agreements in COP21 and similar kinds of frameworks in other areas. It’s obviously a huge undertaking, but sustainable development defines the most important agenda of our generation. Earlier generations faced their specific challenges, ours is the challenge of a very crowded planet, pressing against planetary boundaries, threatening survival itself of millions of species, the well-being, the survival of humanity itself. And so we must take on this challenge.

And we must take heart from the success of earlier vast social change actions as I’ve noted. It may see awfully hard to accomplish this. Some of the technological challenges seem absolutely daunting. Can you really take the core of the world energy system and within 25 or 30 years change it to a low carbon energy system? The answer, the evidence says, is yes, if we really work at it. If we direct our attention and direct our technological change in the needed area.1054

As I’ve said, I was inspired in my youth by the moon shot. By President John F. Kennedy standing in Congress and saying early in 1961 that he recommends that the United States accept the challenge of putting a man safely to the moon and bringing him back safely to earth by the end of the decade. And what’s absolutely interesting about that among so many other things is that when President Kennedy made that call to action, there was no plan to do it. He wasn’t referring to the accepted engineering reports that said exactly what the blueprint is. It took NASA more than a year to come up with the, the basic ideas and then it took brainstorming and problem-solving and heroics and brilliant engineering, a lot of resources and a major sustained commitment through the entire process. In 1962, in talking about this attempt to go to the moon, President Kennedy said something that I believe resonates today in the spirit of the challenge that we face in climate change and in all of this deep systems transformation and technological change that we’re going to need to undertake, he was talking to a public that was asking, is this too hard, can we do it? And President Kennedy said, “We choose to go to the moon.” We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.

Because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills. Because that challenge is one that we’re willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone and one we intend to win, and the others too. And I can tell you as he spoke at Rice University in a vast open stadium that day, the applause were phenomenal, because the public rallied to this.

They said, this is, this is something we can do. This is a challenge we are willing to accept. Fundamentally we need the world around the table. We need the experts. We need the engineers. We need the governments. And we need us as civil society. And we need to do this at a time that is extraordinarily difficult, because we’re talking about climate change at a time where we’re also facing a lot of war, a lot of conflict, a lot of battles that are not only devastating in and of themselves but taking up the energy, taking up our attention, turning us away from what really counts for our long-term survival.

And so fundamentally we are going to have to find a way to cooperate on what is important, find a way to turn away from the violence and the war and find a way to cooperate peacefully for decades to come. And as I close the course I want to close one more time with President Kennedy who pursued peace in 1963 and very much with a vision that by doing so we could turn to science and to the arts and to cooperation and to public health and to other goals. And he faced a big challenge then. The world was deeply divided then as it is now. And he had to urge Americans and the world about the capacity to cooperate.

So I want to close with my favorite lines of President Kennedy about cooperation itself, but you’ll see that they really resonate when it comes to our specific challenges, fifty years later. President Kennedy said, “So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet, we all breathe the same air, we all cherish our children’s futures and we are all mortal.” Thank you for being in the class. I look forward to being together with you in the next semester.

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius IV

Can Everybody Win? Should Everybody Win?

We’re discussing in this lecture the structure, the shape of COP21; of the agreement and the premise of a negotiation in general as I’ve emphasized is a Pareto improvement, that the participants in the negotiation come out of the negotiation feeling that they’re better off than they were in the business as usual trajectory and the question that

I’d like to ask is can everybody really win in a climate agreement and an important second question is should everybody win? It all depends I suppose on one’s perspective. I’ve emphasized repeatedly now that there are many different divisions at the negotiating table.1041

There are the divisions of the rich and the poor countries. There are the divisions of the fossil rich and the fossil poor countries. There are divisions between producers of the fossil fuels and the consumers of the fossil fuels, not as countries but as players in the market, and here I’m thinking about the private companies, the big oil companies Exxon Mobil or Chevron or BP and others versus the consumers on the other side. Not only the consumers of their products but people who will then experience the results of climate change.

And another division which I’ve emphasized although only briefly is the different perspectives of the present and the future generations. Now here we have a little bit of an advantage. Only the present generation is present right now. The future generations don’t get their direct say, but they do have a strong interest. They’re not really at the table except through us, except through our logic, our moral commitments, our cultural imperatives, but we need to understand that future generations really are at the table.

They have interests and the question is, are they winners in this process? Under business as usual, they’re surely losers but how can both the present and the future generations be winners in the process? Well, let me come back one more time to this basic diagram that I introduced earlier where on the horizontal axis we had the income of one group of countries and on the vertical axis the income or the well-being of a second group and I’m imagining that these two groups are negotiating with each other for an agreement starting from inside the potential well-being line at business as usual and trying to reach the cooperative point.

Now in this final use of this curve I’m using the country one grouping to be the oil exporters. Countries like the Gulf states, Venezuela, Canada, Australia, which are significant exporters of fossil fuels. And I’m using in this case on the vertical axis the oil importing or the fossil fuel importing countries that are buying these carbon rich energy supplies from the first group of countries. And as usual, both groups are at the bargaining table and in principle one could have a Pareto improving outcome in which both the oil exporters and the oil importing countries are better off. But think about the ways that the policy choices are typically discussed.

Well, we’ve not focused in this course on the details of policy choices of how to move to the low carbon economy. At this point emphasizing mostly how does one achieve a low-carbon economy.

We know that to move from coal fire power plants to wind and solar power or to move from internal combustion automobiles to more expensive electric vehicles something has to be done through regulation or through emissions permits or through carbon taxation to tilt the balance in the marketplace towards the lower carbon option. And remember of course that the whole theory of this is that we should be willing to spend a bit more of our resources than we’re now spending on the carbon rich infrastructure to spend it on a low carbon infrastructure because we’re going to come out way ahead in the long term by avoiding climate disaster and so the idea is that while the alternatives right now may look more expensive when you add in the social cost of carbon to the market cost of carbon then these alternatives either are or through research and development could be made to be the best cost alternative.

But how do you tilt the consumers or the market behavior in that direction. You may regulate, no more coal fired power plants without carbon capture and sequestration. No more internal combustion engines after 2030. You can only buy light duty vehicles that are…have zero tailpipe emissions. That’s one way to do it. And the other way we know is to tilt the market prices through corrective pricing. For example through a carbon tax that’s levied on the use of coal, oil and gas. And suddenly wind and solar power and electric vehicles look like the better deal.

Suppose we go that second option which has been the preferred option in the European Union for example to use a tradable permit system. We know that the implication of that kind of policy or not an equivalent but closely related policy of putting on a carbon tax is to raise the price of carbon fuels to the consumer but by driving down demand for those carbon fuels to lower the price received by the producers.

So the typical strategy right now not necessarily wrong in any way but the typical strategy is let’s push demand away from coal, oil and gas by creating a price wedge between what the consumers pay, a high price, and what the producers receive, a lower price and that will move the economy to a safer, lower emitting, 2-degree C limit kind of economy of our pathways.

All fine and good; absolutely right from a climate point of view but what I’m illustrating here is one absolutely plausible outcome that the world thereby moves to a higher aggregate level of well-being by avoiding climate disaster but it does so with a big improvement of the oil importing countries because they not only have a safer climate but they now pay a lower market price, not as consumers but the price that is actually net of tax paid to the oil exporters. They get a double benefit.

Whereas the oil exporting countries, say Saudi Arabia or Australia or Canada would face a lower world market price because demand for their products from other countries has gone down. Yes, they’re compensated by a safer climate, but maybe they’ve taken a big hit in their revenues and the way that I’ve drawn it here is that instead of reaching a Pareto improving outcome, that is along an arrow that goes from the southwest to the northeast, maybe the arrow goes to the northwest, that the oil importers are way better off but the oil exporters while living now in a safer climate also have seen their market really, really cut sharply and therefore they would say that’s not a mutually beneficial outcome, that’s just a punishment of the oil countries.

Now what could be done? What could be done for example would be a transfer of income. Let’s say that the oil importers impose a carbon tax and that has the effect of shifting us to a safe energy system but the losers are the oil exporters and the oil importing countries that have collected this tax on oil use could transfer some of the revenues to the oil exporters.

That probably would seem a little bit shocking to a lot of people. Indeed, when I once proposed it they said you’re heretical. How dare you give money to the oil exporters, they’re damaging the world. We’re not going to pay for them, we’re not going to compensate them. I mention this to raise the point. Can everybody benefit from an agreement? Should everybody benefit from an agreement?

Should is on the basis of principle, ethics, morals, legal judgment, responsibility, can is more of an economist’s question. I can tell you it’s possible to compensate oil exporters, even oil companies for a loss of their market income that may come from putting on a carbon tax. The should is another question. Is it really true that every party to the negotiation should walk away feeling better off? Maybe some of the oil exporters should walk away a bit unhappy that well, there goes our market, only compensated by the fact the climate will be safer and they were the polluters in the first place. My point is that there are different standards of outcome.

You might say a Pareto improving outcome is what we’re after. You might say no, no, polluter pays, I’m not interested in the polluter being compensated in any way. They’re both absolutely pragmatic and sensible standards. They contradict each other. And from a practical negotiating point of view it’s complicated. Because it could be that the oil exporting countries become a blocking coalition to say well, these negotiations are all fine and good in saving the climate and saving the world along with it, but why should we be the big losers in all of this? We’ll stop that until we’re compensated.

This is for us to discuss and debate in the global online negotiations next semester. This is for the world to discuss and debate. But as a practical matter, let me make a point. The oil exporting interests have been a blocking coalition in practice. Maybe not in the literal way that I’ve just described it, but there’s no doubt that the resistance to strong climate action has been greater among the net fossil fuel exporting countries than it has been among the net fossil fuel importing countries.

By and large, with exceptions within the European Union, most of the European Union is a net fossil fuel importing region and it’s also a region experiencing a lot of climate devastation. On both counts, the European Union is the world leader in saying we must take climate action. But in other parts of the world where countries are fuel exporters, for instance Canada and Australia, the politics is much, much less interested, let’s put it that way, in a climate agreement because the real weight of the politics is powerful interests of the fossil fuel industry who are saying why should we bear that cost?

I’d say the same is certainly true in the case of Russia. A massive fossil fuel exporter and so far not so interested in a strong, low-carbon climate deal, perhaps because of the specific interests involved.

And so it’s worth us to ask the question who are these big fossil fuel entities, wh1042at kind of role do they play in the negotiations, are they a blocking coalition, what kind of sharing of the costs and benefits would be a reasonable approach to reaching a full deal and I just want to share with you a few tables showing how concentrated in fact the fossil fuel resources are.

Coal, for example, is so concentrated that five countries alone have about three-quarters of the total world’s coal supply, the U.S., Russia, China, Australia and India. And you can imagine within each of those five countries there are very, very powerful lobbies, politically influential that say don’t go there to a low-carbon agreement.

On the next graph, I show the oil reserves. Same story, actually.1043 If I take groupings of countries, the five big groupings constitute in fact the three-quarters of the total proved oil reserves. These are the Gulf countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), that’s Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and neighbors, it’s Venezuela with its vast oil and unconventional, both conventional and unconventional oil reserves, it’s Canada with its massive unconventional heavy oil, the oil sands of Alberta, it’s Iran and Iraq. And these countries obviously also have very, very strong interests in the market price and the future use of petroleum.

And if I turn to the next of the three resources, natural gas reserves, once again there is tremendous concentration of the proved reserves f natural gas. A1044gain, the Arabian peninsula is so central to this story of course, next comes Iran, Russia with its vast natural gas deposits, Turkmenistan and Venezuela. Combined these five countries, the top five holders of natural gas reserves, account for two-thirds of the total reserves. So we see that this is going to be complicated, these negotiations, and there is a question about what these countries will demand, that’s perhaps more evident.

What they might receive, what they should expect on a practical and on an ethical basis in a worldwide transition to a low carbon economy. One thing we can say for sure, and I would like to point it out to all of the oil countries and oil exporting countries and companies, if carbon capture and sequestration works, then the space that is opened up in the carbon budget is expanded and this is why all of the fossil fuel producers have an enormous stake in proving and from their point of view demonstrating if it’s right, the feasibility of large scale carbon capture and sequestration.

And it’s why that group of countries and the companies that I’m going to introduce at this moment also should be major financiers of the testing, the research, the development, the demonstration and if successful the diffusion of carbon capture and sequestration. Now I’ve talked about the oil reserves and production in terms of countries but of course there’s some very, very major players in the world. Those are big oil companies. Some are privately owned, others are state owned and they are extraordinarily powerful actors in the world scene. They’re among the major largest countries it’s almost right because of their scale, but companies in the world and they are absolutely in my opinion the most powerful political lobby in the world.

They’re an enormously successful industry. Massive in scale, massive in wealth, massive in technological capacity, massive in determination for more than 100 years the oil companies have basically gone anywhere to the most remote places to the…to Siberia, to the middle of rain forests, to absolutely difficult terrain to the deep oceans to extract oil and sell it and they’ve made vast fortunes doing it but one has to marvel at the technological might and fortitude of this industry.

But when you look at the bottom line, the bottom line is absolutely amazing.1045 Fortune 500 has its list of the top companies in the world measured by revenue and take a look at the top ten. Wow. Of the top ten, number one, number three, number four, number five, number six, number ten are oil companies. Extraordinary. And number seven is the power distribution company of China, so you have Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation, British Petroleum, the State Grid Corporation of China, and Total. Giants in the world, the biggest companies in the world. Seven of the ten Fortune 500 companies are in the oil sector.

They have a voice, believe me. Two of the remainder…remaining countries…there I go again…two of the remaining three companies in this top ten list are automobile companies. Major users of petroleum. We have number eight, Toyota, and number nine, Volkswagen. It’s fair to say that nine of the ten companies in the top ten of the Fortune 500 are therefore basically in the petroleum sector and it’s not surprising how powerful this sector has been and continues to be. It has to be at the table in my view in these negotiations, it absolutely has to put its vast financial might into the research and development of carbon capture and sequestration because that is ultimately its long term license to operate.

The tenth remaining company on this list is Walmart a retail giant of phenomenal reach. It’s interesting that Walmart has been pursuing a strategy of trying to press tremendous energy efficiency through its supply chains and it’s been involved very much in…in trying to bring its supply chains in agriculture as well and there as a consumer facing company where consumers are saying what are you doing for the environment? Walmart perhaps feels that more directly than the big oil giants. Here is a…an undeniable story and reality that we absolutely need to face and to understand in the coming months of negotiation. We’re talking about the core of the world economy when we talk about the energy system. We’re talking about the very biggest companies in the whole world.

We’re talking about major countries that have strong national interests, reasons of state and a massive part of their economies involved in energy production and in the export or import of primary energy resources. In other words, the stakes are very high if the logic is of finding a way to create an agreement in which there is widespread benefit shared in a way that is…that enables us to get to that agreement, we’re going to have to face the realities of this concentration of fossil fuel resources and fossil fuel economic and political power in the coming months.

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius III

Climate Financing

I want to say some words about a very complicated and unsolved and unsettled area: climate finance. This is a complicated topic because it covers a tremendous range of issues, but involves broadly speaking the question of how the world both individually as governments and collectively through international organizations and institutions and through market forces internally within a country and internationally will finance the transition to a low-carbon world economy and also will finance other parts of the climate challenge including adaptation to ongoing climate change.

There are many categories of need and many issues about how this financing can be allocated, who’s to pay, who would be the recipients, what are the terms of the financing?

There are many kinds of financial instruments that might be considered and there are aspects of financial regulation as well. All of this points to the underlying fact that the category of climate finance is a big one and it means a lot of things and a lot of different things to a lot of different groups.

I want to sort out some key aspects of the climate finance issue, but don’t pretend in any way to find a clear bottom line because as of now there are still too many issues in play and not yet the clarity of either concept or magnitude of financing that will be needed for the whole transition process. Well what are the kinds of areas that need financing when we consider the transformation to a low-carbon economy and when we consider life in the midst of anthropogenic climate change?

The first category is the core financing of our energy-related infrastructure. This is the biggest single item of finance. It is a multi-trillion dollar amount of financing each year. Remember that we are in a world economy of nearly a $100 trillion per annum at this point. And the economy globally continues to grow at around three to four percentage points per year, meaning that it doubles roughly every twenty years. Maybe by 2035 or 2040 it will be at a scale of $200 trillion.

Typically, infrastructure would be a few percentage points of that. That means the investments in power generation, in transmission, in roads, in rail, in airports, in port facilities and in other physical infrastructure, dams, levees, coastal protection, inland waterway infrastructure and so forth might total somewhere between three and five percent of the world economy.

So we’re talking about total investments on the order of roughly three to five trillion dollars a year. And that’s why when we think about climate finance, which does not include the totality of infrastructure, but certainly includes power generation, the transmission grid, the road and rail network which constitutes the core of the domestic transport, ports and airports, those are expensive and large amounts of investment. And in this sense, climate finance is a trillion, trillions of dollar a year activity.

Many questions are raised as to how this financing will get done, especially given the fact that we’re going to have to direct a lot of that financing towards investments that may be at a higher market cost than traditional investments, in other words, costs of power generation that may be more expensive apparently than investing in a coal fired power plant, but less expensive when we take into account the social cost of carbon.

And so to direct massive amounts of investment to sustainable low carbon infrastructure will require all of the normal means of financing, budgets of the government, state financial institutions, the private capital markets, the retained earnings of private companies that may be generating power or managing rail and so forth, plus new instruments of regulation and carbon pricing such as of course tradable emissions permits or a carbon tax.

But the basic idea is that this universe of trillions of dollars of infrastructure finance must continue, but change course under the pressures of regulation, carbon pricing, and other systematic parts of the deep Decarbonization pathway and be directed towards a low-carbon core infrastructure. This is one part of the overall climate finance puzzle. Some of the others of course are ways to pay for other categories of activities that we’ve been talking about at length.

Another part of the climate financing is the financing of the research, development, demonstration and diffusion of low carbon or zero carbon technologies. So this is another category, the RDD&D financing. Then there is a category of financing which is financing for infrastructure in part, but is directed towards the needs of the poorest countries.

And here the Green Climate Fund that has been established under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change is under the agreements that have been reached by the parties to be a major instrument for financing infrastructure and climate adaptation of low-income countries. It is to be one of the main ways that a specific pledge of a $100 billion per year from high income countries for low income countries should be implemented. But the details of the role of the Green Climate Fund and how it will be financed, which countries will contribute, whether it will go to the market and how are still being debated and, and are as yet unresolved.

Then it’s been recognized under the Framework Convention that in addition to the financing of the new power sector or a new low-carbon transport there will have to be considerable financing for adaptation itself. Some of that is for the soft infrastructure of behavior and redesign of settlements ensuring that people are living outside of what will become new flood plains under changing climate conditions.

But also the hard infrastructure that protects low-lying areas such as The Netherlands, or New York City which are each implementing very large scale, tens of billions of dollars hard infrastructure. And I’ve just added a picture for you of many of the so-called Delta Works for this most famous of low-lying countries, The Netherlands, the low-lying lands of Europe, which has been battling the sea level for all of its existence, but as ocean’s levels rise and as storms become more intense, 1031The Netherlands, which is perhaps the world’s leader in the technology of adaptation to sea level pressures has, is now implementing a project of more than a hundred billion dollars over the coming decades to protect itself against the changing ocean conditions. This famous Delta Works program is cutting-edge technology. It includes dikes, dams, levees, storm surge barriers of tremendous innovation and creativity because the designers and engineers are always balancing the physical protection with the protection of the ecosystems as well.

Now in New York City, we don’t have Delta Works quite in the same way, but Manhattan and other parts of New York City are also low-lying coastal zones that experienced a tremendous flooding during Super Storm Sandy. And in response to that, the New York City government under former Mayor Bloomberg put forward a twenty billion dollar plan like Delta Works, just illustrated in part here with new flood walls and surge protection barriers and so forth, showing that the adaptation agenda is partly behavioral and it’s partly hard physical infrastructure and financing of adaptation is going to be also a very pricey item given of course the fact that the climate related hydro meteorological disasters are now claiming also massive, massive losses of infrastructure and not to mention lives per year.1032

This brings us to another category of funding, agreed, but still not designed for losses and damages, experienced especially by poor countries. We don’t have an adequate global insurance system against hydro-meteorological disasters.

The low-income countries demanded it, they got assent in COP19 in Warsaw. And such a financing of losses and damages is now on, on the table for design. We also need financing for more general ecosystem protection and resilience. And here the global environment facility, which was created in part under the Framework Convention and partly under the Convention on Biological Diversity plays the unique role in the official world of financing resilience and protection of natural ecosystems and also human managed ecosystems. Well I hope that the list makes clear how complex this topic is from hard physical infrastructure of power generation and transmission and roads and rail to ecosystem functioning, protection against storm surges, research and development, help for the poor and compensation for losses and damages. The climate finance agenda is obviously extraordinarily complex.

What does financing even mean in this context? Of course it means financial resources devoted to these challenges, but the nature of those instruments is also extraordinarily varied and heavily debated I might add. The rich countries have promised the poor countries a hundred billion dollars in finance by the year 2020. But what do they mean by that? Do they mean private sector financing? Do they mean foreign investment? Do they mean loans? Do they mean grants? There are many categories of finance and some require repayment, others are essentially transfers. And when it comes to something as significant as the hundred billion dollars promised by the rich to the poor countries, the answer is we don’t know because it hasn’t been negotiated yet.

And there are very, very different opinions about it. I mention here some of the categories of finance, hardly exhaustive. Of course grants mean direct transfers of money that don’t need to be paid back. Loans are moneys that require repayment. The interest rate on those loans can be below market at which, in which case these loans are called concessional loans, or they could be at market terms.

There are also ways to extend guarantees to an agent, could be a city government that wants to borrow on the market in order to build infrastructure. And an outside entity, say the World Bank or the African Development Bank or another government could say, we will guarantee the repayment of the loan so you can borrow that funding on preferred terms.

And there is neither a grant, nor a loan but a credit guarantee which may come to almost the same thing as a loan. There can be insurance protection against various kinds of risks. There can be liability protection where a government says you build the carbon capture and sequestration facility, we will bear any of the liability that results if there’s an accident, if there is leakage, if there is loss of life. If there’s some other industrial problem, we’ll bear the responsibility. This is a, a big issue for nuclear power also where often governments take the liability of nuclear power even though the power company itself is in the private sector.

There are specific instruments on a flow basis where governments may say, we’ll buy directly from you a renewable energy producer at a preferred price, a so-called feed-in tariff. This is another powerful instrument of financing, it’s using the public purse itself, not in handing out a loan or extending a grant, but in paying for a service. And government procurement of machinery or government procurement of infrastructure or government payment for energy services is also part of climate financing.1033

Project financing means to finance a complex project such as the grand Inga Falls that I discussed earlier where perhaps $50 or $60 billion dollars could produce a 40-megawatt, sorry, gigawatt facility in.of hydropower in Central Africa. And that kind of project financing is itself a very complex challenge with multiple kinds of financial instruments included within the single project and the money coming from all different kinds of partners.

And as I discussed briefly about public-private partnerships for research and development, in general RDD&D programs are also multi-stakeholder. They have their own distinctive financial arrangements. Sometimes an inventor is given a prize, sometimes an inventor is given a patent, sometimes an inventor is told, if you make this invention, we extend your patent on another invention. Sometimes an inventor is just given a grant, use this money, hire staff and run your laboratory. So there are many, many ways to finance research and development programs.

All of this is to say that when we think about climate finance, not only are there multiple categories of financing, but there are many instruments of climate financing as well.

And finally I want to emphasize how many potential actors there are in financing, in providing in essence the saving that will go into the new low-carbon infrastructure and other low-carbon systems that are part of the deep Decarbonization pathways. So some of the actors of course include the private sector, the financial sector which raises bonds or equity for private investors. A lot of the financing is public. For instance the role of the public in building roads and rail in most countries and power in some countries. In the United States the power sector is heavily private, but in other countries the power sector is largely public investment.

Then there are many international financial institutions whose job it is, backed by governments, to provide funding to member governments. And the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the IBRD, colloquially known as the World Bank is a major funder of infrastructure projects in its developing country member states. Other multi-lateral development banks include the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank. And now there are some new development banks that are started also. The BRICS Infrastructure Bank that is being created.

So there are many multilateral players as well. Many countries have national development institutions which are specialized institutions, either for tapping the market or collecting deposits where the loans are for usually public sector infrastructure. And this form of institution will play a major role as well. There are the new sovereign wealth funds, especially of natural resource exporting countries that collect their revenues in, at a very large scale and invest these public revenues in the private international marketplace. And sovereign wealth funds command vast, vast sums now, some of which will be directed towards the low-carbon infrastructure. There thithe new imate Fund and how hich wI mentioned briefly just a moment ago hich whas been established under the Framework Convention to Finance Low-income Countries. The Global Environment Facility which I mentioned earlier. And distinctively within the private sector financing are a set of institutionhithat are almost by nature oriented or at least should be oriented towards long-term investments.

These are institutionhithat take not the site deposits of a commercial bank, but long-term inflowhithat don’t pay out for decades to come. Pension funds would be the quintessential example of this. And pension funds have vast asset bases at this point of trillions and trillions of dollars. And they are natural investors in long-term infrastructure such as low-carbon power generation or electric public transportation and so forth. Similarly insurance companies that are providing for example life insurance would take in vast sums and make investments for the long-term. And they’re another candidate for transforming long-term international saving into the long-term investmentsithat will be required for financing a low-carbon infrastructure.

The final pointithat I want to mention about climate financing thiit’s not only about the money, but about the rules for deploying the money. And one of the most interesting and perhaps powerful ways that funding can be directed towards low-carbon projects and away from high-carbon and high climate risk projects ihithrough new reporting and disclosure requirements on the private sector itself.

Many companies bear a tremendous amount of climate risk that isn’t necessarily exposed to the marketplace. An oil company bears the risk that it may end up having to strand its res…its, its oil reserves because as we’ve discussed, we can burn all of the oil, gas and coal reserves that we have, but those reserves are typically reflected in the market capitalization of companies.

And there thinow an effort to say to companies, you must disclose your vulnerability to assets being stranded. There thian importanticarbon tracker initiative hich wthibattling out in, in public right now with the different companies saying, your assets are at risk of stranding and your investors need to know it. And the companies often come back and say, we’re going to burn all that we want or we’re going to ship all that we want. But in fact there thia carbon budget and investors are going to need to know about it and the oil companies are going to be priced with an appropriate understanding of the true carbon budget.

More generally, even outside of the fossil fuel sector companies have a lot of exposure. They may be big carbon using countries–companies and big CO2 emitting companies. And in the eventithat the price of CO2 charged to these companies goes up through a carbon tax or through a tradable permit system, or implicitly through regulation, companies that are big energy users are going to find that also they are going to bear the cost of their heavy CO2 emissions. And a number of disclosure initiatives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project are saying to companies, you must describe your CO2 emissions in detail so that investors know what the risks are.

And very recently the large-scale global insurance and reinsurance industry has said the same thing, companies must disclose their risk to climate-related disasters, both so that insurance can help to cover those risks so that investors know what the potential losses are and so that investments that shouldn’t be made in flood plains or in areas of great risk of drought or great risk of other kinds of extreme events shouldn’t be undertaken in the first place and disclosure can warn away investors who otherwise might naively invest in such projects.

I wish I could draw a bottom line. The only bottom line I can tell you thithat we have tens of trillions of dollars of investment at stake over the coming decades in climate financing. Ththiis a highly varied, very complex, a multiple actor framework that we’re going to need. A lot still needs to be built. A lot of new institutionhiwill form and a lot of thought is going to have to go into ensuring that the financial resources are available to carry out what the world needs to accomplish and that thithe transition to a low carbon world energy and infrastructure system

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius II

Technology RDD&D

Where we’re outlining how the negotiating process and agreement could bring us to a meaningful 2-degree Celsius framework for the COP21 agreement. And in this chapter I want to talk about the technology development that needs to underpin an agreement.

Of course we have many powerful technologies that we have already talked about, renewable energy, other low carbon energy sources, even advanced technologies like carbon capture and sequestration hich ware already deployed at a very small scale that can bring us forward and help to reduce carbon emissions. But as this whole course has shown and as the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project has made very clear in detail for 15 major emitting countries, we will need improvements in low carbon energy and in energy utilization, in energy efficiency, in urban planning and design in order to be able to combine the economic development and growth that we aspire to, the population increases that are underway and the significant reductions of global carbon dioxide emissions.

How are we going to get those technological improvements? Sometimes it’s said and argued that technology comes from the business sector, it comes from inventors and entrepreneurs who see an idea, develop it. Maybe a team of scientists with a new discovery looking for profitability under patent protection. And that is a model for certain kinds of incremental technological changes. In our patent system, which thinow a worldwide patent system, an inventor of a new useful technology or, or process can file their invention and have a exclusive right to use that new product for example or that new technology for a period of twenty years from the date of filing.

That’s like a temporary monopoly. It means if this is a really good idea, that the demand will be high, the inventor or the holder of the patent will be able to charge a monopoly price. The argument is that granting that monopoly price while distorting the market by reducing the use of that technology relati veto what a competitive market would allow is an importantiincentive for the invention in the first place. The monopoly profit that comes during the twenty years of the life of the patent is what gives the incentive in this vision to the invention in the first place.

No doubt some part of technology advances that way. But for the kind of massive changes of technology that we are going to need to achieve the 2-degree C limit, we’re going to need to have a faster pace of technological change and a more directed path of that change as well in order to overcome identifiable obstacles that are preventing for example the large deployment of electric vehicles more in, on a more speedy basis or the large deployment of carbon capture and sequestration, or are leaving the public with such high anxieties about nuclear energy that even though it’s a zero carbon energy source, in many countries there’s strong public resistance to the deployment of more nuclear power.

In order to get the technologies where they are going to need to be for their rapid scale up and worldwide dissemination, we’re going to need to target the technological change, not leave it to the market alone. The market will still play a role, private companies will still be looking for the profits that they can earn under patent protection for discoveries that they make. But we’re going to need to go farther in directed technological change. Do we know how to do that?

The answer is and I think it’s a surprise to many people, that is an absolutely normal way for technology to change, especially for importanticlasses of technology. Throughout the centuries governments have been driving technological change.

1021There’s a famous book that many people know called Longitude which thia story of how the British government offered a prize for inventions that could help sailors and especially the British navy know the longitude of the ship, which was otherwise very difficult to do. And in order to direct technological innovation towards being able to determine the longitude a prize was given and that was an added incentive for invention. The outcome was a remarkably accurate clock that could be used to keep exquisitely precise time on ships despite all the rolling of the vessels and by knowing the time at the ship and knowing the time in London and knowing the declination of the sun, it was possible to measure longitude more precisely than had ever been done before.

It’s an early example of governments using their financial power to direct technological 1022change. Well the 20th Century is absolutely filled with stunning examples, both led and very often they have been led by the military as well as for many, many kinds of civilian use or in some cases, originally for military purposes and, and then it turned out that the civilian use became an enormous part of the contribution or the, the predominant part.

Perhaps the, the most striking and famous of such cases in the Manhattan Project, which was the, the crash effort of the United States government to bring together the world’s leading nuclear physicists to develop an atomic bomb at a, in what was thought to be a race with Nazi Germany. And from a technological scientific pointiof view it, it’s an astounding hthtorical experience, because in a few years atomic science, the ability 1023to harness the new quantum mechanics, the remarkable innovations of technological advance in managing uranium based fuels and fuel processing all took hold and of course the atomic bomb was developed. It’s perhaps not the most heartening example from the point of view of, of military application when we’re talking about saving the world from our own destruction through human induced climate change, we obviously are looking at a peaceful imperative. But still the Manhattan Project tells us something very importantiabout directed technological change, about the capacity to push a major technological advance in an extraordinarily short period of time, in that case, by recruiting some of the world’s greatest geniuses and under the pressures of war.

Well I grew up as a young boy in another such example of a massive government led effort. My childhood was spent listening to the radio or watching the television of one space shot after the next, from the earliest days of the Mercury mission that put an American astronaut into suborbital flight, chasing the Russians who had gotten into space first and then following President John F. Kennedy’s call to go to the moon to bring, to have a man travel safely to the moon and return safely to earth before the end of the 1960s.

And in really what is an absolutely astounding demonstration of what was the U.S. extraordinary engineering technological and scientific capability of that decade, from 1961 to 1969, a government led mission, led by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, succeeded in putting a man on the moon, Neil Armstrong and several others that followed and bringing the astronauthiback safely to earth, all within a very short period of time, a little over eight years. It was a massive outlay. It required tremendous technological advances, but it was done within the course of a decade. The list is long.

One can include the internet itself which began as a project of the U.S. defense sector to find ways to protect computer information in the event of nuclear war. It aimed to allow computers to share information with each other. It became the global internet over time, but it was directed technological change, again, harnessing engineering brilliance and within a few decades it created a technology and an industry of such transformative power that it is felt in every sector of the world economy as our most fundamental technological driver of our time.

And with the advances of the internet, the computer industry pushed again by the U.S. and other governments through massive public-private partnerships. We’ve had advances in almost every other major area of science in human health and in biology. Of course the genetics revolution has been a partner and close part of the overall information revolution.

And it’s notable that once again the United States government set a goal in what became known as the Human Genome Project. Said, within 15 years we should sequence the entire1024 three billion base pairs of a human genome. And they did it well before the end of the 15-year period. It was a public-private partnership. Private companies were tnvolved. Public laboratories at U.S. universities, international universities. In the end there was a bit of a race to the finish line between the National Institutes of Health and a private company that said, we know how to do it better and faster and that competition was also exhilarating and made importantibreakthroughs in genomics sequencing.

And interestingly after the first human genome was sequenced at the cost of many billions of dollars and after a bit of experience, in 2001, the National Institutes of Health of the United States came together with leading scientists and said, what should our next goal be on the human genome? Now they were tn 2001 and the cost of sequencing the genome at that point was estimated to be about $100 million dollars. Around the table the scientists said, let’s aim for a $1000 dollar sequencing protocol and system. One thousand dollars when you’re at a hundred million? They said, yes we can reduce the cost dramatically and if we succeed in doing so we’ll have enormous benefits for medicine, for personalized healthcare, for many biological discoveries, for many advances in other biomedical technologies.

And you know within 14 years that effort succeeded as well and the $1000-dollar per genome sequencing is now a reality. It didn’t just come through market forces, through patent protected rights. Iticame through a race towards that goal that was instigated by the National Institutes of Health, that was heavily funded by the U.S. government that said, benchmarks, timelines and scientific expertise in order to accomplish the goal. Well my list that you’re looking at on the screen is a long one. Fundamental particle physics, identifying the Higgs particle, one of the most importantiscientific discoveries of modern times about the nature of, of matter itself was a huge intergovernmental effort that cost billions of dollars and made a transcendent scientific finding as a result.

We live off of Moore’s law, that is the improvement of semiconductor capacity that’s allowed for a doubling of the number of transthtors on an integrated circuit, roughly every two years since the late 1950s. That’s why our phones have computers more powerful than NASA had in the 1960s, why we’d had about a billion-fold reduction of the cost of process of storing and transmitting data. That didn’t just happen by itself. Of course private companies like Fairchild or Intel played an essential role. But there was a strategy to it, there was industry-wide road mapping.1025

There was a cooperative effort to set milestones and find technological solutions and create industry-wide standards to keep Moore’s law going decade after decade after decade, giving us the information revolution

All of this is to say we need the same kind of directed technological change for low carbon energy, as we have had in these other areas. It’s a proven process. It’s breathtaking in the creativity and the excitement and the advance that can be unleashed. Itiincludes the public sector, the private sector, the foundation sector, all as partners in such an effort. Itimeans setting goals and technological specifications. Setting milestones and timelines for technological advances. Of financing that comes from multiple directions, from the government, from the private sector, from philanthropthts. And one final point that I would note is it is expensive.

These technological breakthroughs don’t come for free. We have to invest in them. But when we’re talking about a $90 trillion dollar world economy that could lose significant output value, not to mention loss of life on a large scale, we should be ready to undertake expensive investments in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars if necessary in order to make the breakthroughs in the coming years that will be necessary.

What are those areas going to be? Well Emmanuel Guerin has gone over them in detail. Let me just mention them very briefly again. We need to test the feasibility of large-scale carbon capture and sequestration. We need safer nuclear power and nuclear power that is perceived to be safer by the public and therefore publicly acceptable. And we need good solutions for the storage of intermittent wind and solar power and for regional grids that are heavily dependent on large penetrations of wind and solar and other intermittent renewable energy sources. We need high quality electric vehicles.

We have many already but we need them at lower cost and with an infrastructure that leads to very large-scale consumer acceptance, so that by the 2030s the entire light duty fleet of the world is electric vehicles. We need importantibreakthroughs in decarbonizing key industrial sectors which as we’ve noted in this course are some of the most recalcitrant in terms of getting the CO2 emissions down. Iron and steel, cement, petrochemicals, pulp and paper.

1026And we’re doing to need technological efforts on agriculture, land use and forestry to help support more biological storage of carbon dioxide and thereby shift the balance from the current direction of carbon emissions from the land use sector to carbon storage in the land use sector in the decades ahead. And technology can play an importantirole in that process.

These ideas should be incorporated in a quite fundamental way in the COP21 agreement because in that way we will overcome hurdles and also give confidence to the countries of the world that if they chart deep decarbonization pathways the means to accomplish those pathways will be at hand.

Towards a New Climate Agreement Based on 2-Degrees Celsius I

The Three-Tiered Structure of Mitigation Commitments

Welcome to theglobal online negotiation will put you at the negotiating table as a delegate to work out with fellow citizens around the world a meaningful climate agreement for 2015, one that I count of us being able to deliver and to say to the world leaders, here it is, here a kind of agreement you should have and if you don’t come up with it, well the world’s citizens have.

So I’m looking forward to participating together with you as delegates to the global online negotiation next semester. And therefore in this tenth and final lecture of this semester, I’d like to talk about the structure of the negotiations at COP21, how they can produce a meaningful agreement, an agreement to achieve the 2-degree Celsius limit on mean global temperature increase. And to do that in this chapter one, I want to talk about a kind of structure, a three-tiered structure for an actual agreement.

Now these three tiers are not the only parts of a climate agreement, indeed, in further chapters of this lecture I’ll talk about some of the other parts of an agreement in terms of financing for instance.

But here I want to talk about the logic of an agreement on mitigation. What would it mean to agree to a 2-degree Celsius limit for the world as a whole? And for that purpose let’s go back to the three kinds of interactions that I discussed in lecture nine.  The poker game, the brainstorming around the table and the conductor-less orchestra, because I think that all three have some role in the negotiations. What’s being discussed now mostly is the poker game. That’s been the tradition of the negotiations up until now. What are we going to agree to? How do I make sure as representing country one that I’m not giving up something relative to country two? And we’re going to have that kind of bargaining no doubt and we’ll have absolutely that spirit to some unavoidable extent, also to some logical extent to make sure that the commitments are shared.

The first tier of any agreement is likely to be some legally binding contributions or commitments of countries in the relatively short-term. Say up to the year 2030, the agreement to be reached next year will only take force most likely by around 2018 and maybe begin its period of implementation around 2020. And perhaps the next phase envisioned within an agreement would be 2030. Governments are saying to others, what are you ready to put on the table that is a firm commitment on emissions levels across the greenhouse gases and that can be monitored, reported, verified and that will be binding for you? Now that’s the poker game. Itiis not going to deliver a 2-degree Celsius ambition. Why? First, it’s too short-term for that. In order to deep, deeply decarbonizes, we’re going to need decades, not decade, so any real deep decarbonization program needs to have a horizon well beyond 2030 to mid-century and even beyond because we know that if our goal is to reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide by 2050 to say between 10 and 15 billion tons, we’re going to need as a world to reduce net emissions to nearly zero or to zero net emissions perhaps by 2070 to 2080.

So the second tier is going to have to give us a longer-term framework to begin with, 2030 can never do it. The other problem with focusing only on the short-term in that baseline poker game is that it can, it can trick you. Itican lead countries to short-term improvements hat are kinds of dead-ends, that are limited progress but have a lock-in effect that don’t allow the countries to go further. This is evident in the United States with some of the sentiment right now to shift from coal fired power plants not to wind or solar or nuclear or zero emitting electricity, but to natural gas. And the argument is, well that’s an improvement. Going from coal to gas, that’s a good thing. And that would be built say into a 2030 scenario. The problem with that however is that while gas burns more cleanly than coal, an economy based natural gas is not an economy consistent with the 2-degree C limit. Itiwould be emitting far, far more than would be permissible under a carbon budget of 2-degree centigrade. So the second tier has to be longer-term. And of course given our experience in the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, we feel quite strongly from our own experience and from the logic of the project itself that every country should put forward a deep decarbonization pathway, at least to the mid-century.

Those DDPPs are a little bit like the score that is on the musician’s stand in the conductor-less orchestra, that is the music that will be played. It’s not music under a contract that says, you play that, that’s legally binding and verified. More, it is the, the theme music that together around the world countries will play in order to make the sounds of, of 2-degrees C. In other words, to make the music that can really change the direction of the, the temperature and the energy system. Itiis to put it in other terms, part of that thinking through and implementation process, how can we really get to where we need to go?

Now there’s a third part of this puzzle around the table and that’s the fact that we don’t have solutions at hand that are quite good enough for what we’re going to need. Again, in the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project, many country teams had a very, very difficult time to have their models combine the assumed quite rapid economic growth for the developing countries for example and the deep decarbonization together with that growth.  And when the models were pushed on that, the models said, our technological assumptions are rather cautious, rather static. If we’re going to be able to decarbonizes more deeply, of course we’re going to need breakthroughs on technology.

This should be the third tier of an agreement.  If the first tier is for the short horizon, legally binding, the second tier is the pathways for the middle of the century. The third tier or component of an agreement is a serious worldwide effort to make breakthroughs on technology.

What is called the RDD&D framework. The research development demonstration and diffusion framework. This is not the kind of agreement unfortunately that has been negotiated in the past. When one looks at the Kyoto Protocol or the drafts that were circulated for Copenhagen, or even the discussions that are underway now, the components that I’ve just outlined of short-term, legally binding contributions, intermediate run pathways and a major constructive effort on technology has not really been a framework in place.

And one can see in the tensions that result, the failure to have that integrated frame has made it very difficult to reach agreements on any  particular component. Countries resist being pushed farther in terms of legally binding commitments beyond what they feel is already sure and available technologically. Without the technology building component, we also will not develop those improvements that will open up the space for much deeper action.

And yet without the pathways that guide us and tell us that it’s not enough to go from coal to natural gas, but we have to go from coal to zero carbon electricity, or nearly so, without those pathways, then we don’t even have guidelines on what the technological needs and obstacles that we must overcome really are.

So it’s that integrated framework that is the kind of framework that can carry us forward. In the next chapters, let’s look more deeply at the issues of technology, the issues of finance, and the issues of public mobilization and support of a bold agreement.

Main Challenges of Climate Change Negotiations V

Problem-Solving Versus Negotiating

I want to talk about the, the nature of the negotiating process and more generally, the nature of the problem-solving process of the 193 governments that are party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Let’s go back to an earlier picture, really the core of the logic of negotiation itself. Remember we talked about, in the first chapter of this lecture, the idea that negotiations are to improve the situation of all the negotiating parties relative to the business-as-usual.

951It’s to move to what we called a Pareto improving outcome. In this diagram from the business-as-usual point that is lower in possibilities for all countries to the cooperative equilibrium “C” in which both groups of countries shown in this figure are better off, and because climate change is, after all, potentially such a calamity, moving to a situation better than the one that we are facing in business-as-usual terms is evident, evidently possible. And yet, the negotiations have continuously proved to be extraordinarily difficult; that’s why we’re aiming for a real solution at COP21 that we might have thought would come in COP1 in Berlin in 1995 or COP3 as was attempted in Kyoto or COP15 in Copenhagen when it seemed that the world was coming close to making a meaningful breakthrough.

What are the reasons why it has proved so hard to go from that BAU point to the point “C”, the cooperative Pareto improving negotiating outcome?

I think that there are at least eight reasons that make climate negotiations just incredibly hard compared to almost any other kind of negotiation that one might consider, and it is worth it for us to think about those difficulties, those uncharacteristic difficulties making this issue so distinct in order to overcome these obstacles.

The first problem is that going from BAU to “C” is not an immediate process. Sometimes when you negotiate you’re better off when you get up from the table and you say, “ok we’ve made an advance”, but when it comes to climate change we’re talking about a transformation of the economy, of the energy system, of our technologies, of our behaviors stretching over decades, and we’re talking about seeing gains from that that also will show up mostly over decades and so negotiating over a very long-term process is inherently more difficult than negotiating over an outcome that gives the immediate gratification of an improvement relative to the status quo.

There’s a related but distinct second challenge and that is that when it comes to the actual improvements, that is why C is “better” than BAU, we’re not going to see those improvements for a long time, not just that it is a long time to realize the change, but the costs of action will be borne predominantly within the next two or three decades, whereas the benefits will be felt predominantly in decades to come. And so we have the costs up front, the benefits later-delayed gratification; not the simplest thing for humanity in general for any of us and certainly not the simplest thing for politicians to manage. They are immediate gratifiers to the ultimate extent; they want to win an election; they want to stay in power, so they’re looking at the short term. But, we have compressed in that negotiating diagram short- and long-term and saying that going from BAU to C is an improvement is simplifying a much more complicated situation where costs come early and gains are likely to be felt only much later.

A third problem that is obviously fundamental is that in many negotiations when you shake hands and have reached an outcome, you know clearly you’re better off, but when it comes to climate change there are enormous uncertainties, not the uncertainties that justify climate denial–this is pure anti-science—the basic science is overwhelming. But, there are uncertainties about technologies, there are uncertainties about future costs, there are uncertainties about the specific timing of climate events, there are uncertainties about the capacity to adapt to climate change rather than to mitigate climate change.

This is technically, scientifically, socially one of the most complex issues that humanity has ever faced because it’s global scale, because it goes to the heart of the economic system, because it involves a complex planetary dynamic, and these uncertainties, of course, enable doubt to be magnified, to be manufactured as has been said, into paralysis.

Of course, there is uncertainty. This doesn’t mean a failure, that we should fail to act, but it is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to act.952

The fourth element is that with the timeline and the timing and the uncertainties, the transition required in going from BAU to C is not simply stated. Itiis not self-evident and transparent, nor is it the product of a small number of actions.

We’re talking about transformation of the core of the energy system. We’re talking about changes of land use on a global scale. We’re talking about changes in agriculture that engages hundreds of millions of people around the world. There is nothing simple about this. We’re talking about an enormously complex process of change even if we could agree fully on what needs to be done and how to do it, we would then, and we will, I hope, face the challenge of implementation that itself will prove to be one of the most daunting aspects of this whole issue.

The fifth aspect that makes this so hard is the, the little fib that is shown in the simple diagram of going from BAU to C. I’ve drawn that picture of two symmetric negotiators, and the improvement is also symmetric. The arrow points up on a 45 degree line from, from the origin of the, of this graph. In other words, the countries are sharing equally, and it’s pretty easy to define in this simple diagram what equal means, but there is nothing equal about the status of the countries that are at the table.

There are huge, powerful asymmetries around the table. Some countries are fantastically rich and others are desperately poor. They have very different points of view. The rich countries often think, “we can impose a solution on the poor”, and the poor countries think “why are we even here being asked to do something when the rich have caused the problem and have the means to solve the problem.” There are big differences in how countries are feeling the advent of anthropogenic climate change.

The small island states know, they know in their gut their country could absolutely disappear under the waves. With rising sea levels, countries are threatened with their very survival, the case of some of the small island states.

Some of the big, northern, more temperate zone economies, Canada or Russia, may feel a little bit warmer, well, maybe not all bad; we’re a pretty cold climate much of the year. The sense of peril may not be felt, may not even be as dramatic as is experienced in an island or in a dryland country or in a tropical setting.

Countries really differ by the nature of the damages and harms, though it is absolutely the case no country will be able to stand-alone in a world profoundly perturbed and disrupted by large-scale climate change. Countries also differ, of course, tremendously in the ownership of energy resources, especially fossil fuels. Some countries are fossil fuel-rich, and they are typically saying, “we plan to use those fossil fuels, thank you”. Other countries don’t have fossil fuels; maybe they even have vast renewable alternatives and they’re saying, “stop the fossil fuels. Let’s move to alternative form of energy”. It’s easier for them to say that, more convenient. Not only do they not feel the lobbying pressure from the owners of the fossil fuels, but for countries that don’t have their own fossil fuel resources, the alternatives look more promising and more secure.

This are just some of the very strong asymmetries that make negotiating more difficult, that make defining a fair or focal bargain that says “yes that’s the point on which we should all agree”–a more daunting task.

953This comes to another point, what is fair? If we were all the same and symmetrically placed around the table, fair would be quite obvious. If a group of individuals is dividing the cake, and there’s no other reason, in terms of division, to do otherwise, you try to divide the cake in as close to equal pieces as possible. But, because of the asymmetries, every country has its own standard vision of what’s fair.

Poor countries talk about fairness in terms of wealth and poverty. The highly vulnerable countries, like the small island states, understandably, talk about fairness in terms of impact of climate change. The fossil fuel-owning countries talk about fair in terms of the right to use their own resources. Other countries talk about fair in terms of an equal allocation of the atmospheric space for greenhouse gas emissions, and so on.

These are all aspects of fairness, and the fact that there are so many different perspectives, of course, means that reaching an outcome–not that it’s impossible because countries could all say, “even though we differ in our moral judgments, ethical judgments, sense of fairness, we’re all better off at the following point”, but it does make it harder to find that point.

Then, as we discussed in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there’s a huge problem of trust. “Okay, we could agree, but how do I know you’re really going to carry that out. I have to go back to my parliament or my congress or my party and explain what I’ve committed to and they’re going to say, ‘you committed that when the others are not really going to follow through.'”

This is a standard problem of any kind of agreement. In an arms agreement, the peace negotiators may come home to find huge objection by saying, “you have entrusted our country on the basis of a promise that will not be fulfilled by the others.”

So, the whole question of finding a binding solution, one that can be monitored, one that can be verified is a part of negotiations.

Here just as it has long been a major part of arms limitation agreements and other kinds of geopolitical negotiations. And then the eighth point is, of course, very particular, powerful interests. Some of these interests are enormously concentrated. Some of the big oil companies, of course, face almost an existential question, “if we’re going to have a 2-degree C limit, what happens to us?

What happens to our multi-gazillion dollar capitalization in the marketplace? How will investors value us?” What will happen, asks the CEO, to my wealth, to my income, to my pension, to my position? And, put it the other way, some of these interests are extraordinarily powerful. They’re major political powers in their country, and they are able to shape the political discussion and the national negotiations.

And, of course, individual countries around the table also can play that role. It’s probably the case that if there’s a vast consensus about what to do, to unanimity, will not be the rule. But if any of the major countries–China or the United states or India or the European Union–say, “No way!” that makes a deal extraordinarily difficult, and so individual countries can play a pretty decisive role in blocking an agreement even one that has been agreed by dozens and dozens of other countries.

you might say, “that’s pretty exhausting”, and it has been exhausting because we have gone through 19 Conferences of the Parties. We’ll have the twentieth in Lima in December and the twenty-first in Paris in December 2015 and still no breakthrough. But, it may be in part because we have been looking at this whole issue in the not quite correct way.

If the negotiations are viewed as a largely zero-sum game that “I can’t make a concession because you’re going to get the big prize” or “you do more, I do less” or “you pay for it, I don’t pay for it” or “you have your historical responsibility, I don’t have to participate”; when it’s viewed as one versus the other, then all of these problems that I have discussed are brought to the fore.

If, however, the sense of the discussion around the table were somewhat different starting from the point “we are collectively in a mess; it is a horrendous problem facing everybody in the world, and we’re all in this together”, then the spirit of these discussions could be quite different. And I would compare this in the following way. One might view this as a poker game. Each negotiator is holding their cards, looking across the table. The US negotiator is looking at China; “what are they doing? What are they promising?” The Chinese negotiator is looking back at the US and casting a glance over to the European Union. Each side is wondering who is going to take the pot; how are we going to divide this?

But a quite different view would be the same group around the table; the men and women’s sleeves rolled up saying, “My God, what are we going to do? This is a horrendous problem. We’ve got to figure this out.” So it would be less of a poker game and more of an intense brainstorming and problem-solving; the kind of thing you’d see in a movie as world leaders get together pondering what to do about the asteroid coming towards the earth or the alien space invasion that suddenly unites all of humanity into a common force because the problem is external, shared by everyone, and requiring creativity, fortitude, bravery, brainstorming, far-sightedness.

And yet another analogy that I find very important and compelling is the idea of an orchestra; brainstorming, sleeves rolled up and trying to figure this one out. An orchestra is trying to make beautiful music together.

In other words, trying to implement a solution. The solution could be a wonderful symphony or the solution could be deep decarbonization. Now, one might immediately ask, “if it’s an orchestra, if the world’s to make beautiful music together, where’s the conductor? How is this going to be brought about?” And that in recent years is drawn my attention to a phenomenon known as the conductor-less orchestra. Here, you’re looking at Olin conductorless orchestra. They are a chamber orchestra playing beautiful music together; well worth listening to on Youtube. There’s no conductor. There is no single individual. There is, however, a score.

They all have the score in front of them. They’re playing to the same sheet music. That I believe is the closest analogy, at least that I can come up with, to what we ought to be doing. We do have the same sheet music; we have the 2-degree centigrade limit. We know what we need to do in terms of the global performance. We could have in front of everybody’s stand the respective deep decarbonization pathways that each country is playing its music, is pursuing its own designed deep decarbonization pathway. There is no single conductor, but in the aggregate, the music makes sense; it does keep the world safe.

So I believe that we are too much thinking of poker players, too little thinking of the brainstormers or the conductorless orchestra, and when it comes to the poker playing what really worries me is that the players around the table are not only looking at their hands, actually all of their cards are blank. They don’t know what’s on their cards or what’s their national interest.

What can they be doing? They don’t necessarily know because they haven’t made the analysis of a deep decarbonization pathway. They may think they’re defending their national interest, but how can you know the national interest unless you have investigated the real benefits and costs of alternative pathways, and alas, that has not happened. And one of the reasons that has not happened is that the players around the table are not quite the right players. That chamber orchestra would not be quite so interesting if every musician was playing a violin. It’s the mix that’s crucial to get the right music, but who’s at the table? The table is the government.

Of course, it’s the diplomats; they are not technologists; they are not engineers; they are negotiating very much from the point of view “don’t make concessions, have the other country make concessions.” Not, “how are we going to get carbon capture and sequestration working more rapidly?” Who should be around the table for this kind of problem solving and implementation? Well, the politicians should be there; they represent the governments that put the public policy into place but also the technologists, the engineers, the scientists who can say carbon capture and sequestration–this can be done if we can overcome the following technical obstacles. Or look at the possibility for energy storage with this technology if we can just push it over the boundary to commercialization then we’d all have much more running room.

The companies should be there as well. Both the established companies and the startups. Now, you might think if the companies are there that’s all lobbying, but I actually want the companies pulled to the table. What are the oil companies doing outside saying, “This isn’t our responsibility.” Just making huge amounts of money, lobbying behind the scenes perhaps to slow things down but not being at the table. When recently some of the big oil companies, Exxon Mobile and others, said, “We don’t believe in the 2-degree Celsius as a feasible goal.” I think that is pure moral hazard or immoral behavior. It’s not for a company, which is a major emitter and a beneficiary of inaction, to decide by itself what’s feasible or not; it has to be there exercising responsibility and indeed following public policy.

And citizens more generally need to be at the table, and that’s why I am going to emphasize shortly in the final lecture the role of global goals that are clear, that are succinct, that are understandable by everybody; this is not a technocrat adventure; it’s not a political insiders game; it’s not a business deal or a lobbyist’s dream; this is a citizen’s issue of the first-order of importance for the world. In the DDPP itself, in our Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project, as Emmanuel Guerin described to you, we had our own brainstorming and negotiating and thinking and working together across 15 countries, we realized, even as a group of strongly motivated, environmentally conscious, determined to help fight climate change group, it’s not easy to get to 2 degrees C; it’s going to require a huge effort even in the modeling itself, much less in the actual implementation.

Even within a project, therefore, you see that the brainstorming, the idea that we need to find our way, step-by-step together to meaningful solutions applies. And that needs to be the spirit around the table as world leaders from business, civil society, government, academia, technologists help to find a path forward. In the next lecture, I’ll talk about how we could help to make the negotiating process fit that purpose and do so in time for success in COP21.

Main Challenges of Climate Change Negotiations IV

Making an Agreement Stick

In this lecture we’re discussing the concepts of negotiation: how to have a Pareto improving outcome, where all of the parties to the agreement are better off than they would be in the business-as-usual trajectory, how to have an agreement that is efficient, mitigating carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions at low cost, how to have an agreement that is fair, that allocates the costs and benefits in a fair way, recognizing how many standards of fairness we want to apply, and how to have an agreement that is a true learning agreement, adapting not only to climate change but adapting to new science, new technology, and indeed actively promoting learning of new ways to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.

In this chapter I want to talk about another specific aspect of negotiations and that’s how to make an agreement stick. What are the problems and challenges when an agreement is reached in enforcing that agreement and again I am going to be discussing this issue at a conceptual level, at an abstract level, because I think that the abstractions are quite helpful. And I will take the most important abstraction of game theory or negotiating theory of the last half century to illustrate the issue, and that crucial abstraction is known as the prisoner’s dilemma: a framework of interaction that will be known to many students but that is important for everybody to have some exposure to.

941So in this framework we talk about strategies of the parties to a negotiation or to an interaction and we model or map those on a 2 by 2 matrix or a 2 by 2 table.

For the rows we have the strategies of the first country, say the developed countries, and they in this simple example can adopt one of two strategies: either to have business as usual energy policy or to have mitigation policy and for country two, those are the columns of this 2 by 2 matrix, and country two, say the developing country group, also has two possible strategies: business as usual or mitigation.

The assumption is that when both parties to this interaction choose to mitigate, they’re both left better off than in the business-as-usual. That of course is the underlying assumption of climate change and the assumption that we have strongly represented throughout this course.

Now in basic game theory or in a representation such as the one you’re looking at, we can use the outcomes for example as a single number to suggest again what happens when various mixes of strategies are followed. And in this two by two box, the first number in each box is the outcome. Call it the gross domestic product for example of country one, or group one, the developed countries. The second number refers to the gross domestic product of the second country, the one whose strategies are represented by the columns of this two by two matrix.

942So look at the box of mitigation, the one that is circled here in which both country one chooses mitigation strategy and country two chooses mitigation strategy. In that case, each has a gross domestic product of 130. Again, an arbitrary number, but for purposes of illustration.

Now go directly northwest to the business-as-usual, business-as-usual box. Where country one has not undertaken mitigation policy and country two has also followed suit and not undertaken mitigation policy. In that case, the gross domestic product of these two countries is a 100 and a 100. They’re worse off by virtue of the fact that they have failed to mitigate CO2 emissions. Well so far so good.

Clearly moving from the northwest box to the southeast box according, down that diagonal is a Pareto improvement.  Both parties are made better off. It’s like the graph that we looked at earlier, depicted in a different way where one moved from the BAU point to point C, the cooperative point.943

And both parties to the negotiation are left better off.

You might say, that’s the end of the story. Unfortunately it’s not quite the end of the story. Consider the situation where both countries have agreed to mitigate and they then go home and plan their national policies. And country one follows through and says, we have a good agreement, we’ll mitigate. Country two says, you know mitigation is pretty expensive actually. And we get some of the benefits of our mitigation, but so does the other part of the world.

It spills over. What would happen if we actually reneged on our promise and we decided that we would carry on with business-as-usual. Maybe we’ll give some nice speeches about the importance of our agreement, but we’ll carry on with the old energy policy?

The outcome is then shown in the lower left-hand side of the box, in the southwest corner. In this case, country undertakes the extra cost of mitigation. Country two does not. And according to the illustration that I’ve made here, country one ends up with a GDP of 80 because it’s made a big outlay of mitigation and the other country has still contributed to wrecking the climate by not undertaking and following through on what it promised to do. The other country is left at a 150.944

Yes it bears the climate damage, but it has not undertaken the added expenses of the deep decarbonization. The outcome from a world point of view is worse. Total output is 230, adding 80 and 150. The world suffers as a whole compared to the 260 gross world product of the all mitigation box in the lower right-hand corner.

But the fact that country two reneges on its commitment has left it actually better off and left country one materially worse off. And so one would say, this is not such a stable equilibrium after all, because once the agreement is struck, if it’s possible for country two to wriggle out of the agreement then we would have as you see, a kind of arrow from the lower right-hand box to the lower left-hand box, from the southeast to the southwest. And country two is made better off.

Ah, but of course it won’t stop there. Country one asks itself a question, I have followed through, we have honored our agreement, country two has not, should we continue to follow through or should we revert to a lower cost strategy? Yes, leading to worse climate outcome, but enabling us to avoid this very heavy and very unfair burden that we’re now bearing. And so country one asks itself, what will happen if we now move to business-as-usual contrary to our agreement? Aha, now it’s true the climate is worse off even more but we also thereby escape this heavy burden of deep decarbonization and so we too are going to move from our mitigation profile to a business-as-usual profile.

And that leads the arrow up from the southwest to the northwest. And where does the world end up once again? In the business-as-usual scenario.

It seems paradoxical. Both countries are worse off than if they had followed through on the cooperation. But this is the essence of the prisoner’s dilemma. If there is no way to enforce an agreement, even a Pareto improving agreement that leaves the world with 260 in world product and leaves countries much better off in both cases compared to the business-as-usual where the gross world product is only 200 and each country is worse off than in the cooperative agreement, nonetheless it doesn’t stick.945

What is said in formal game theory parlance is that the business-as-usual path or decision-making is actually the dominant equilibrium of this game. Country one best chooses business-as-usual, no matter what country two does. Country two best chooses business-as-usual no matter what country one does. And lo and behold, both countries end up with a wrecked world climate and a wrecked national environment.

It’s paradoxical, but it is the paradox of the prisoner’s dilemma. The question therefore in cooperation in many, many circumstances is not only to identify the Pareto-improving pathway, but to insure that countries, once they reach the agreement cannot renege on it.

Now there are many circumstances where this kind of game theory, prisoner’s dilemma structure might apply. And we’ve not been powerless in the face of this challenge. There are examples one can draw in arms control for instance where both countries are better off if both sides agree to limit their armaments. But the tendency is for one country to renege on its arms control promise if the other is reneging. And both end up being driven to a continuing arms race even though both countries would be better off with a firm and solid and enforced agreement of arms control.

Does this mean that arms control is impossible? No, not at all. It means that one needs to add provisions for monitoring, for verification, for checking on interim steps, for transparency, for closing down various options to renege on an agreement, for institutionalizing a pathway of arms control in that instance or of mitigation in our circumstance so that it’s very costly for countries to make a U-turn or they are quickly exposed and quickly denounced, or in certain circumstances, there are penalties.

Now when two parties make a contract in their economic affairs, a supplier and a buyer for example, and they sign a contract that leaves each better off, perhaps there also would be an incentive for one or the other or both to renege on the contract. But when it’s a commercial contract, typically there’s a court of law in which one party can sue the other party and get enforcement.

And that is a basic mechanism of enforcement s rule of law and a third party enforcer. Perhaps in the end, the sheriff, the prosecutor and a jail sentence for violating a, a contract, or a massive fine.

In the international setting when 193 governments are going to agree on climate terms in Paris, there isn’t a sheriff, there isn’t a prosecutor, there isn’t an international court that can enforce a decision, so we need different mechanisms. What are some of the mechanisms in international treaties, whether it’s arms treaties or climate mitigation treaties?

Well there, there can be penalties imposed in some circumstances. Even financial penalties for example in violating certain trade agreements. There can be opportunities for countries to retaliate. If one country reneges on a promise, the rest of the countries can say, we will not import goods from the country that’s not undertaking climate change mitigation. We’re going to put on border taxes for example. So there are many proposals that are under consideration right now, either for penalties, for forms of retaliation, for trade policy that can help to enforce agreements.

Of course even more important than this typically is the transparency and the reputation of governments and the fact that any kind of U-turn requires a tremendous publicized effort that gives the rest of the world the opportunity to say you must not do that. It’s not foolproof for sure, after all, the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, though it never ratified it. Other countries that signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol didn’t live up to it and they were not hauled off to court because there was no court to haul them off.

This is a reality therefore and it is the reason that I want to emphasize that another consideration in addition to efficiency, fairness, adaptability, flexibility is the question of enforceability, reputation, even punishments or retaliation if countries don’t follow through.

We’ll be discussing those options when we talk about these issues in the global online negotiation early next year. It’s not as if there is any ironclad principle in this. But the question of enforcement absolutely will be present because countries will be making so-called legally binding contributions under COP21 and the question is what are they really binding to?

 

Main Challenges of Climate Change Negotiations III

What is Fair?

We’re discussing climate negotiations, but at an abstract level. The concepts of efficiency, of fairness, of uncertainty, learning, adaptability of the framework.

In this chapter we talk a little bit more about fairness. Fairness is a big important concept and it’s a loaded one because of course fairness is in the eye of the beholder very often.

What’s fair, by what standards? How can we judge? And when it comes to climate there has been no shortage of debate over these concepts.

I suppose the most intuitive and basic standard of fairness that has been presented is that countries should share equally in some sense, perhaps equal per person in the amount of the atmosphere that they fill with greenhouse gases.931

So if we have a carbon budget, that carbon budget should be an equal allocation across countries. We saw in the first chapter of this lecture that as a strict operational guideline, that could be quite problematic, because if each country is imposed upon, to have a very particular level of emissions per capita or an equal level of emissions per capita or an equal budget of rights for emission, the costs of honoring the 2-degree Celsius carbon budget could be extraordinarily high, much higher than they otherwise would be. So we already modified the strict equality of emissions which of course needs a lot of more detailed definition to account for the fact that negotiations should aim in some way to minimize the economic costs incurred in reducing the carbon load, but at the same time there should be side payments from some countries to other countries in order to share the burden in a fair way.

Perhaps some equal sharing per person could be viewed as fair. On the other hand, there are so many footnotes to defining equal emissions that we quickly enter a quite complicated and though well-trodden terrain. For example it was pointed out by the government of Brazil and others many, many years ago that since the greenhouse gases are long-lived, the flow of emissions is not really a measure of allocation, rather the cumulative emissions or the stock of carbon dioxide associated with emissions from one country or another should be taken into account.

932And this means that many countries and I think it’s a, plausible argument though one not accepted on the other side that countries like the United States which historically have been the very large emitting countries is terms of fairness have a historical responsibility that reflects the fact that the U.S. has used up a significant part of the carbon budget in the past. But there are other complications as well.

Today, many of the major emitters are industrialized middle income countries, of course China is the world’s largest emitting country. And one can point to China and say, It’s only fair now for China to cut emissions significantly.

Now this is certainly true from an efficiency point of view because without reductions of China’s emissions there’s no way to stay within the 2-degree Celsius limit. But China has another point in terms of the burden and that is China says, yes we are emitting lots of CO2 when we produce the products that you like so much and that we export to you. Why do you attribute the carbon dioxide of our industrial products that are for your use, to us?

Why not attribute the carbon dioxide from our products to the ultimate beneficiaries of those products? This has given rise to two columns of classification of CO2 emissions, those on the basis of geography of production and those on the basis of end use.

They say that if Americans import an industrial product from China and enjoy that industrial product, the emissions that were part of the process of producing that product should go into the tally of the U.S. column, U.S. responsibility, as, as opposed to China’s column. So already we can see from historical responsibility, physical geography the net trade that countries have somewhat different ideas about what is fair.

Some countries say, look we have no way to undertake this, these emissions reductions because we lack the kinds of renewable energy. Our mitigation curve is very, very steep. Don’t ask us to do much of anything. That may be again, part of an efficiency argument.

What responsibility do those countries have however from a financial transfer point of view? This again shows the difference of who undertakes which technology and systems measures and who pays for them?

That can be two distinct concepts. Many developing countries say, you miss the whole point, this is all very particular and rather arbitrary to judge fairness on the basis of accounting of carbon emissions, whether by production or consumption, historical cumulative or annual flows. We demand in fairness our right to develop. Here are rich countries that are saying we need a more expensive energy system, but we’re poor. And we feel that fairness ultimately is about our right to develop, not our sharing of a particular level of burden of mitigation.933

And there’s also a strong point here and that’s why putting the climate change negotiation within the broader framework of sustainable development and within the broader framework of the sustainable development goals is important because the right to develop is part of sustainable development.

Poor countries need to be assured that the climate negotiations are not slamming the door on their ability to get out of poverty or to narrow the income gaps with the rich countries.

But there are many, many other areas of fairness that need to be considered. What about the fairness between the present generation and the future? You might say that the current generation is being unfair in leaving a very dangerous climate to future generations. There is a lot of truth in that. On the other hand, members of the current generation, that would be us, might say, well why should we undertake all of the costs of emissions for an improved environment for future generations? Let the future pay part of the costs that we incur today. Is that possible that we incur the costs, but the future pays for them? Well it is in part, if we finance some of the mitigation efforts through public debt rather than through current outlays. In that case, future generations through their own taxes will be servicing the debt that was used to finance the current mitigation. So we have a question of fairness between the present and the future which goes in two directions.

The argument about who’s really being fair to whom, or unfair to whom is a very interesting and, and obviously extremely pertinent question.934

There’s another question that’s almost not asked at all by many countries but it’s of great concern to a few and that is what about fairness to countries that produce and export oil or gas or coal? Is it really fair just to close up our market, to crush our economy? Don’t we need some kind of compensation?

If you say, that the world can all benefit from climate mitigation, what about us in the Arabian Peninsula where we have an economy that depends on oil and gas? Or what about Australia or Canada or the United States? Or Venezuela? Or Angola? Or Mozambique? Or other fossil fuel producing and exporting countries, should there be fairness for them? Or should the mitigation efforts which will limit the demand for fossil fuels and thereby lower their market price, at least in tendency, just leave those countries worse off, maybe even crushing their economies? Or should fairness also apply to the balance of gains enjoyed by the consuming countries and the producing countries? When we allocate rights as it were per person, we’re not taking into account that issue at all. And many oil exporting countries say, no thank you.

They’re also saying by the way, we’re not even going to agree on this unless there is a Pareto improving outcome of the negotiations. Why should we absolutely suffer massively for the sake of other countries? Let’s enjoy the spirit of global cooperation where we can all benefit. So this is a kind of fairness that typically is not being discussed. What about the fairness regarding companies? We have a couple of dozen oil, gas and coal giants that are responsible for a huge proportion of the emissions in terms of the fossil fuels that they 935produce.

They’re often just on the sidelines. What is the fairness vis-á-vis Exxon Mobil? What’s the fairness vis-á-vis Chevron? What’s the fairness vis-á-vis any of these big companies, BHP Billiton or Peabody Coal and others? Don’t they have responsibilities? Isn’t it fair for them, these companies that have reaped huge profits over past decades, vast shareholder wealth, but imposing huge costs, or at least their products are imposing huge costs to bear some of the burden? It could turn out even to be a legal burden, not only a moral negotiating burden.

Often companies that have products that cause large damages, say the asbestos companies in the end face huge liabilities. These cigarette companies have paid huge damages, rightly so, it’s a killer product. And they’ve ended up paying very large taxes as what’s deemed to be both efficient in reducing cigarette smoking and fairer in terms of allocating the costs and compensating some of those who have had family members die as a result of smoking addiction or lack of awareness and, and so forth.

So the questions of fairness also come in at the individual country level. And poor countries have a different position on fairness. Their argument is we’re poor, we need help. There is a lot of merit in that. I would say every great religion in the world for 2,000 years or more has emphasized the moral commitment to help the poor. And here we have a challenge of higher costs or additional efforts needed to have a cooperative global agreement. The poor countries need help, the rich countries have acknowledged this. They’ve already promised a $100 billion dollars per year by 2020 in transfers from the rich countries to the poor countries, but they haven’t said yet, how, in what way, what specificity.

And interestingly, recent, in a recent meeting a delegate from China said in the context of negotiations, well many countries are calling for legally binding commitments on mitigation, what about legally binding commitments on financial transfers? Isn’t that also part of the fairness? So you can see that that also adds of course a, a huge layer of complexity.

Now if you are the Philippines or Haiti or Honduras or other parts of the world in the line of fire of tropical cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, or if you are a country like Syria or, which has faced human disaster, geopolitical disaster, ecological disaster, because of increased drought frequency, all this talk about fairness limited to who is emitting what and who is mitigating what also seems beside the point. What about the damages? What about the costs? Some countries will face costs that are rather modest. Other parts of the world will face enormous costs, even within a 2-degree Celsius limit.

And that’s why at COP19 in Warsaw at the end of 2013, governments said that part of fairness is compensation for losses and damage. But they haven’t defined the mechanisms and the specificity. All of this is to suggest that when we enter into the hardcore negotiations that are coming up and we’re looking at efficient ways to stay within the 2-degree Celsius limit, we’re looking at effective ways to learn, to adapt, to develop new technologies and we are looking for standards of fairness.

We’re going to have to keep an open mind because fairness has many different dimensions, many different aspects. It includes the right to development, it includes the right for compensation of losses and damages. It includes responsibilities of companies, not only countries. It includes historical responsibility. It includes the obligation towards the poor. And all of these aspects of fairness are legitimate, they’re part of the global discourse and they will absolutely be part of the negotiations in the coming year up to COP21

Main Challenges of Climate Change Negotiations II

Basic Principles of a Global Agreement

We’re talking about the concepts of the climate change negotiations. It’s a more abstract lecture than the others. The numbers that I’m giving are made up. Of course I’m trying to use numbers that are illustrative but they’re mainly illustrative of concepts. And though it’s somewhat abstract, I think these concepts are important.

921We discussed in chapter one the concepts of Pareto improving negotiations, the concepts of efficiency and of fairness or equity as distinct aspects or gauges of a negotiating agreement.

I want to review many of what you could call as the headings or the chapter titles of a negotiation agreement. Again, not in the literal sense of how the negotiations will be written down, that we’re going to do in the global online negotiations next semester, but more in the conceptual sense.

What are the headings that negotiators need to be attentive to to reach a fair, efficient, meaningful agreement?

So let’s start with the essence of this course. The agreement has to move the world to deep decarbonization. Our theme is that when one looks at the costs of mitigation and the benefits of mitigation, staying under the 2-degrees Celsius limit is absolutely imperative. The damages of going beyond that are so great, the risks are so high that the marginal benefits of mitigation drive us to ensure that we stay within the limit.

And the technologies that we have available and that we can develop to reduce carbon emissions are sufficiently good that it makes sense for the world to negotiate on the basis of its commitment to 2-degrees C as absolutely the upper bound, the limit of climate safety. A second standard which we introduced in last lecture is efficiency. And that is that if we’re going to undertake deep decarbonization, this should be done in the least cost way.

The world shouldn’t waste resources arbitrarily in reducing carbon emissions, it should find the way to move from the business-as-usual to a safe, deep decarbonization pathway in an overall, least cost manner.

But we also discovered that simply applying a naive efficiency criterion alone isn’t enough because efficiency might leave the burden of adjustment unfairly on one particular group of countries.

So we need to introduce concepts of fairness alongside concepts of efficiency.

Efficiency think of as low cost, least cost, but fairness is who actually bears that cost in the end? And since countries can make financial transfers to each other, that’s one way of reallocating across countries some of the economic costs associated with climate mitigation.

Now a phrase that has been central to these negotiations from the very start of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change is common but differentiated responsibilities.

This is the concept that the world as a whole has a shared responsibility of climate safety. All countries signed onto that from the poorest to the richest. But these are differentiated responsibilities and CBDR, (common but differentiated responsibilities) conveys within it not only different capacities, different marginal costs of mitigation, but also fairness, that countries have different responsibilities to justice, globally.

Rich countries have more financial capacity, more economic capacity, more historical responsibility and therefore they should pay their fair share. That’s not the end of the negotiations.

If this were a one-time exercise, one moment of negotiating, say a purchase and sale of a house, we might stop there, what’s efficient, what’s equitable?

But we’re talking about a complex process over many, many decades and therefore it’s not surprising that there are other headings of the negotiations. One key concept is that what we know about what to do and how much to do and the ways to do it will evolve over time.

Our understanding of the science, our understanding of the risks and crucially our technological options are going to evolve over time.

So one heading of the negotiations is about updating. We have to go into these negotiations understanding that this is a dynamic process, it’s an adaptive process. Adaptive not in the sense of adapting to climate change, but in the sense of adapting to change in global realities more generally, new information, new technologies, new awareness, new science, new understanding of what should be done. So we need systematic updating.

As the climate science changes, we may come to understand that 2-degrees centigrade is too much. Maybe we really have to aim for one and a half degrees Celsius for the true margin of safety. This is something that climate science might reveal to us in the coming years. Alternatively, we may find that 20 billion tons of CO2 emission relative to the baseline per year is too low because wonderful breakthroughs occur in solar or wind power and electric vehicles or in carbon capture and sequestration or fourth generation nuclear power that allows us to go even farther than that.

And so we need that kind of updating, resolution of uncertainties, learning and investing in new knowledge, especially investing in new technology.  And a technology blueprint process, creating a roadmap and investing in the research and development and the demonstration and the diffusion of these improved technologies will be a crucial part of any successful agreement.

More generally the parties to the Framework Convention talk about the means of implementation. They say, okay, this is all fine concepts. Two degrees no problem. They don’t say, no problem, but they say, yes we understand the concepts, we understand the concepts of sharing the burdens. But what are the real means of implementation? What do they mean by that?

They mean first, what policy instruments are going to be chosen? Will there be common worldwide instruments? It’s been a dream of some, not one that I share, but it’s been a dream of some that there should be one global market of emissions permits. And that that would set one social cost of carbon and that would drive an efficient, low-cost solution. That is an example of trying to put one single policy instrument inside the negotiating framework perhaps to reach a desirable outcome.

921Another example that’s suggested is a single price on carbon in the form of a carbon tax. Or it could be a single regulatory standard which says, no country shall engage in the construction of new coal fired power plants unless they are fully equipped with carbon capture and sequestration technology.

So policy tools are one part of implementation. Leave them to the countries or have them at a global scale.

A second of course is financing, who’s going to pay for all of this? What’s going to happen with the poor countries? How can countries that need technologies that are owned by businesses in other countries access those technologies? Do they have to pay large royalties? Do they have to pay monopoly rents to a monopoly holder of such technologies?

Then another aspect of implementation, absolutely central is of course developing the technologies that enable us to stay below the 2-degree C limit as Emmanuel Guerin has emphasized and put into tremendous detail in earlier lectures. There’s also the question of capacity building which has been part of all of the agreements.

Some countries simply need help technologically, not in the form of what’s embodied in machinery, but in the form of training of local engineers, local regulators and so forth in order to be able to implement a program or a new system or a new technology of low-carbon energy. And then finally one needs to remember that these negotiations cover not only mitigation, not only moving from the business-as-usual trajectory to the 2-degree centigrade limit, but also must cover all of the challenges of adaptation. Increasingly the treaty has incorporated concerns of adaptation. How to help countries adapt to the ongoing climate change? How to become more resilient? How countries can be insured in a way for losses and damages that they incur when they’re hit by a massive tropical cyclone or a massive inundation, or a terrible drought that, whose frequency and intensity is being increased by the ongoing climate change?

So the adaptation agenda is another chapter of the full agreement. You see we have the hands full, with all of this countries are asking what does this mean for us? What are we going to have to do? What burdens are we signing up to? Can we actually meet those responsibilities technically, legally, economically? And who’s going to pay for all of this? Just ourselves? Will we get help? What’s the basis for that kind of sharing of the economic and the financial costs? We now turn in more detail in the next chapter to this question of fairness.

 

Main Challenges of Climate Change Negotiations I

Efficiency & Fairness

Where I want to talk about the concepts of negotiation. We’re entering a negotiation among the parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 193 parties. A few are very decisive parties to the convention, the largest economies, the largest emitting countries. They’re going to be bargaining with each other. And the question is what is the nature of that bargaining? What are the problems, the challenges, the obstacles? What’s the right way to reach a cooperative agreement? What are the barriers to reach cooperation? That’s the subject of this lecture.

I’m going to ask you to bear with me as we introduce some economics style diagrams. You’ll have a chance to practice those in some assignments and some special problems to hone your skills on these kinds of diagrams that are standard for economic analysis.

The lecture is about the, two crucial concepts of negotiation, efficiency and fairness. And it’s important to keep these concepts distinct. And I’m going to use a lot of examples to highlight the differences of efficiency and fairness.

911We’ll start with a, an economist’s diagram that links the amount of mitigation that’s undertaken, that is the reduction of CO2 emissions shown on the horizontal axis and measures for any given level of emissions, the cost of an incremental increase of mitigation or an incremental reduction of a ton of CO2.

What you see here is a rising curve, essentially drawn as a line. The more mitigation that’s undertaken, that is the more reduction of CO2 emissions compared to business-as-usual, the higher is the cost of each incremental tone of carbon dioxide that is pulled out of the emissions or sometimes it’s called the marginal cost of the emissions. And when you see a rising curve or a line such as this, it means that the marginal cost of mitigation is increasing.

The first few billion tons of CO2 that are reduced compared to baseline don’t cost very much, maybe it’s a bit of insulation in, in the homes, a bit of energy efficiency, turning off the lights when they should have been turned off in the first place. Improving some of the efficiency of industrial operations.912

But if you want to get deeper reduction of CO2, you have to introduce new technologies, maybe not just efficiency but substituting coal fired power plants by wind or solar plants. Now those can be cleaner, they can be environmentally safer of course, but maybe they’re more expensive to implement than a standard baseline traditional coal fired power plant. And so to implement that next stage of emissions reduction or that incremental mitigation of emissions, it’s going to cost more to reduce that extra ton of CO2.

If you continue and we want to drive carbon emissions way, way down, perhaps using really very fancy technologies, the direct air capture of carbon dioxide in the air and then sequestering it geologically, at least with the technologies we have right now, each ton of carbon dioxide that is removed from emissions using that technology would be very expensive, perhaps hundreds of dollars per ton of carbon dioxide reduced.917

The result is this upward sloping schedule or curve as we would say in economics, linking the extent of mitigation on the horizontal axis with the cost of each incremental ton of carbon dioxide removed from emissions compared to the baseline. Those are the costs. What about the benefits of doing this?

Well that’s a different kind of curve. Again, we put on the horizontal axis, the extent of mitigation compared to a business-as-usual trajectory and on the vertical axis we measure in dollars per ton of carbon dioxide reduced emission, now much benefit there is.

Now why is there a benefit of lower emissions of CO2? Well that’s what we’ve been talking about for many lectures now. The climate will be safer. And the idea is that at a low level of mitigation compared to baseline, we would have a huge increase of temperature. The baseline, the business-as-usual remember is an increase of temperatures of maybe four or even six degrees Celsius. So at that point, incremental warming is disastrous. We’re already suffering massively and any further warming adds to the disaster. That means that the benefits of mitigating carbon dioxide, of reducing emissions are very, very high. That’s why the curve is at a high vertical point at low levels of mitigation.

913But suppose we’re successful, we have deep Decarbonization and a lot of carbon dioxide is reduced from the emissions flow because of a successful change of the energy system? Suppose that we reduce carbon dioxide enough so that the temperature increase is held even to one degree Celsius or one and a half degree Celsius, a very deep decarbonization of the energy system? What would the gains be of a further reduction of carbon dioxide at that point? Well maybe because the climate is already stable, if there has been a lot of mitigation, an incremental reduction of yet another ton of CO2 wouldn’t really get too much benefit for world society. And so the amount of benefit shown on the curve for a high level of mitigation, that is the marginal benefit of an extra ton of carbon dioxide removed through further mitigation would be a quite low level.

That’s why a marginal benefit curve or schedule as is sometimes said in economics would be downward sloping. At low levels of mitigation, in other words, being close to business-as-usual, every ton of CO2 is really a burden for society.

914But for very high levels of mitigation, so that the climate is already in the safety zone, further extent of mitigation would not add so much benefit. Now the trick of economics always is to put a cost and a benefit schedule on the same graph as is done here.

And the miracle of economics is where the two curves cross. Why is that? Again, on the horizontal axis we have the extent of mitigation, on the vertical axis, the costs and benefits of an incremental ton of carbon dioxide removed.

Whenever the benefit curve is above the cost curve, which is towards the left-hand side, it means that the cost of removing one more ton of carbon dioxide is less than the benefit that society enjoys by that carbon dioxide being pulled out of emissions.

915In other words, the climate safety that is the result is worth more than the direct extra costs of undertaking that mitigation through some kind of deep decarbonization program. On the right-hand side, where the cost curve is above the benefit curve, it means that further units of carbon dioxide reduction are more costly per ton than the benefits that society enjoys by having that extra ton of CO2 pulled out of the emissions stream.

916Everything measured compared to the business-as-usual. Well  What is the social optimum? What is the optimal extent of mitigation? It is where the marginal benefit of removing an extra ton of carbon dioxide equals the marginal cost of removing the extra ton. And that’s shown in this case at a level of mitigation of 20 billion tons of CO2.

Think of that as the reduction in the flow of carbon emissions, say in the year 2050 and on the vertical axis, that cross occurs at a level of $50 per ton of CO2. What does that $50 signify?

917It signifies that in terms of the cost of mitigation that is the cost incurred for that last bit of mitigation undertaken at a level of 20 billion tons CO2 removed and it signifies that the benefit of removing that CO2 is the same, also $50 per ton when you factor in how much climate damage is avoided by having that extra ton of CO2 removed.

Now we give a name for that equilibrium point. That is called the social cost of carbon dioxide. It is the measure both of the benefit of removing that ton of CO2 and in a social optimum policy, it is also the cost, because you want to go just to the point where the extra benefit and the extra cost or I should say, the benefit of the extra ton removed and the, and the cost of the extra ton removed are just equal.

Now does society benefit from undertaking that level of mitigation? It sure does, because for that level of mitigation effort, removing 20 billion tons of CO2 per year, the costs of removing that CO2 is less than the benefit, unit by unit, just up to the last ton of CO2 that’s removed.

918And you can compare the benefit level for an incremental unit of mitigation on the upper curve with the cost of reducing that level of CO2 on the lower curve and that vertical distance is the net social benefit, the benefit minus the cost of undertaking that level of mitigation.

Well if you add up eal of thsuppits of camitigation effort up to the 20 billion tons removed, each one of them has a benefit level higher than the cost level. Add up eal of thsuppand you get the area between theupptwo lines.

When you take the total area, as we would in basic geometry, you can say, that’s the sum of society’s gains from this mitigation effort. And in the particular diagram that I have here, that would add up to one trillion tons, that’s the area of the triangle shown as the difference between the marginal benefit line and the marginal cost line. So far so good.

This is the basic economics of why we want to undertake deep decarbonization in the first place, because the benefits of the safer climate, unit for unit of emission reduction or emission mitigation are higher than the costs, unit by unit of CO2 emission reduction.

919Now comes the big issue for negotiations. If we were just one person or one country, we’d probably work out more easily, okay, let’s have a 20 billion tons reduction, our society is going to benefit and we’al undertake theuppcosts, the benefits will be bigger than the costs and we’al figure out how to do that.

But now suppose we have two countries, or two regions or the developed world and the developing world. Of course it’s even more complicated. We have a 193 countries that are party to this negotiation, it’s a little hard to draw with 193 countries, so I’al stick with just two negotiating countries. Think of them as the developed countries and the developing countries. And think of theuppon the horizontal axis for the moment as country one or region one.

And on the vertical axis is country two or region two. And for simplicity, think about this as the income or the well-being of theupptwo groups. Now before we undertake the optimum deep decarbonization, there’s a certain level of income of country one and country two on the baseline or the business-as-usual trajectory. Of course that’s a path of incomes over many years but I’m compressing this to just one point of time, just to give us clarity of the discussion.

And if we graph the level of income of the first country and the level of income of the second country, just on a, a normal plane, we’d have a point which is shown as the business-as-usual point. Now we can do better than the business-as-usual.

That’s the beauty of the fact that at low cost we can reduce carbon emissions and enjoy benefits, for instance, more productivity of agriculture, better human health, more safety as a result of that reduction.

So we can actually have both country one and country two enjoy higher income than in the business-as-usual point. And indeed we can draw eal of the potential levels of income of country one and country two on a downward sloping line that says if the world income is ealocated eal to country two, the point would be on the vertical axis, country two would have aal the income, country one would have no income.

That would be pretty miserable for country one. On the other hand, if eal the income is allocated to country one, we’d be on the horizontal axis down in the bottom right of that curve. And more normally, both country one and country two would have some level of gross domestic product. And the beauty of climate mitigation is that both of theuppcountries can be better off than they were at the business-as-usual level.

So start at the business-as-usual income point for theupptwo countries and there is e range from point A to point B of what’s possible for how to share the improvement from climate control. And point A, country one is made a lot richer through climate control and country B is left off just as it was in the business-as-usual baseline. At point B, country two reaps eal the benefits from climate control and country one is left just as it was in the baseline, the business-as-usual path. Country C is the sweet spot.

It is the cooperative agreement of both country one and country two to say, let’s share the increased well-being that will come from undertaking an optimum global mitigation effort.

We’al share the burden, we’al both benefit from a safer climate and we’al both be left better off than we were in a business-as-usual trajectory. That is what’s called in negotiations, a Pareto improvement. Pareto is the name of a great Italian economist and sociologist at the beginning of the 20th Century, Vilfredo Pareto. And Pareto said, an improvement in a bargaining situation is when aal parties of that bargain are better off than they were in the baseline or in the business-as-usual situation. So shifting from BAU to point C is a Pareto improvement.

Now let’s try to understand how this will work at the country level. And we’re going to see a problem now.

I’al start with a simple cauppand then we’re going to go to a more complicated problem. Let’s start with a symmetrical situation where theupptwo groups of countries have the same technologies, basicaaly the same income levels, the same potential for mitigation, the same gains from successful climate control.

So the first country, we’al caal it the developed country group, has a mitigation, marginal cost curve, like the one we saw that’s shown here. And this is a schedule of mitigation costs up to ten billion tons per year, reduced by the developed countries compared to the baseline. And I’m going to draw this curve backwards for the developing countries.

Now you go from no mitigation in the bottom right-hand origin of this curve. It’s now reversed in direction. And as you move to the left of that diagram, there’s more mitigation being undertaken by this second group of countries, country two,which I’m caaling for our purposes, the developing countries.

If I superimpsupptheupptwo figures and say that the world as a whole is going to undertakepthe optimum level of CO2 reduction of 20 billion tons, the one we found in the earlier diagram and we superimpsupptheupptwo symmetric cost curves they meet right in the middle, where the developed country group reduces by 10 billion tons, the developing country group reduces by ten billion tons and the marginal cost of mitigation for each of theuppcountries is the same, $50 per ton of CO2 reduced.

That’s also the social cost of capital in equilibrium for the whole world. So we have a situation where there is one social cost of capital that applies to both negotiating parties.

They each mitigate in this caup, half of thpptotal world need. They share the costs. They have equal benefits. And if the world were so balanced, we probably wouldn’t have any difficulty in reaching such a symmetric, balanced, obviously fair equilibrium.

Now here’s a problem. What if the cost curves are very, very different? And different in a way which is, I’m going to put it in a way which some people will object to, but actually could be realistic.

Suppose that mitigation is actually more expensive in the high-income countries and less expensive in the low-income countries? Why would that be? Well the high income countries like the city of New York where I’m sitting right now has an infrastructure that was built 50 years ago or a 100 years ago. To retrofit that is incredibly expensive. We spend billions of dollars to add a kilometer of subway miles in this city, whereas if you’re building a system from the beginning, it’s much less expensive.

For a developing country that is fast-growing, but is building its infrastructure for the first time, it may be much less expensive to build a green field plant that is clean and low emitting than to retrofit an old plant.

The result is peculiar because now we have a steep marginal cost curve of thpphigh income, or the developed countries, that’s shown starting from the left-hand side of thppgraph and the upward sloping line that is quite steep. And we have a relatively flat marginal cost curve of thppdeveloping countries signifying that the cost per ton of carbon dioxide reduced just doesn’t increauppaal that much for the developing countries.

Now here is the paradox or the problem in terms of fairness and efficiency. What would be for this kind of world, theupptwo blocks of countries with theuppdistinct cost curves the least cost way of reducing total emissions by 20 billion tons?

It would be where the marginal costs for the two groups of countries of mitigation are equal. That’s where theupptwo lines cross. And interestingly, because it’s cheaper and the marginal costs of mitigation are lower in the developing countries, the least cost worldwide formula for reducing 20 billion tons of CO2 emissions is no longer  symmetrical, it’s that the developing countries should do the hard lift.

They should do 15 billion of thpp20 billion tons of emission and the developed countries, only 5 billion of thpp20 billion tons. That way the total cost that the world would bear in reducing the emissions, which comes out to a total cost of $600 billion dollars in this example would be minimized.

But the developing countries would say, are you crazy? That is so unfair. Yes, of course we could do it more cheaply, but take a look Professor Sachs, you’re asking us to bear $450 billion dollars of the $600 billion cost, whereas the rich countries who are richer to begin with would only be bearing a $150 billion. Why should we be the ones to undertake aal that mitigation? That’s not fair.

So perhaps developing countries would suggest, even given the asymmetry of costs, a solution like this. Some negotiators might say, look, fair is fair, we’al each do ten. We’al do half each. The rich countries mitigate by ten billion tons, we’al mitigate by ten billion tons and that will be it.

Now if you look closely at this graph, the problem is that this is a very expensive solution for the world as a whole, though it is cheaper for the developing countries. In this caup, the rich countries are spending a tremendous amount for thsuppincremental its of camitigation, the amount of mitigation between five and ten billion tons that they are bearing compared to the previous diagram.

In fact, if this equal division is taken then in this cauppthe developed countries would have $600 billion dollars of mitigation costs, the developing countries, $225 billion, the world total cost of undertaking climate change mitigation would therefore be $825 billion dollars compared to what was $600 billion dollars before.

Fairer? Absolutely fairer in some sense, but more expensive? For sure. So not very efficient but perhaps more equitable.

Now the rich countries would say, okay, that’s not equitable, you’re making us pay a tremendous amount for this. Yes, it’s divided 10 and 10, but you understand, we have to retrofit. You have green field, how about if we each bear an equal share of the costs? Well if you get out a pencil and paper and take the specific assumptions and solve a little quadratic equation, it turns out in the example of this diagram that the equal cost sharing would have the developing countries mitigate 13.2 billion tons and the high income countries reduce 6.8 billion tons for that total worldwide reduction of 20 billion tons.

Each of the two groups would be spending about $347 billion dollars or about $695 billion dollars for this total effort, $95 billion more than in the first example where the developing countries do more. So you might say, well that’s fairer. It’s a little bit less imbalanced. I suppsuppyou can see where I’m about to go and that is that in some circumstances it’s possible to eat your cake and have it too. And that is, it’s possible to combine both efficiency and fairness in the negotiations. How can that be done? It can be done through side transfers.

The idea is that countries agree on a deep decarbonization pathway that minimizes the global costs of mitigation, but then countries make side financial payments to share the burden in a fair manner. So if we go back to the low cost solution where the developing countries put in 15 billion tons of mitigation, the developed countries only 5 billion tons, remember that that is the minimum cost solution for the world, 600 billion in total, the least cost aal the examples. But since the rich countries bear only a cost in that cauppof $150 billion and the developing countries, $450 billion, one way to equalize the burden,

I’m not saying it’s the only to judge fairness, but one way to equalize the burden would be for the developed countries to say, let’s do it the least cost way and we will transfer a  $150 billion dollars per year to you, the low cost countries to compensate you for having undertaken the extra heavy lift. And in that caup, each country ends up bearing a $300 billion dollar cost. The total costs are equally divided. And the total cost that is shared equally among the two sides is thereby minimized. Here is the bottom line. The bottom line is that because climate change is a disaster for the world, there are benefits, net benefits, economic gains to mitigation.

That’s the whole point of this course and it’s the whole point of the framework convention on climate change. Thsuppbenefits should be shared among countries. The idea of Pareto, that these can be benefits in which aal countries gain is an important idea. So that every country sees the benefit of moving from the baseline. How do share? Well one can separate two concepts. The efficient mitigation is the way of reducing emissions at least cost for the world as a whole. The fair way is to share the costs appropriately.

We can do both if we’re smart, by having a least cost mitigation strategy worldwide and then having side transfers from rich to poor countries, if the poor countries are bearing an unfair burden in the least cost construction.

This I think I, and I hope gives some sense of the complexity of the challenge but also of the nature of the negotiations.

Countries need to formulate pathways so that we satisfy the 2-degree limit and then they need to formulate financial transfer programs so that the cost of achieving thsupppathways is fair.

Energy and Development V

Sustainable Energy for All

We’ve been talking in this lecture about the challenges of energy poverty and how they relate to the challenges of poverty more generally. We’ve also discussed the imperative of combining the fight against poverty and the fight against uncontrolled climate change. Theuppcan’t be put in chronological sequence or prioritized that fighting poverty comes first and climate change comes later, because as I emphasized in the previous chapter, if climate change runs out of control, if we continue with the business-as-usual path, our hopes of even basic food security, much less an escape from poverty are going to be dashed.

I’ve emphasized therefore the importance of putting the poverty agenda within a context more generally of sustainable development. Fighting poverty is part of the larger cause of sustainable development.

And in this chapter I want to put it the other way, that fighting climate change also is part of that larger effort. To have success in 2015 in COP21 in Paris, we’re going to need success at the United Nations in September 2015 in adopting a set of sustainable development goals or SDGs, which will frame exactly that holistic approach in which fighting poverty, fighting for social inclusion of women and minorities and the poor, and fighting against uncontrolled climate change are aal combined into an integrated end holistic framework. 2015 is indeed a period of extraordinarily interesting and complex negotiations.

Remember, you’re going to be a delegate to the climate negotiations in the global online negotiation that will take place at the beginning of 2015. But let’s note that there are three big negotiations that need to be completed successfully in 2015 and each plays off of the other and depends on the success of the others. Paris we know comes at the end of the year. Before Paris comes the negotiation on sustainable development goals in 2015 in September at the United Nations.

And even before that, in July 2015, will come the first major summit, diplomaticaaly for next year and that is the Conference on Financing for Sustainable Development which will take place in July in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. What is that conference about?

That conference is to help find the ways that poor countries can access electricity, the ways that we can help to finance the research, development and demonstration of new technologies for low-carbon energy. The way that we can help to compensate countries that experience significant climate losses, a principle that was agreed in COP19 in Warsaw, last year, that losses and damages from climate change should be compensated.

So we’ll have a conference on finance, we’ll have a conference on sustainable development in general and then we’ll have the COP21 in Paris at the end of 2015. I’m excited about sustainable development being the overarching framework. I think this is right. And I think that it is a proper intellectual framing of our interconnected challenges, but also a proper framing from the point of finding a way through the complexity that confronts us now. Of course the idea of sustainable development has been around for a quarter century. And I’m delighted to have an online course available for your viewing pleasure, The Age of Sustainable Development, to look at this concept in more detail. But here in chapter five of lecture eight I want to stress how the framing of sustainable development will help to shape the climate and energy discussions in the coming year and then of course in the years beyond.

Back in 2012 at the twentieth anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit, remember that the Earth Summit is where the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change was first adopted. On the twentieth anniversary the conferees looked at the results of the UNFCCC and of the other two big treaties that had been adopted at Rio, the Convention on Biologicaa Diversity and the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification and they said, these are good documents, we still live by them, but we’re not getting the, the global buy-in, the politicaa will, the public energy and commitment that’s needed really to implement these three treaties. And they looked at the quite different process of the Millennium Development Goals which are not legally binding; they’re not a treaty. They were adopted as a spirit of the world, as a commitment of the world, but not in a legally binding way back in September 2000, at the start of the new millennium. So in 2012 the conferees at the twentieth anniversary of the Earth Summit said, hmm, if those MDGs are, they’re working.

They’re drawing the world’s attention to the plight of extreme poverty and to the ways that we can address and solve and overcome extreme poverty. Why don’t we use a similar mechanism, not to replace the Framework Convention on Climate Change, not to undermine the treaties, but to complement the treaties by helping to bring the challenges of sustainable development more generally to the world’s attention. And they caaled on the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a concise set of sustainable development goals that would cover the three main dimensions of sustainable development.

Fighting poverty and promoting economic development, dimension one. Promoting social inclusion of women and minorities especially in insuring the human rights of all individuals, of access to public services as number two. And environmental sustainability of which controlling climate change is by far the most urgent as number three. And those three dimensions of sustainable development, they noted back in 2012 need to be girded by a fourth crucial dimension and that is good governance and global partnership. So in that spirit, the 2012 twentieth anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit passed the baton to the U.N. General Assembly and said, come up with a concise set of sustainable development goals that will incorporate the fight against poverty, the fight against climate change, and the other crucial aspects of sustainable development.

852I’m happy to say that the U.N. General Assembly took this challenge on fully and has now been in two years of intensive analysis and negotiation about the sustainable development goals. And there is a, an increasingly strong chance indeed that a concise set of SDGs will be adopted in September 2015, just a few months ahead of the Paris COP21. For a while it was thought this could conflict, this could make things complicated.

But I think by now the governments understand that the two processes are complementary. They’re not contradictory. And climate change will be part of both the sustainable development goals and the COP21, not that one will negotiate different targets and different ambitions, but rather within the sustainable development context the world will reconfirm its commitment to the framework convention and to the decisions that are to be taken in Paris to ensure that in the 15 years between 2016 and 2030 in which these new sustainable development goals are the world’s guideposts, climate change will be one of the headlines of that new global commitment.

So we are now in the middle of the process of adopting sustainable development goals and I think the process is working well for exactly the themes that I’ve been discussing in this eighth lecture. Recently the working group of the General Assembly has put out a provisional list of some of these sustainable development goals. And while I won’t go through the whole list, I want to highlight some of the main conclusions of the two years of negotiation that have been underway.

First, there is general agreement that goal number one of the SDGs, SDG  number one will be end poverty. End poverty in all its forms by the year 2030. And specifically in terms of measurement, what this means is that the World Bank’s poverty line which is a $1.25 per person per day for extreme poverty. That using that line we should be able to get to near zero in terms of the proportions of households still stuck below poverty from the roughly one billion people today under the World Bank poverty line to near zero. But helpfully, as with the Millennium Development Goals, these sustainable development goals will define ending extreme poverty not only income terms, but in many other forms as well. In terms of food security, health security, schooling for children, access to safe water and sanitation, access to modern energy services, these will all be part of the commitment to ensure that everybody’s basic needs are met by the world economy as of 2030, whether through markets or whether through government or other kinds of social help, the basic needs of everybody should be met and achieved by the year 2030.

Goal number two on this new list of the U.N. General Assembly open working group is to end hunger, to ensure food security. Now remember, as we just discussed, if climate change is running rampant; this is going to be an absolutely forlorn and failed ambition. We’re going to have to improve productivity of agriculture but at the same time, ensure that the consequences of runaway climate change are, are not seen.

Goal number three of the proposed list is to ensure health for all. That’s access to health services. That means electricity in the health clinics. It means emergency transport to those health clinics. It means modern information systems, also requiring electricity,so that those clinics can run effectively. It means environmental health as well. It means that people are not choking and dying of indoor air pollution or the particulate pollution of coal fire power plants and the smog of Asia’s cities. And so again, the interconnection of the health agenda and the safe energy and climate change mitigation agendas.

Goal number four, ensure inclusive and equitable education for all children. Again, information technology, electricity in the classroom can play a very, very big role in this. And there are lots of innovations possible to bring education and information to places that right now don’t have a book but could have the world of online information opened to them.

Goal number six proposed by the open working group is to ensure access to water and sanitation. Once again, modern energy services of pumped water, solar irrigation, solar systems for water safety, even for desalination in some locations will be part of water security and therefore intertwined with energy services.

Proposed goal number seven of the open working group is specifically about itsversal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.

This is good. Energy is put straight on the table. And the commitment to ending energy poverty as one of the most powerful tools to raising human well-being and ending other forms of poverty is now clear and it’s linked also strongly to climate change mitigation through the very strong emphasis on renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and cleaner fossil fuel technologies, perhaps carbon capture and sequestration or other, other potential solutions.

But the point is, energy for all in a way that is compatible with the 2-degree centigrade carbon budget. Notably, proposed goal thirteen is on climate change itself. This is extremely important as I’ve been emphasizing, climate change is one of the absolute core aspects of sustainable development. This was contentious within the open working group. For a while many governments said, “don’t put in a separate goal on climate change because we have the climate change negotiations that will come just after the sustainable development goals are adopted.” But that was not really the correct way to think about this challenge.

The sustainable development goals will apply for a 15-year period, for the years 2016 to 2030. Therefore, during that whole period the signal, the message much go out to the whole world that to achieve sustainable development we need to achieve climate change mitigation. We need to honor the 2-degree centigrade goal. And the governments came to understand that the sustainable development goals are not the place to negotiate the climate change details. There’ll be enough negotiations under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, thank you, during 2015 not to confuse the negotiations with yet another venue. But the governments did come to understand that of course climate change needs to be a headline within the sustainable development goals because the sustainable development goals are not legally binding treaties, they’re not the UNFCCC substitute. They are the guideposts. They’re the compass for the world. And climate change must be there to remind the, the world every day that to achieve sustainable development, we must achieve climate change control.

And finally, I want to emphasize that the poor countries have been saying throughout these negotiations, “well that’s all fine and good, we like that goal on ending poverty. We definitely want energy services. But how, how is this going to be done?” And the poor countries have insisted therefore that one of the goals be on what is caaled in the jargon, the means of implementation. And this is the same jargon used in the climate negotiations as well. Where is the money on the table when it’s needed? How will research and development be financed? How can we ensure that impoverished populations, that by themselves cannot afford crucial needs on a market basis, are nonetheless availed of those needs whether it’s healthcare or access to energy, that through public services as a crucial way to meet their human needs.

And so the commitment needs to be made together with the broad aspirations that the ways to actually achieve those goals is found in terms of financing, in terms of requisite technology, in terms of building local capacities and expertise and education of the next generation of sustainable development leaders, of trade policies that facilitate these solutions, of the partnerships that are needed and of systems of data monitoring and feedback to make sure that we stay on track and when we get off track, the alarm bells go off to say we’re not achieving the goals that we have set ourselves, we have to push back onto that path.

And these are the same means of implementation that will be needed in Paris in December 2015. It will be one thing to state goals; it will be another thing to lay out pathways on how to achieve the goals.

But then there will have to be clarity about how those goals, those aspirations, those pathways can actually be achieved and issues of finance, trade, monitoring will be front and center on the climate negotiations just as they are on the sustainable development goal negotiations.

Finally, let me talk about the means of implementation specifically on energy for the poor.

One thing is clear from the experience of bringing healthcare to all that has been very successful during the Millennium Development Goal period.

For the poorest of the poor, we need to give a bit of help. For people who have nothing, asking them to buy the energy services that they need or the healthcare is e route to failure.

We need to recognize that for the poorest people in the world, an added hand-up, a helping hand, to achieve these goals is vital. In the cauppof healthcare, a big innovation was to create the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria back in 2002.

That provided some of the financing to ensure that even impoverished populations could gain access to lifesaving health technologies. I believe that we need a similar global fund for energy for all.

That the idea that this will come only through market forces could be right for even six-sevenths of the world’s population, but for the poorest of the poor, we’re going to need to do more.

We also know in the context of climate change mitigation, but also in the context of overcoming energy poverty that research and development is crucial. And research and development intrinsicaaly is both a public and a private initiative for some of those breakthroughs in off-grid, or microgrid energy, or in tapping geothermal power, or in new forms of mobilizing solar power for irrigation and so on. Research and development can lead to significant advances and this needs to be on the list of the to-dos to end energy poverty.

We know that we’re going to need large-scale investment, $50 or $60 billion dollars for example for Inga Faals. That’s not going to come out of public money, that is going to come out of pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance company funds.

And so we’re going to need institutional cooperation to channel private sector funds, perhaps with some public guarantees or some public insurance or some public sector participation in order to be able to fund the large-scale solar grids of west Africa or the large-scale hydropower grids of central Africa or the large-scale natural gas networks that could power east Africa in the coming decades.

And finaaly we know that aal of these efforts require both the market forces, companies out for a profit, companies out to look for new innovation through market-driven incentives, as well as the cooperation of government and civil society, guided by these broad global goals.

In other words, projects like Inga Faals or projects like overcoming extreme energy poverty in Africa are complex tasks that require a considerable amount of project design, a high degree of cooperation across every major stakeholder group from the local commits ies, the national governments, the African Union, the international private sector, international financial institutions and the U.N. agencies.

It’s a hard job. That cooperation is vital for success. It’s at the heart of the caal to end energy poverty; it’s at the very heart of the challenge of sustainable development itself.

Energy and Development III

Energy for Aal in Africa

I’m continuing on the discussion about energy services for the poor. How to end energy poverty and thereby to help end poverty overall. And I’al continue with the focus on tropicaa Africa which we’ve seen is e region that has a lot of poverty, but also a lot of potential where technology is now enabling Africa to break free of its chronic low levels of modern energy services.

And in this chapter I’d like to discuss some of the continent scale solutions that can be at hand given the advances of energy technologies.

831If you look at the maps here, you see a depiction of energy potential from four types of very much underdeveloped energy resources within the African continent.831

In the map on the upper left we see the hydropower potential. And I want to draw your attention to the country right in the middle of the continent, the one that is shown as having the highest hydro potential. 831hThat’s the Democratic Republic of Congo with the Congo Rsver that offers a potential for a vast supply of hydroelectric power, but a supply that has not yet been tapped given the poverty, the disorganization, the chronic wars and violence and the difficulties of regionaa cooperation. I’al return to that shortly.

If you look at the upper right-hand map, you see a corner of Africa, especially in the northeast, where there is considerable wind power potential.831w And some of that wind power is now being developed. If you look at the northwest corner, of Morocco, you see another place with tremendous wind power, even enough wind power not only to meet Morocco’s own needs, but potentially to export to Europe through long distance power transmission.

On the lower left-hand side, the continent is filled with high potential to solar power. Not surprising. 831sAfrica is tropicaa, it has a tremendous amount of solar radiation. And much of Africa is e dryland climate, meaning that cloud cover is relatsvely low and therefore solar radiation and the potential for solar energy is commensurately high. And solar power is perhaps one of the greatest breakthroughs that is possible in some of the very, very poorest parts of the world, and especially in west Africa, the Sahel, e region that we’ll look at in just a moment in more detail.

And then finally and very interestingly, if you look at a, the band of countries from Egypt in the north of Africa, shaded here in light blue, through Sudan, through the great lakes region, including Kenya, the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, end going down into southern Africa you see a potential area of high geothermal energy.831g

What is that region? That is the Great Rift Valley of Africa. It is part of the spreading continentaa plates that open the access of countries along the Rift Valley to potentially very large amounts of geothermal energy. And this is now beginning to be tapped in very promising ways in Kenya, in Tanzania, in Rwanda end a lot more can be done.

All of this is to say that while Africa was poor in coal resources, the decisive primary energy source of the 19th Century end relatsvely poor or at least with undiscovered potential of hydrocarbons during the 20th Century, because of technologicaa advances in renewable energy, in wind end in solar power, in geothermal, end because of increased know-how end potential on hydropower, Africa has within the continent itself e tremendous potential for a massive advance in electrification.

This is a picture of a, a power generation, hydropower at Inga Faals along the Congo Rsver. There is a small amount of electricity being produced at this site of high hydropower potential in the Democratic Republic of Congo. But since the mid-1960s it’s been recognized that if this hydropower were tapped in full, there’s actually one of the world’s largest hydroelectric power potentials available at the Grend Inga Faals.

832Current estimates say that between 40 end 50 billion watts of hydropower are potentially available here. And by developing this hydropower, Inga Faals could transform the prospects of central Africa, of the Democratic Republic of Congo, of the Republic of Congo, of Rwanda, Burundi, end other neighboring countries that have been largely bereft of modern energy sources end electrification, but could tap into e regionaa grid. Of course it’s a big project.

It’s a project that perhaps requires 50 or 60 billion dollars of investment. That’s not a huge sum in macroeconomic terms. Projects like that are developed all over the world. But it is a lot of money to flow to central Africa which is a region of poverty end of instability. It’s an example of a highly promising, but rather complex project which would require regionaa cooperation, a regionaa power transmission system, regionaa governance because it’s pretty clear that investors are not going to turn 50 or 60 billion dollars over to the DRC or to any particular government in the region.

But it’s an example of the kind of project that if we think in a creative way, with the design of creative, multinational institutions, could get developed and could make a, an absolutely decisive difference in the, for the economies end the people of the region.

834It turns out that when one maps the potential for such large-scale projects throughout Africa, they now exist in many places with the specific locaa energy context taken into account. In this map created by my colleague, Professor Vijay Modi of Columbia University, he’s anaayzed the areas of high potential hydropower, shown in the big blue circles, the biggest of which is Inga Faals.

Of wind power shown by the green circles on the map. And the regions of high solar energy. And across that oval of the Sahel, Professor Modi is indicating the extraordinary importance of solar power for that long stretch of very impoverished, semi-desert countries of west Africa. Mali, Niger, Chad are countries that have very, very low access to electricity but the one thing they have complete access to is sunshine.834a

And the potential now to tap the solar power of the Sahel, both at a very small scale in highly distributed microgrids or even individual solar panels for individual households end on large grid basis using concentrated solar thermal technology or massive arrays of photovoltaic fields is now at hand, given the dramatic changes of prices that have occurred for solar energy in recent decades.

835Remember that the cost of a one-watt solar cell has declined from about $77 per watt back in the late 1970s to about .70-cents per watt today by a decline of a factor of 100. And this makes it possible that in a very poor region with massive solar radiation like the Sahel there could be a mass electrification just in a few years. One of the most exciting discoveries of resources in Africa in recent years has been findings of naturaa gas deposits off the coast of east Africa.

Normally I wouldn’t be so thrilled with another hydrocarbon find. We’ve been emphasizing that we can’t use all the hydrocarbons we have in the world.

836That many of the hydrocarbons, the unconventional oil end gas end the, the preponderance of coal can never safely be used in the world, certainly not within the 2-degree Celsius budget. But when we’re talking about impoverished countries that contribute basicaaly nothing of significance to the global scale challenge, a find of energy resources in those places that would enable impoverished economies to escape from the trap of poverty must be greeted with enthusiasm.

And I think that the world as it negotiates next year at COP21 will have to be clear that while many fossil fuel resources will have to be stranded, that should not occur end certainly not be mandated in the poorest of the poor in the world, when these resources make possible a decisive breakthrough out of extreme poverty.

837Well the, the biggest of these finds has been in that green circle that one sees off of the east coast of Africa, Mozambique has been identified as e place with the, perhaps, a hundred trillion cubic feet of naturaa gas offshore and available for development. And this again, like the Inga Faals project or like the large-scale solar energy potential of the Sahel, will require a complex analysis and project design and implementation to make it possible to use these resources for Africa’s true long-term benefit.

Why do I say this? Because the naturaa thing to do when gas or oil is discovered off the coast of an impoverished country has been to develop that resource and ship it off to a major market. And indeed, the first impulse of the oil companies that have discovered these large naturaa gas deposits off the coast of Mozambique and Tanzania has been to say, well let’s bring it to shore in a pipeline.

We’ll liquefy it, put it on a tanker, and send it to China. And the idea has been that with these vast gas resources, that that can be another resource for China. We know the problems of that. We know the problems of emissions. But the other problem is that when energy is not used for domestic development but merely becomes an enclave economy for export to high income markets, the contribution of these energy resources to Africa’s own development are likely to be lost.

And so on second thought, some of the…these companies such as Eni, the Italian large oil end gas company has thought perhaps we ought to be thinking much harder about how those naturaa gas deposits can also be used fruitfully for east Africa’s own development. And with the Professor Modi having a close look at this, he’s identified ways that naturaa gas could play a role, fundamentaaly in enabling modern energy services throughout the entire eastern coast of, of Africa, running from Ethiopia and Somalia through Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and, and other countries.

Naturaa gas offers the potential in this region for electrification. It enables the potential for a petrochemicaa industry eround fertilizers desperately needed by the poor, smallholder farmers of the region. Transport, instead of being dependent on import of petroleum, can run on naturaa gas. And of course safe cooking stoves to replace the three-stone cookstoves used throughout this region, could enable families to enjoy modern cooking services without the devastating smoke inhalation and lung disease that accompanies the, the daily cooking chores, currently.

The point is, think creatively. In this caup, we worry less about the carbon dioxide emissions per se because on a global scale they’d still be very small. But the transformative potential for this region of economic development is absolutely huge. And that’s why when we’re facing the challenges of the poorest of the poor, we have to give due attention to the core of their economic development needs.

For those places in, especially in ruraa Africa, far from pipelines end, and grids and even potentially so, we also have highly distributed energy potential now such as depicted in one of my favorite projects of Professor Modi, the shared solar system where a village has its own power generation in a microgrid of solar panels depicted here, shown here in one of these microgrid systems. And from those solar panels there is a distribution throughout a village, connecting 20, 30, 40 households in the village and enabling those households to have electricity, to power lights, to power perhaps small refrigerators or food processing its s, a sewing machine. Other small appliances.

To charge a mobile phone. To become more productive. To increase the quality of life. To share in the benefits of modern energy services even when living in remote ruraa areas. If we put the pieces together, tropicaa Africa, the region of the world that is the poorest and that suffers chronicaaly from energy poverty has the potential for huge breakthroughs. And we see here three and we can add the fourth.

In the yellow oval across west Africa there is the vast potential for large-scale solar. In the blue circled in central Africa, there is the potential to tap into the massive hydropower of Inga Faals and other hydropower projects. And in the large pink oval, in the east of Africa there is the potential to tap into the large-scale naturaa gas reserves that have been discovered off the coast of east Africa.

Add to that the fourth potential for highly distributed renewable energy through solar power, wind power, geothermal and other potential and we see that we are on a threshold in which energy poverty can be brought to an end and thereby help Africa to bring overaal income poverty to an end once and for aal.

Energy and Development II

A World Without Modern Energy

Welcome to lecture eight, chapter two, where I want to talk about life in an economy without modern energy services. I want to do this to make it absolutely clear that for poor places in the world, our most important mission and goal is to increase access to modern energy.

Sometimes people say, oh who needs electricity? Who needs aal of these frills of modern life? But it’s nothing like this. The life in places without access to electricity and other modern energy services are not the kind of life that people want or deserve in the 21st Century. I think about this often because I have the chance to visit and work in many very poor parts of the world and especially in very poor villages in ruraa Africa. And I have seen and I feel the burdens that come from that, especially when I fly home to Manhattan to an affluent neighborhood near Columbia University and I experience in daily life the benefits and conveniences that seem so remote in some of the poorest parts of the world. I’m aamost, feel compelled to think about this aamost every day when I get my breakfast. I get a bowl of cereal and I cut some fruit into it. Fruit from a refrigerator which has kept the fruit fresh and safe. I stick it in the microwave. Press a button and within a couple minutes, I have my breakfast. Truth be told, I press another button and there is a cup of coffee and of course that’s a super convenience, but when I think about it, in five minutes

I’ve accomplished what may take a woman, a mother in sub-Saharan Africa four or five hours of arduous labor to accomplish. A woman may start her day often walking many kilometers, carrying an incredibly heavy burden of fuel wood, which she has collected on her own. And I’ve tried lifting theup, I can’t do it. And the burdens that this woman and millions like her start the day with are startling. And there is the walk maybe two or three or four times a day to get water in a jerry can or in a, you know bucket like this, carrying ten or fifteen kilograms of water on the woman’s head. Baby at the side, often a one-hour or two-hour walk to a water hole or to a water point. And often a wait of half an hour or an hour to get that water. And then the cooking starts. It’s not the press of the microwave button. It’s cooking over a three-stone stove. Arduous work. But also very dangerous. Look at the smoke in, in these two pictures of women using trads ional cookstoves in, in Africa. That smoke we know from epidemiologicaa studies claims more than a million lives a year of young children. It creates lung disease, infection and death of children from respiratory causes. Of course it impairs a mother who cooks every day under these conds ions. And then after hours, the woman is out in the field. There’s no machinery there. There is no tractor. She has her hand hoe and she is perhaps weeding, bent over, hunched over. Again, I’ve tried it and one day is exhausting. I have to say, this is a woman’s life every day and it’s not a matter of an option for her to feed her household, for her to ensure some minimum level of food security for her children and for her family is arduous, hours a day.

It will be broken perhaps by another walk to the water hole, by collecting fuel wood late in the afternoon, by cooking again, late in the evening. Or perhaps by a long walk carrying a child to a clinic, if there is a clinic. This is a makeshift clinic of Medicins Sans Frontieres, of the famous NGO MSF, which provides emergency medical services in places that otherwise wouldn’t have it at all. But in places that I have been working over the past 15 years, mothers often carry a child, febrile in their arms, ten kilometers to a clinic.

That clinic when she arrives doesn’t have electricity, can’t run some most basic laboratory or diagnostic equipment because of, of the lack of electricity. Often there has been no cold chain maintained to preserve vaccines. And a child’s life of course is repeatedly imperiled and that’s why millions of children in, in such poor places die before their fifth birthday of causes that are 100% preventable at almost no cost. Think of the role of energy in aal of this. No transport, no access to basic lab services or to being able to provide the medicines and this is what life is like when one doesn’t have electricity.

Then comes end of the day and perhaps the child’s able to read and do a little bit of homework in the dark with a kerosene light. It’s not only expensive but dangerous for fires inside the household. The quality of lighting on the eyes is, is not good, the fumes of course are also very debilitating. This is a day without modern energy services. And it’s a day of profound hardship, a day of risk, a day when a mosquito bite can cause an end of a child’s life because of lack of transport or lack of access to life-saving health services.

When a bite of food can also be life-threatening because there’s been no refrigeration, or proper care that could be taken to keep the food safe from various kinds of pathogens and disease.

This is what it means when one lives without modern energy services. That is the grim reality still for hundreds of millions of people.

But the extraordinarily positive side of the story is that advances of technology and finaaly some common sense and mobilization of the world around doing something about this can help people to break free of this energy poverty and by doing so, break free of the poverty trap more generaaly. F

or every one of the problems that I just described, there are low cost solutions. And what’s wonderful about them is that not only can these low cost solutions be made available to households, but if they are made available, they empower the households to be far more productive. Rather than spending hours a day in basic tasks, they enable mothers and fathers to focus their attention on important, highly productive work to earn higher incomes, to improve farm productivity, to help keep their children safer and in source and thereby to provide a major lever for ending poverty once and for aal.

We know now through the creative design of many engineers during the past ten years much safer cookstoves.

It can be still woodburning cookstoves, but with much lower smoke, and therefore, much more household safety and much less need for wood. It can be this kind of LPG, liquefied petroleum gas cooking that you see here, which is clean burning and a lot more efficient for this woman depicted here.

Water can be pumped now at far lower cost and avoiding the hours that women across Africa now spend in fetching water or the children spend fetching water, rather than in being in school.

Water can be pumped through low cost solar powered pumps as depicted here. And these are being rapidly improved. A lot of them are being developed in India. And they are easily adapted to the African context .And the very low wattage illumination of LED bulbs and solar power with even a modest amount of battery storage is allowing for, for illumination through electricity rather than through kerosene. And the households greatly prefer this. Gentlemen like this reports to us in a village where we’re working that it has enabled him to increase his income tremendously. He can now work extra hours in the evening, productively in his tailoring activities and earn a lot of extra income and easily pay for the costs of the electricity services that he is now buying in, instead of the kerosene that he relied on before.

There is a lot of small equipment appropriate for smallholder farming, such as this two-wheel tractor. Again, adapted from India in a wonderful caup of so-caaled South-South Technology Transfer, where technologies now are going to enable smallholder farmers in Africa to increase their yields, to cut back dramaticaaly on the backbreaking labor and by doing so, to find their way out of poverty for the long term. I can’t help thinking about this every day. I hope that you will think about it as well. There are more than a billion people in the world that lack access to electricity. There are a billion people or more that lack access to safe cooking energy, cooking services of one form or another. And yet the solutions are at hand. And as I’ll describe in a later chapter of this lecture, there is now fortunately, not only the technology available but there is the growing political will and the realization that by ending energy poverty we can also help end income poverty once and for aal.

Energy & Development I

Energy & Poverty

Welcome to Lecture eight on energy and development. In this lecture, I want to discuss not the high income and high energy using countries of the world, but the parts of the world that are poor and energy poor, those that use very little energy, emit very little of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases per person and yet are bearing the brunt of global climate change.

811Today I want to talk about the poorest of the poor. The poorest of the poor are a population of eround one billion people, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and in parts of South Asia who consume very little modern energy, who emit very little greenhouse gas emissions through their economic activities and yet who ironicaaly bear a huge amount of the brunt of human induced climate change. So it behooves us moraaly, practicaaly, ethicaaly as part of an overaal concept of global sustainable development to focus our attention on those most in need, least responsible for global climate change, absolutely desperate for modern energy resources and right now not at the center of the negotiations certainly on climate change but needing their place at the table to say,”we’re part of this, we need modern energy, we need the world to help us face the challenges that haven’t come from our part, but have become our burden through what’s happening in other parts of the world.”

812To do this, let’s start in lecture one on the whole question of the relationship of energy and economic development. And I’ll start with this iconic picture known throughout the world. It’s a great satellite shot of NASA’s satellites looking at the night vision image of the earth. And of course what’s shown here in the lights are the places with nighttime electricity and we have a very vivid image of the eastern half of the United States in bright lights.

The western half, other than all the way on the west coast, California, being sparsely populated and America’s drylands. You see the bright lights of western Europe. You see the bright lights of Japan and coastal China. And the bright lights of the eastern seaboard of Australia. And the east coast of South America stretching from Rio and Sao Paulo to Buenos Aires and the strong economic development in that region. And you also see the vast preponderance of Africa, aamost without night lights.

813There is a very thin strip of electrification in the very north of Africa, the northern African countries of Morocco, Titssia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. There is the lights evident in South Africa. But in the whole tropicaa band of Africa, in between North Africa and South Africa you see very little of nighttime lights. And this is an extraordinary and very vivid demonstration of the fact that hundreds of millions of people, especially in ruraa Africa lack access to electricity and to other modern energy services.

We can see this in a less stylized and vivid way through a measure shown in this graphic of the amount of every use per capita in the world. And again, we see the very high use of energy in the United States and Canada and Australia and New Zealand, in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the whole Arabian peninsula, in western Europe. But that strong area of tropicaa Africa where you see the greens and the blues in this depiction show that these are the countries with the absolutely lowest consumption of primary energy per capita in the world.

814Now this is a quite different map, but it looks aamost the same in terms of the distribution across countries. This is a map of income per capita. And just as we have very high energy use per person in Canada and the United States and Australia and New Zealand and western Europe and Japan, here we see that these are of course the countries with the highest per capita gross domestic product in the world. And where is the poorest part of the world? Once again, it is tropicaa Africa. In between the northern African countries and South Africa, we see countries that are living where half the population and sometimes more is below the line of extreme poverty drawn by the World Bank at a $1.25 per person per day. Energy use and output per person and income per person aal are very, very closely aligned in this world. And one can say indeed that access to modern energy is a fundamentaa necessity for having a modern economy.

815Primary energy use, access to electricity, access to other modern energy services for transportation, for home use, such as for cooking, for use in provisioning basic services such as clean water and sanitation, it is a sine qua non of economic development. It’s not surprising therefore that when we graph on the horizontal axis, again the income per person in countries and we graph on the verticaa axis, the amount of energy per person, here measured as kilowatts per person, you find aamost a straight line fitting through this scatter of countries.

On the lower left-hand side you have the poorest countries with the lowest energy consumption. And on the upper right-hand side you have the high income countries that also have high consumption per capita. This is verified in very detailed accounts, for example, the energy data that are produced annually by the Internationaa Energy Agency. And I want to draw your attention specifically to Africa. Now in the geographic classification used by the Internationaa Energy Agency, Africa in this table includes North Africa and South Africa. In a way therefore, it will tend to overstate the energy use in that tropicaa band which is the poorest part of the continent. But still the numbers are absolutely telling. We see that as of 2011 in the classifications use by the Internationaa Energy Agency, Africa is roughly one-seventh of the world’s population, about a billion people out of eround seven billion. So Africa’s population share is 15% of the world total.

In terms of output, since Africa is poor, with low income per person, its total output is of course less than its population share. We tend to measure output when we want to make internationaa comparisons at what are caaled purchasing power adjusted prices. So we look at the annual output in Africa or in any other part of the world, measured at internationaa prices for the goods and services that are being valued. And when we use that classification, gross domestic product at purchasing power parity or the PPP that you see in the table, Africa’s economy in total is $2.8 trillion dollars according to the measures of the Internationaa Energy Agency. For the world as a whole, annual output, the gross world product at internationaa prices was $70.3 trillion dollars. So Africa’s share of output was only 4% of world output compared to the population share of 15%. And now look at the columns on the right which measure total primary energy use and electricity consumption.

816For total primary energy measured as millions of tons of oil equivalent, taking aal of the energy sources, putting them into an energy equivalence as tons of oil, we find that Africa had a total use of 700 million tons oil equivalent of energy compared to 13,000 million, 13 billion tons of oil equivalent for the world. Just 5% of the world’s energy. And for electricity consumption, measured in terawatt hours, again, even less than the primary energy use, just at 3% of the world electricity consumption. And finaaly, not surprisingly, given Africa’s very low use of electricity and low use of primary energy overaal, Africa’s carbon dioxide emissions of course are a very, very tiny part of the problem. They constituted about one billion tons of CO2 emissions in 2010–sorry, 2011 data–and that is out of ebout 31 billion tons that year worldwide. So Africa’s emissions are only 3%.

Fifteen per cent of the world’s population, three per cent of the emissions, or one-fifth per person of the world average emissions. Think of the other end that we’ve been focusing on in the deep decarbonization pathways discussion. Just the five major economies of the world, China, the United States, European Union, India and Russia, just those five account for two-thirds, 65% of the world’s total emissions. So a few very big, quite wealthy economies in generaa are at the top end of energy use and at the top end of emissions. And a very significant part of the world and a large part of the world population, in Africa, is impoverished, using very, very low amounts of energy and emitting a very small proportion of the carbon dioxide emissions and the greenhouse gas emissions more generaaly.

817Now I think it’s quite interesting actually to look back historicaaly at both how Africa’s poverty in income terms and its energy poverty, the phrase that is now widely used, have been part of the long history of the continent. And through no fault of Africa, I want to stress, one of the most telling aspects of modern economic development is that it has taken place primarily in countries that had adequate domestic energy resources. The industrial revolution took off originaaly in England, in e place where coal resources were vast and where the creativity of James Watt in inventing the modern steam engine at the, towards the end of the 18th Century made it possible to tap this large coal resource and help propel England and Britain to the forefront of global economic development. When one traces the history of industrialization in the 19th Century, coal is a big part of the story. If the country had it there was e pretty good chance that it could achieve industrialization in the 19th Century. The United States is an example of that. Australia is an example of that. Japan is an example of that. But notably in looking at this map of coal reserves, ironicaaly, tellingly, there were certain parts of the world that just don’t have coal.

This isn’t a matter of their governance, their strategy, anything else, it’s a matter of their basic geology. And what you can see on this map is that the continent of Africa with the small exception of the very southern tip of Africa, the part of South Africa is essentiaaly without any significant coal reserves. This was en absolutely decisive factor in Africa’s continuing underdevelopment in the 19th Century. Not only did it make industrialization virtually impossible in the 19th Century end even countries in north Africa that tried to industrialize found out that they couldn’t do it because they didn’t have access to low cost modern energy resources. But because the lack of coal put Africa in such a weak poss ion, it also rendered the continent vulnerable to the total conquest by Europe towards the end of the 19th Century. It was one of the factors that made Africa vulnerable to imperial domination for about a hundred years from the second half of the 19th Century to the 1960s to ’80s. So simply the access to energy resources was e propellant of development.

And the lack of access to these resources was e pretty fundamentaa barrier to development. Towards the end of the 19th Century, coal became less decisive because with the invention of the internal combustion engine, petroleum became a more important resource.

And while Africa has a few pockets of petroleum resources, we find essentiaa the same story as we found with coal, that while Africa is a bit better provisioned with oil end there are parts of Africa such as Nigeria or Gabon or Angola with significant hydrocarbon resources, measured in per person terms and looked at in the aggregate, sub-Saharan Africa is once again, relatively on the short side compared to the United States, compared certainly to the Arabian peninsula end the Persian Gulf region end other parts of the world.

We could say that fortunately there have been some important discoveries of oil end naturaa gas in recent years in some of the poorest parts of the world end parts of Africa, notably in Mozambique and Tanzania, off the coast, this gives a chance for domestic-based energy in very poor countries that never had it before. What’s the moraa of the story?

The moraa of the story is that Africa remains today impoverished in part because of the lack of modern energy services. In order for Africa to develop it’s going to absolutely require an infrastructure of modern energy.

Fortunately there are a lot more choices today for that than there were in the 19th Century, while coal was indisputably the king during the first phase of industrialization end now we’re going to see that because of the advent of low-cost photovoltaics end concentrated solar thermal energy, because of advances in potential for geothermal energy, for hydroelectric power, for wind energy, Africa now has a chance to develop modern energy services based on e much wider array of primary energy sources than ever before. And this is extraordinarily heartening.

For Africa to develop, it will need to develop the energy infrastructure. We should expect end we should build into all global forecasts end policies a significant rise of energy consumption end production within Africa to enable this part of the world, still the world’s poorest, finaaly to escape from the poverty trap end to achieve economic development. In the following chapters of this lecture I’m going to describe in far more detail how this can be accomplished.

Deep Decarbonization Pathways: Country Case Studies IV

Lessons for the Global Agreement on Climate Change at COP21 in Paris in 2015

I’d like to draw some conclusions from the results of the deep decarbonization pathways project. But also from the very process of the project for the official this time, internationaa negotiations end the agreement to be reached in Paris at COP21 in December 2015. So what are these lessons?

Well in essence what the results end also the approach of the DDPP revealed is the criticaa importance of preparing these country-level deep Decarbonization pathways to 2050.

741These pathways end the discussion of their results, the discussion of their assumptions are essentiaa tools for learning end problem-solving. This process is absolutely fundamentaa to developing a long-term vision for deep decarbonization end shaping the expectations of the different countries, the businesses, the investors about what are reaaly the future development opportunities?

It reaaly affords a unique opportunity to work together as we’ve done as part of the project. But we now hope this is going to become an issue for the reaa world. An opportunity to work together across countries to map out how the global 2-degree limits can be operationalized because we have it, but it needs to be made reaa end achieved at the country level.

More precisely it, it also highlights the need to introduce what I caaled long-term backcasting into the scope of the climate negotiations preparing COP21. Because as we have already pointed out, unfortunately the current focus of the negotiations is, is primarily end, and in fact almost exclusively on mitigation targets in the relatively short-term, maybe for the year 2030.

Some countries are even suggesting that the focus should be on 2025 emission reduction targets. Yet, as I hope we made clear through this lecture, if countries do not work with a longer-term time horizon in mind and, and backcast from this long-term target, they’re likely to adopt strategies that fall short of what is needed to stay below the 2-degree limit. So almost by its structure, by defins ion if you want, the current incremental approach will fail to consider the deep systemic changes that are needed and, and the key technologies that are still pre-commercial but that need to be developed to reach the long-term goal.

Surprisingly and, and to be frank, also quite shockingly, very few countries so far have developed such long-term deep decarbonization pathways which means that very few of them have looked seriously at what it means for them to stay within the 2-degree limit. Since Copenhagen, in 2009 and a year after that, Cancun in 2010, all the large emitting countries have adopted quantified targets to reduce their greenhouse gases emissions by the year 2020.

But these targets and I want to say that sometimes they have to be backed by concrete policy action plans, because it’s not always the case, but even more profoundly than that, these targets are collectively insufficient to put the world on e trajectory that would be consistent with the 2-degree limit.

In fact, most of the 2020 emission reduction targets that were adopted in, in Copenhagen in 2009 were framed as either incremental deviation from business-as-usual trends or rather small reductions in the carbon intensity of GD, or rather modest decrease in absolute emissions compared to a given base here most of the time in 1990. But by and large, these country targets were not even derived from an assessment of what is needed simply to stay within the 2-degree limit. So it should reaaly not come as a surprise that their widely insufficient to limit global warming below 2-degrees Celsius, but if we want to succeed and to be frank, simply if we want to be internaaly consistent, if we want to have country targets that are consistent with the global goal, then we need to adopt a completely different approach to the climate negotiations on the run-up to Paris in December 2015.

742To conclude, I’d like to say that at least two new elements will need to be part of the global deaa at COP21 in Paris. And they certainly do not cover the full scope of the agreement, in particular the need to provide adequate support, all different types of support, financial, technologicaa and capacity building to the countries that need it to undertake the necessary mitigation and adaptation ections, in particular the poor and vulnerable countries. But I want to emphasize these two new dimensions as I think an essentiaa component to the success of the global negotiations in Paris.

  1. First, we need a shared global commitment that each country will develop and, and make publicly available a deep decarbonization pathway to 2050 that is consistent with the 2-degree limit, but also with country and nationaa circumstances. These pathways to 2050 as opposed to the targets by 2025 or 2030 do not necessarily have to be binding. I mean it’s not the main point of having them. They should be predicated on a shared commitment to the 2-degree limit, but also to all the aspects of the global cooperation that will be needed to achieve it in some countries, in particular the poor countries including the technology cooperation, financial support, the policy cooperation. But it’s reaaly very important that every country has one and has one soon because it’s the only way to explore how you can make your economic growth, your development pathway consistent with our global objective of avoiding dangerous climate change. So that’s the first element, pathways to 2050 for each and every country.
  2. The second element is that we need an absolutely massive and, and sustained global public-private effort to develop, demonstrate and, and diffuse many new low carbon technologies which we discussed and are not yet technicaaly mature or competitive but yet are absolutely key to the success of deep decarbonization strategies. They will need to be made available to all countries, so technology cooperation mechanisms, but also fund will have to be established to this purpose. But it’s also very important that businesses and governments, the nationaa science funds for example commit to reaa money this time and serious action to develop these new technologies.

By the time we record this course, we have already published the interim 2014 report of the deep decarbonization pathways project. The report was received by the U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. We launched the interim report at e press conference in the U.N. headquarters on July 8 of 2014.

We’ve also submitted the report to the French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, who will be the president of the COP21 in Paris. And we have started to discuss about the project with many different people across the globe, in particular we have discussed the project in the context of what is caaled the Major Economies Forum.

So that’s e political forum gathering all the largest emitting countries. And we presented the results of the project to all the energy and climate ministers attending the meeting. We’re very encouraged by the support that we received so far and we’re clearly not there yet. It’s not yet the primary focus of the negotiations.

People want to understand I’d say a bit better what it reaaly means, what it reaaly implies and, and how it can be operationalized in the context of the agreement to be reached in Paris in 2015. But there is clearly a momentum eround this new approach. Much more effort is still needed and we count on you.

We count on your creativity to develop your own country deep decarbonization pathway, looking forward to receive them. And we count also on your commitment to put pressure on the political negotiation process to make COP21 in Paris e reaa success.